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INTRODUCTION;
The object of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate Pakistan's foreign 
policy on selected political questions that arose in the United Nations 
from 1947 to 1968.
Both in this International forum and outside it member states are 
constantly in the process of forming coalitions and blocs. Because there 
is no single Central power, there are competing power groups, shifting 
their composition constantly in an effort to maintain a balance that would 
prevent world control on the part of any group, somewhat analogous to the 
political situation in Pakistan before 1998#
The extent to which Pakistan has participated in such political alignments, 
and the nature of the alignments with which it has been associated, together 
with its influence in these alignments and their influence - if any - on 
Pakistan's foreign policy, constitute a measure of its political role in 
the world community.
This study is not intended as a complete survey or a textbook of Pakistan's 
activities in relation to the United Nations# This would be impossible 
within the scope of a thesis.
Instead, the principles and major developments of Pakistan's foreign policy 
are analysed and then examined in terms of 'selected political issues' of 
great importance dealt with by the United Nations and in which Pakistan 
actively participated# The issues are;
(a) Pakistan's Membership in the United Nations. Immediately, 
after the partition of British India into the Dominions of 
India and Pakistan, there arose the general legal question 
of Pakistan's place as successor in part to the rights and 
duties, national and international of British India as a self- 
governing British Dominion and as a founder member of the 
United Nations.
It/
It is worthwhile to inveetigate the oiroumetanoes and 
events which were responsible for confering the original 
United Nations Membership of British India on the new 
Indian Dominion, The study of this question - though not 
directly associated with other political issues - is use­
ful from an academic point of view, but its practical 
values seem to lie in its influence - as a factor - in 
shaping Pakistan policy towards India*
(b) Admission of new Members*
(c) The Representation of China#
(d) Colonial Questions, i.e. Self-determination, the case of 
Algeria.
(e) Peace-keeping, the questions of Suez and Hungary.
These questions have been selected to present different types of Issues, 
affecting different parts of the world and covering a sufficient period 
of time, to see the effect, if any, on Pakistan's foreign policy, of:
(a) The Cold War, Alliance Politics, particularly United States 
Aid.
(b) Palcistan's power relation with India.
(c) Non-alignment tendencies in Pakistan's policy,
(d) Afro-Asian bloc influences.
(e) Muslim (Islam) influences.
This is done by a study of the Official Records of the United Nations,
i.e. the position taken and the policy views expressed there by the 
representatives of Paidstan on these issues* Examples in the form of 
case studies have been used to show the different kinds of motivations 
which have influenced the voting attitude of Pakistan.
The factors that determine the nature of an International role are 
compounded of a nation's attitude towards itself as a member of the 
International Community and towards other nations and peoples. This 
requires a background loiowledget why Pakistan came to exist, what her 
character is, and why Pakistan maintains certain attitudes in foreign 
affairs./
affairs. The way a country won its independence can effect its whole 
ethos.
Pakistan came into being because 80 million Muslims found themselves in a 
minority in the Indo-Palc sub-continent. They were convinced that under 
the majority rule of the Hindus their culture was in danger of effacement 
and that their economic position, which was low, was not only unlikely to 
rise as rapidly as they desired, but more likely to sink still further. 
They could not accept the Hindu concept of secular equality, because 
Muslims believe sincerely, if somewhat vaguely, in the idea of an Islamic 
State. They demanded that in those parts of British India where they 
were in a majority, they should be allowed to set up their own State.
This was opposed by the Indian National Congress as well as by the British 
Government*
The Congress Party's assertion that it was the only political party which 
represented the Indian masses was challenged by Mohammed Ali Jimiah, who 
claimed that the Muslim League was the watch dog of Muslim interests in 
the sub-continent. The plebiscitary election in 1946 proved Mr, Jinnah'e 
claim; the Muslim League won 46O of the Muslim seats out of a total of 
555 in central and provincial Assemblies,
The Congress opposed partition to the end, but finally accepted when it 
found that the alternative was a Civil War. Britain, on her part, had 
her own considerations for opposing the partition. The United States, 
which was taking over the leadership of the Western bloc from Britain, was 
also not in favour of the division of India. In the larger interests of 
its global strategy, the United States believed that a United India would 
be powerful as a defence against Communism in Asia. In opposition to 
these internal and external forces, Pakistan found its way to independence 
in 1947.
The politics of the sub-continent are, therefore, basically a continuation 
of/
of the old animosities built up during the independence struggle fought 
at cross-purposes by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.
As a result, India and Pakistan have followed divergent foreign policies.
Palcistan'e polioy-malœrs have always laboured under the image of an India 
unreconciled to the creation of Pakistan and ready to do anything, if the 
opportunity presented itself, to undo the partition. As Sir Peroival 
Griffiths has pointed out*
"Pakistan was very conscious of this feeling and 
regarded her powerful neighbour from the outset 
with fear and suspicion, which were strengthened 
by the belief that she had been unjustly treated 
by India in the division of the assets and particu­
larly the military stores of undivided India."
'liny chance that this sucpicion and bitterness 
might gradually fade away", wrote Sir Peroival,
"was destroyed by the Punjab Massacres in 1947*
Every refugee fed the fire of hatred with his own 
tale of horror and brutality, and since India and
Pakistan were now in the main the lands of the
Hindus and Muslims respectively, the mounting 
communal antagonism naturally exacerbated the bad 
feeling between the two countries.
The final cord was cut by the Indian occupation of Kashmir in October 1947*
Now Pakistan was fully convinced that India was bent upon its destruction.
This added to Pakistan's feeling of insecurity and mistrust with respect to 
India.
Whatever might be the outward semblance, "a cardinal underlying purpose
of Indian policy", said Michael Breoher, "was to keep her smaller neighbours
2weak and isolated, for eventual reabsorption." "Pakistan does feel", says 
Professor Quincy Wright, "that India has its eye out for re-annexation of 
Pakistan."^/
1. Sir Peroival Griffiths, Modem India, (London: Ernest Penn Limited,
1962), p.165.
2. Michael Breoher, in Selig S. Harrison (ed.), India and the United 
States. (New York: Macmillan, I961), p.55*
5Pakistan#*'  ^ "As late as I965", stated Professor Frank N. Trager, "Nehru 
regarded Pakistan as an area which should be reincorporated into an Indian 
dominated confederation."^
As a small nation in comparison with India, Pakistanis always regard them­
selves vulnerable to their old Hindu foe. This fear of insecurity, the 
problem of survival, has been the focal point around which the foreign 
policy of Pakistan has revolved. This fear has dominated foreign, defence 
and economic policy. It has always been the major objective of Pakistan's 
foreign policy to search for friends who would be able to help Pakistan 
counterbalance India's power superiority on the sub-continent and support 
it in its various Indo-Pakistanl disputes, the foremost of which being 
Kashmir.
It would, however, be an over simplification to say that there is no other 
consideration in Pakistan's foreign policy than the fear of India. There 
is, of course, the genuine desire to promote friendly relations with new 
nations of Asia and Africa and particularly with the Muslim countries.
Like many other new nations of Asia and Africa, Pakistan feels a deep sense 
of sympathy towards the aspirations of the people under colonial rule.
Thus, Pakistan has constantly and vigorously supported the causes of 
dependent people for self-determination.
Finally, it can be said that Palcistan's policy attitude in the United Nations 
can be viewed on the basis of her past Colonial existence and the treatment 
of Muslims by the British in British India, the tragedies attending parti­
tion, her youth as a nation, her geographic duality; the fact that she is a 
predominantly/
5. Quincy Wright, in Selig S. Harrison (ed.), Op.cit., p.55
4. Frank N. Trager, "The United States and Pakistan i a failure of 
Diplomacy", in Orbis. Vol.IX, No.5., 1965, p.626.
6predominantly Muslim society and extremely aware of this, her membership 
in the "Asian" world, the nature of her neighbours and near neighbours and 
the low economic status of her people and her dependence, on other nations 
to improve their lot.
The first chapter to follow, which covers the partition of India, provides 
the background to Pakistan's policy in the United Nations, The following 
five chapters are analyses of Pakistan's position on selected issues that 
were considered by the United Nations from 1947 to 1968, Finally, a con­
cluding chapter summarises the experiences and lessons of Palcistan's policies,
CHAPTER I
A. Origin of Pakistan
Palcistan oame into being on 15 August, 1947* after the partition of the 
British Empire in India,
Muslim separatism was the result of the historical incidents that shaped 
the Muslim outlook with regard to their position in predominantly Hindu 
India after the establishment of British control.
One factor was the cultural and religious differences of Hindus and Muslims, 
In spite of living in close physical association for many centuries, a 
Hindu-Mualim cultural synthesis was not achieved. As a Pakistani author 
has stated:
" The encounter between Hindu and Muslim cultures that
began over a thousand years ago has profoundly
influenced both. They have met at a thousand points,
on battlefields and festivals, around market places
and in homes, on spiritual heights and in the lowlands
of mundane affairs# They have learnt from each other,
inter-acted with each other, and penetrated each other;
................     In
styles of dress and in ways of living they have left
their mark on each other. And yet they have remained
distinct with an emphasis on their separateness. They
have mixed but never fused, they have co-existed but have
never become one *..... . ........ .
........         The
clothes, the food, the household utensils, the layout of
homes, the manner of speech, the words of salutation, the
postures, the gestures, everything about them will be
different and will immediately point to their origin.
These outer differences are only the reflection of an
1inner divergence, "
In the West, religious differences had been submerged in the development 
of/
1, Ch. Mohammed Ali, The Emer/Rrenoe of Pakistan (New York; Colombia 
University Press, 19^)1 p.l." ' ""
of national cultures, but nothing of this kind happened in India.
Social and religious differences between the Hindus and the Muslims were 
so acute and fundamental that they raised a "Chinese wall" between the two 
communities and even seven hundred years of close residence (including two 
hundred of common servitude) have failed to raaice the least crack in that 
solid and massive structure.
Another factor was the loss of Muslim political power with the complete 
take-over by the British in 1857* The Hindus easily adjusted to their new 
masters and adapted themselves to Western education. Hut the Muslims, who 
had lost political power, could not reconcile themselves to British rule, 
and this resulted in the stagnation of their community. The Muslims were 
lagging behind the Hindus in modem education and in adjusting to new 
professions. In view of this backimrdness and the fact of Hindu numerical 
superiority, Muslims were convinced that the Hindus would dominate repre­
sentative Institutions in British India and eventually in Free India.
The possibility of such a Hindu Raj frightened Muslims who had strong 
traditions of rule in the country, particularly rule èver the Hindus.
Between 1857 and 1940 the Muslim Community reacted to these conditions to 
protect their interests.
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan stated the Aligarh Movement, which sought to protect 
Muslim interests by initiating cultural reforms and by staying aloof from 
the Hindu dominated Congress Party and its politics.
Sir Syed Ahmed Khan asserted that there were"2 nations" in India; a Hindu 
Nation and a Muslim Nation and that the political ambitions of the two 
nations were different. He had speculated on a possible struggle for 
power in the event of a transfer of sovereignty to Indian hands.
As he mentioned, "it is possible that under these circumstances two nations 
the/
the Mohanimedan and Hindu - could sit on the same throne and remain equal
in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should
conquer the other and thrust it down. To hope that both could remain equal
2is to desire the impossible and the inconceivable."
The question was largely academic at that time, but it contained within it 
the seeds of Pakistan. As we shall see later, the struggle for Pakistan 
was based on the two-nation theory.
The second phase starts from the partition of Bengal in 1905* The partition 
was undertaken by Lord Curzon as a step towards administrative efficiency, 
yet it was branded by the Hindus as a British-Muslim conspiracy against their 
community. The reaction of the Hindu community towards this partition in 
miniature was a signal of alarm for the Muslims in India. It alerted the 
Muslims to protect their own rights. The success of the Muslim deputation 
at Simla in I906, asking for a separate Electorate, encouraged the Muslims; 
with the following assurance by Lord Minto, "I am entirely in accord with 
you", he said, "I am as firmly convinced as I believe you to be, that any 
electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure 
which aimed at granting a personal enfranchisement, regardless of the beliefs
5
and traditions of the communities composing the population of this continent."
In their official communication to the Secretary of State in October I9O8, 
the Government of India recommended that the Muslims should be granted 
separate electorate* "The Indian Muhammedans", they averred, "are much 
more than a religious body. They form in fact an absolutely separate com­
munity distinct by marriage, food and customs and claiming in many cases to 
belong to a different race from the Hindus."^
2. C.H. Philips, ed., The Evolution of India and P aids tan 1858-194-7. 
Selected Documents (London: ' Oxford Hniverelt^ , I962),
pp. 188-189.
3. Cited in Syed Razi Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist 
Movement 1905 to 1910 (Oxford: ClareMon"¥re"ssT96"4T, P* 166V
4. Cited in V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Calcutta: 
Orient Longman, 1957), p.10.
10
This resulted in the formation of the "All India Muslim League" to serve 
as the Chief Muslim political organ and a watch dog of Muslim interests.
The coming of political reforms » the "Morley-Minto Reform" - increased the
Hindu-Muslirn differences as the Muslims sought to protect their interest 
through such constitutional devices as a separate electorate.
" This concession to the Muslims of a separate
electorate marks the beginning of the Hindu
Muslim conflict in its twentieth century form
of a struggle for political power# Some
foreigners and even some Indians have talcen it
at its face value as a religious conflict, such
as the world has hardly seen for over two
5centuries."
But if religion and histo2^  were the only factors in the Hindu-Muslim conflict 
of the twentieth century, it would be hard to explain why, during the previous 
century, in spite of sporadic communal riots and a certain amount of bickering 
the two communities had on the whole lived fairly peacefully side by side.
' The reason is, of course, that the political 
element had not yet been injected into the 
conflict. The Government, neither Hindu nor 
Muslim, would arbitrate in the religious quarrels 
of the two communities. Its neutrality was the 
result of its being both alien and autocratic.
Hence the communities had nothing political to 
quarrel about.
As soon as there was any prospect of even a limited transfer of power, there 
arose the question of who would inherit the power, which the British would 
relinquish.
The conclusion of the Lucknow Oongress-League Pact of I9I6 - in which
Congress conceded to the Muslims demand for communal representation - proved 
only/
5. E.V/.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India 1945“47 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin L t d . 1^65 /, pp. 12-13,
6. Ibid., p.14.
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only a temporary relief in Hindu-Muslim relations. Moreover, the 
enthusiasm of the 1920-22 Khilafat - non-oooperation died shortly after 
the Turkish Government's declaration for the abolition of the Caliphate.
The Moplah rebellion in Malahar, though started against the Government, 
took a violently anti-Hindu turn and lighted a spark that set in motion 
a train of communal riots in different cities of India.
This broke the backbone of Hindu-Muslim co-operation and relations,there­
after, never regained the same friendliness. Many attempts were made for 
a rapprochement between the Congress and the Muslim League, through the 
Nehru Report, All Parties Conference, Simon Commission, The Round Tables, 
and the Communal Award, but all proved futile.
Even Clement Attlee - who later as British Prime Minister assented to the
partition of India - as a member of the Simon Commission expressed doubts
about Indian Unity. In the course of interview he said -
"You have to see the place and smell it and talk with 
people of every kind before you realise the strength 
the Indians have on the one hand and the extraordinary 
amount of minority opinion (the Muslims) that exists 
in that country on the other. On the Simon Commission 
everywhere we went the minority always claimed they 
would be oppressed unless they had special represen­
tation.   .......     By
the time you had added up all the special representations
they wanted, the majority ended up with about five per
cent. As a matter of fact, the unity of India was really
due to Britain. They talked of some semi-mythical King 
hundreds of years ago, but it was British rule that United 
India."?
Finally, the last instalment of political reforms - which provided separate 
representation/
7. Francis Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers (London* Heineman,
1961), pp.203-204.
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representation to the minorities - was passed by the British Parliament, 
as the Government of India Act 1935*
After the election of early 1937 " oo the basis of the Government of India 
Act 1935 “ the Congress Party came to power in seven out of the eleven 
provinces*
The treatment meted out to the Muslim Community in the short rule of the 
Congress Ministries - 1937 *" October 1939 •* worked as a lighting flash 
on the Muslim mind throghout India. V/hat had been a suspcion before, now 
became a certainty. The Congress as a Hindu-dominated body was bent 
upon the eventual absorption of Muslims.
"All sorts of petty pressures and harassment
aimed against Muslims began to be alleged.
School children were instructed to worship
Mr, Gandhi's portrait with folded hands in
the Hindu manner, and to sing "Bande Mataram"
a Hindu national ditty. Beef eating was
actively discouraged; also the Urdu language
and script; the best appointments always
went to the Hindus; the police sided with,
8the Hindus during ribts and so on."
Jinnah - now the undisputed leader of the Muslim League - set out to preserve
the culture of the Muslim Community against suffocation by militant Hinduism,
which was using the ballot box as a tool and concealing itself behind Congress
9Party’s secular cloak. Jinnah expressed his feeling in 1939» "In my
judgment ........ democracy can only mean Hindu Raj all over India: to
this Muslims will never submit
When/
8. Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London; Ernest Benn Ltd., 1963)» p.77*
9. Pandit Nehru himself admitted that many a Congressman was 
cortmunalist under a national oloalc. See Jawaharlal Nehru, An 
Autobiography (London* The Bodley Head, 1958)* p.136.
10. Cited in Keith B. Gallard, PaJÿistan* A Political Study, (London* 
George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1957)» p.199»
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When the Congress Ministries resigned in October 1939» Muslim League 
rejoiced and called on Muslims throughout India to observe December 22 
as a 'day of thanlts-glving and deliverance' from the tyranny, oppression 
and injustice of the Congress Governments* "This bitterness", writes Sir 
Peroival Griffiths "had its inevitable reaction on Muslim constitutional 
thought* Up to now the Muslims had been prepared to depend for their 
protection on "weightage" or "safeguards"* By 1939» they were convinced 
that, whatever safeguards might be designed, an Indian Federation in which 
the centre retained substantial power would in fact mean Hindu dominations.^^ 
This had considerable impact on their demand for a separate State.
These events resulted in the demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims
of India. . The Muslim League held its historic session in Lahore on 23rd
March, 194C. In his Presidential Address, Jinnah said, "Islam and Hinduism
are not religions, in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different
and distinct social orders, and it is only a dream that the Hindus and the
12Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality,"
He declared that democracy was unsuited to India; that the Muslims are a 
nation, according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their 
homelands, their territory and their State.
The following resolution, which came to be Imoi-m as the "Pakistan Resolution" 
was passed:
Resolved that it is the considered view of this 
Session of the All India Muslim League that no 
constitutional plan would be workable in this 
country or be acceptable to the Muslims unless 
it is designed on the following basic principles, 
namely , that geographically contiguous units are 
demarcated into regions which should be so 
constituted with such territorial adjustments as 
mby /
11. Sir Peroival Griffiths, The British Impact on India (London, 
Macdonald, 1952), p.341,
12. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Ml*. Jinnah. 
(Lahore: Ashraf, 1952)» p.138.
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may be necessary, that the areas in which the 
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in 
the North-west and Eastern zones of India should 
be grouped to constitute 'Independent States', 
in which the constituent units shall be autonomous 
and sovereign.
Mr. Setalvad, who himself was a staunch opponent of Pakistan, suras up its 
origin as follows*
" The real parentage of the Polcistan Movement can be 
traced to the Congress leaders, who, by the vjrong 
way in which they handled the Communal questions 
and by their behaviour when they were in power, 
created great distrust in the minds of the Muslim 
Community which has driven them to advocate Paiiistan.
In the beginning, Congress leaders said that there was 
no Communal problem in India and if there was, it 
could be settled after India got independence, for­
getting that for the very purpose of getting indepen­
dence, communal unity was essential. Then there is 
the tragic perversity which the congress displayed 
when they assumed office under the Act of 1935
        They dealt xmjustly with the Muslim
Community and made them hostile."
The rest of the tale may be quickly told. During 1940 to 1945 8, series 
of negotiations and proposals were shipwrecked on the rook of Hindu-Muslim 
differences. The Cripps Mission of April, 1942, though it ended in failure, 
nevertheless advanced the cause of Pakistan. For the first time, the 
British Government recognised the right of individual provinces to stay out 
of the proposed Indian Union and form a separate federation.
The Gandhi-Jinnah talk of 1944 end the Simla Conference of 1945 were dead­
locked on the communal problem.
In/
13. Ghimanlal H. Setalvad, Recollections and Reflections. (Bombay: 
Padma Publications, 1947), p.414»
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In the plebiscitaay election which followed in 1946, the Muslim League 
emerged with resounding success. It won 460 out of the 555 Muslim seats 
in the Central and Provincial Assemblies. It proved the truth of its 
counterclaim against the Congress, that there were, in fact, two political 
parties in India.
A Cabinet Mission came to India in March 1946, and after its failure to 
reach an agreement with the Congress and the Muslim League, it announced 
its own plan on 16 May, 1946. The Cabinet Mission rejected the Muslim 
League's demand for a sovereign state of Pakistan as "impracticable and 
unworkable". The Muslim League called the Mission's arguments as 
"unwarranted, unjustified and unconvincing". Nevertheless, it accepted 
the plan with certain reservations. But it was asked to join the Interim 
Government, only when it demonstrated its effectiveness by 'Direct Action* 
to the British Government as well as to the Congress. In the words of 
H.V. Hodson,
"   the Great Calcutta Killing (an experiment
in direct action) set in train a sequence of 
catastrophes which did not end until many more 
thousands had died of communal violence and 
revenge throughout India and Falcistan, indeed which 
might be said even now to be continuing in the 
Indo-Pakistanl confrontation.
The Interim Government was a strange combination of negative forces, because 
the Congress and the Muslim League were working for their ovm ends.
The Labour Government in Britain felt that in such circumstances, a bold 
policy was needed to save the situation. Prime Minister Attlee, announced 
on 20th February, in the House of Commons, the appointment of Lord Moun that ten 
as new Viceroy and set as June 1948 the time limit for the British withdrawal, 
following the transfer of power.
Although/
14* H.V. Hodson, The Great Divide. (London; Hutchison, I969), pp.l67-l68.
16
Although the British Government was in favour of granting protection to 
the minorities, it was from the very beginning in favour of a United India* 
As a British writer remarked;
" What is strange in the whole Pakistan controversy, 
is not the support which it is slowly gaining among 
all realistic men, but the opposition which it still 
evokes from sincere well-wishers of India* This is, 
of course, due to the strength and persistence of 
Congress propaganda, backed by Hindu big business *
The Hindus have almost a monopoly of propaganda* By 
subtle and persistent suggestions they have managed 
to persuade the world that they are "India" and that 
any attempt to divide "India" is a 'wicked plot on 
the part of British' acting on the well established 
principle of 'divide and rule'.
Most liberals of the West have fallen for this propa­
ganda hook, line and sinker# Consequently, we have 
the extraordinary spectacle of 'advanced* British 
politicians rising to their feet in the House of 
Commons, and solemnly and sincerely pleading the 
cause of Indian 'Unity* in the joint cause of Indian 
freedom - sublimely ignorant of the fact that their 
insistence on this so-called 'Unity' is the one and
only thing that keeps the British in the saddle; Unite
15and rule, Divide and quit, "
In the words of Z.A# Bhutto:
" The age of Colonialism with its prescription of 'divide 
and rule' was giving way to the era of neo-colonialism, 
which required the enforcement of the new formula of 
'Unite and Rule’. The changed conditions and the 
corresponding demands of neo-colonialism required the Unity 
of the sub-continent for the maximum exploitation of larger 
markets and for defence against the incursions of 
Communism# It was feared that to divide the sub-continent 
would/
15# Beverley Nichols, Verdict on India (Londons Jonathan Cape, 1944)
P.195.
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woi£Ld be to 'divide and lose'; that access to 
the vast raw material markets would be impeded, 
and the defence of the region weakened against 
the age-old Russiara ambition to control the sub­
continent and the Indian Ocean. On the basis of
this appreciation, the British resisted partition 
16to the end. "
When Lord Mount bat ten arrived in India, he found the country faced with a 
desperate situation, in that government was paralysed by mounting lawless­
ness and communal warfare* In view of this grave situation, Moun that ten 
ultimately decided in favour of what Lord Wavell called a 'major surgical 
operation'.
On June 3rd was announced a plan for the partition of India. The Indian 
Independence Act, which was passed by the British Parliament On 16th July,
1947? brought into being the two new dominions, i.e. India and Pakistan, 
after the transfer of power on 15th August, 1947*
It should be noted that Congress leaders had always opposed the partition of 
'Bharat Mata' - The Holy Motherland. They agreed to Palcistan only when 
it became clear tO them that partition was inevitable, because the alternative 
was a civil war. They never really approved the two-nation theory. They 
accepted partition on the basis of some kind of territorial self-determination, 
"It was perfectly clear", said Nehru, "even as late as 1950» that it was 
quite impossible to divide it (India) on the basis of separating religious 
groups on one side or the other. They overlapped. So it was clearly 
understood that those communities which became the minority communities on 
this side or that must have the fullest protection and fullest security of 
their lives; otherwise the whole (secular) structure which we had built up 
collapsed."
16. %.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969)» p.52.
17. Nehru's speech in Indian Parliament,March 17, 1950, Parliamentary 
Debates, Part S.2. III. 5*50/821 (Nex-r Delhi: Government of India,
1950), p.1700.
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The acceptance of partition was, thus, a matter of bitter expediency, in 
the hope and expectation that the new State would not be viable and would 
collapse under pressure from its large and more powerful neighbour,. There­
fore, there had been grounds for mutual suspicion and distrust between the 
two new States*
Dr. Rajendra Prasad - who later became the President of India - wrote in 
1946:
" ...... whatever the position might be as far as
the Muslims are concerned the Hindus and Sikhs 
have declared their unequivocal determination to
resist partition  ....... ....... .
...............  It is difficult to forecast
what èhape this conflict may take in the future.
One thing is certain: partition is not likely to
be attained with the goodwill of those most 
concerned, and this ill-will is bound to persist 
on both sides, even if the proposal succeeds, even 
after the separation is effected. Distrust which 
is the basis of the proposal is bound to grow and 
any hope that after separation things will settle 
down and the Independent States will become friendly 
will have been built on sand
The prophecy of Dr. Prasad has proved true, in that relations between India 
and Pakistan since partition have never become friendly.
18. Rajindra Prasad, India Divided (Bombay: Hind Kltabs, 1947),
p.337. -------- -
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B .The Basis of Pakistan*8 Foreign Policy:
The politics of the Indian sub-continent are basically a continuation of 
the old animosities built up during the independence struggle fought at 
cross-purposes by the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. 
Congress sought a united, free and secular India. The Muslim League 
wanted to divide India on communal lines. This had demanded the develop­
ment of opposite habits of thought and action among the leaders of the two 
parties. These contrasts of style and attitude have been translated into 
the national foreign policies of the two countries, after partition.
There were those in India and elsewhere who disbelieved the possibility of 
the survival of Pakistan, even under favourable conditions, and actual 
conditions were far from favourable, for Pakistan was born in chaos. As
such, it (a) had to prove its viability, military and economic which was
widely doubted in 1947, (b) had to find a place in the community of 
nations, (c) had to establish an identity and role in the International 
system different from that of India, and (d) had to secure (i.e. other 
States) from it environments, the essential means of sustenance.
Every state pursues its foreign policy in accordance with its national 
interests. Pakistan's national interests in relation to its foreign 
policy may be treated under three headings: Security, Ideology and
Economic Development.
(l) Security, the problem of survival :
Obviously, the most vital consideration for any country is the maintenance
of its security and freedom. For Pakistan, this objective was of paramount 
Importance, because it was born in a gloomy and hostile environment. 
Moreover, some sections in the Congress resented partition and accepted 
Pakistan/
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Pakistan with mental reservation? in the hope that ultimately, Palcistan 
will come back to 'Mother India'* As Keith Gallard states, "Many Indians 
feel that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistalce which might still 
be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned,
Sardar V, Patel, Deputy-Prime Minister of India, in his message on India's
First Independence Day, referred to "the bitterness and sorrow which
partition has brought to those who cherished unity", and expressed "the
full hope and confidence that sooner or later we shall again be united in
20common allegiance to our country,"
The political leaders in Palcistan were veiy conscious of this fear. ^n
the words of a Palcistani author, "the ruling passions in Pakistan's foreign
policy, a passion which has influenced its behaviour towards all other
21countries, has always been the fear of India."
Pakistan's foreign policy objectives have revolved round its power 
relationship with India and the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir* The 
primary objective of Pakistan's foreign policy can be termed the search 
for security against India, i.e. the search for moral and material support, 
from whichever quarter possible to counterpoise and neutralize the presumed 
Indian threat to its security.
Whether this presumption of a threat from India existed or not, it cannot 
be denied that the image of an aggressive India has always influenced the 
makers of Palcistan's foreign policy. It is the image that matters, rather 
than/
19. Keith Gallard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy i an Interpretation. 
(Hew York, Institute of Pacific Relations1957^,19*^1»  ^^
20. Amrita Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 15 August, 1947»
21. Khalid Bin, Sayeed, "Pakistan and China : the Scope and Limits 
of Convergent policies", in A.M. Halpem, ed., Policies towards 
China : views from six Continents (Hexf York, H.yT7~ 1965)^
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than the reality which might or might not coincide with the image*
The history of Indo-Pakistan relations shows that the fear Of the policy
maker in Palcistan with respect to India was genuine. For, India had made
every effort to make it difficult for Pakistan to exist. India first
refused and then delayed the despatch of military assets and financial
balances which had fallen to Palcistan's share# India diverted the water
of the Ravi in 1948* She refused to accept Pakistan's decision of not
devaluing her currency and suspended all trade in 1949* She announced
her intention to control and utilize the x-faters of the three eastern rivers,
thus turning West Pakistan into a desert. The conclusion is that India
wants to see Palcistan weak economically as well as militarily, so that when
the opportunity is present, it can annex Pakistan to the Indian Union
through a so-called "police action". As Michael Breoher, while commenting
on relations betx^ een Pakistan and India has observed,
" The relatioîB between India and Pakistan since
the partition of 1947 have been characterised
by extreme tensions much of the time, tension
almost all the time, economic blockade on one
occasion ..... periodic threats of war and
continuous ideological and political warfare
which have produced, to put it mildly, a
shambles in the relationship between these two 
P?
countries.""
The Times remarked that Indian foreign policy "amounts to little more than
23the containment of Pakistan."
The major events in this chain, which helped to shape Pakistan's foreign 
policy orientation with respect to India were the massacres of the Punjab 
at the time of partition and the Indian occupation of Kashmir in October, 
1947.
22. Michael Breoher, in Selig S. Harrison (ed.), India and the United 
States, (hew York : Macmillan, I96I), p*53*
25. The Times. Jxme 2, 1956*
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This led Paidstan to spend a great deal from its "budget for the consoli­
dation of defence and thus sustaining national integrity and other inter­
national rights. The basic motivation of Pakistan’s foreign policy has, 
therefore, always been to secure a position of strength vis-a-vis India, 
This was the rationale behind her alliance with the United States and her 
membership of Western sponsored military pacts.
25
Ideology;
The second vital factor in Palcistan’s foreign policy is that of National 
Ideology, Pakistan’s ideology is based upon the principles of Islam,
Islam demands submission to the will of God. The implication of this, 
if rightly grasped, will clearly show what characteristics mark out an 
Islamic state from other types of states. Allegiance to God and submission 
to his will means willingness to accept the moral principles and ethical 
values implicit in the idea of an omnipotent and omniscient God, and to 
operate them in every branch of life, irrespective of material considerations.
To be brief, Islamic principles encompass a sense of human unity stemming 
from the idea of the organic wholeness of life instead of its division into 
watertight compartments, Islam believes in freedom, equality, fraternity, 
tolerance and social justice. There is no room for theocracy, because 
Islam stands for freedom of conscience, condemns coercion, has no priest­
hood and abhors the caste system and racial discrimination. It believes 
in equality of opportunity and equality before law, with an independent 
judiciaxy and an unalloyed rule of law, prevention of concentration of 
wealth in a few hands, elimination of all forms of social stratification 
and tyranny so that status is determined by Character and not by birth or 
wealth; a greater sense of duty and responsibility than of rights, and a 
balance between the acquisitive urge of the individual and the collective 
good of the society; tolerance and goodwill towards people of other faiths, 
active sympathy for the wealc and the needy, and respect for the individual 
coupled with readiness on the part of the individual to sacrifice himself 
when the integrity of the society is thz'eatened; and a constant conscious­
ness of the moral content of all actions, even the most mundane, and the 
need to subordinate all else to it* The Islamic State may, in modern 
terminology, be called a Welfare State, worked on ethical principles 
designed/
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designed to ensure the halanoed progress of the people.
This ideology was the bedrock on which the Muslim League built a separate 
homeland for the Muslims* It means that Pakistan is religiously, cul- 
turaly and emotionally allied to other Muslim countries of the world*
This feeling of special affinity with other Muslim States, was one of the 
directive principles of foreign policy laid doim. in the 19$6 Constitution, 
that the "State should endeavour to strengthen the bonds of unity among 
Muslim countries". Moreover, public opinion in Pakistan has always goaded 
the government to support the Muslim nations in all their quarrels with 
other nations.
At Pakistan’s initiative, an organisation, The Hu’tamar-i-Alam-i- Islami 
(World Muslim Conference) held two conferences in Karachi in 1949 and 1991* 
Pakistan also sponsored the International Islamic Economic Conference, 
which held its first session at Karachi in November 1949* It was attended 
by 18 Muslim countries* The conference set up the International Islamic 
Economic Organisation, which held a few more conferences and then disinte­
grated. But the recent conference at Rabat of Muslim Heads of States has 
again kindled the long cherished Pakistani hope for Muslim unity*
Paid8tan has always supported eveiy Muslim cause at the United Nations and
elsewhere* Palcistan’s vehement opposition to the partition of Palestine
by the United Nations (Resolution) was the starting point of Pakistan’s
support for the Muslim cause* Sir Zafrulla Khan spealcing in the General
Assembly of the United Nations on the question of Palestine declared,
" The so-called State of Israel was the culmination 
of a course of the most insidious aggression carried 
on and persisted in during the course of a third of 
a century, contrary to all the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, including the 
principle/
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principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples. It was now proposed to stamp that 
culmination with the approval of the United Nations,
The Pakistan representative wished to offer a solemn 
warning that setting up of the State of Israel in 
Palestine would mean the introduction of a canker into 
the body politics of the Middle East, which would 
eventually either have to be ejected through a surgical 
operation or else would poison the culture, economic 
security and policy, not only of the Middle East, but 
of vast areas beyond that region. Militant Zionism 
was the spear-head of a new aggression of the West 
against the East and it was idle to pretend or to hope 
that it would not sooner or later exact from both the 
West and the East the Inevitable penalties that always 
followed upon aggression. He called upon the Assembly 
to pause and reflect while there was yet time.
He wondered what would be the attitude of the represen­
tatives of the Nations of the West both in Europe and 
in America if it were a case of the Easv. seeking to set 
up in the heart of the West a sovereign Independent 
State for the benefit of the East, however much the 
establishment of such a State might be supported by the 
kind of consideration which had been advanced in the case 
of the so-called State of Israel, He wished in all 
humility, but in all earnestness to remind and warn the 
assembled nations that at no time and under no circum­
stances would the East over assimilate or reconcile 
itself to a sovereign State of Israel, With Je\rry as 
such the East had no quarrel; it had indeed deep sympathy 
with the sufferings of the Jewish race, but the proposed 
State of Israel offered no solution, either economic or 
political of the problems facing the Jewish people. The 
insistence upon the establishment of a sovereign State of 
Israel in Palestine which would help to solve more of the 
problems of the Jewish people, was bound to create and 
intensify many complicated problems and it might not be 
possible to solve them through peaceful means. He again 
urged/
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urged the Assembly to pause and reflect while
2dthere was yet time, "
PaidBtan* s support for Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria,, Indonesia,
Egypt in their hour of need, and at present in the Arab-Israeli war is 
an open secret* Pakistan has always sustained hopes for Islamic unity 
but the emergence of Qamal Masser as an Arab Nationalist has hindered the 
promotion of this idea*
There is an important question; whether Pakistan’s support for the Muslims 
is motivated by Ideological considerations or by national interest. The 
answer is that both are important factors* The hard fact of Palîistan’s 
birth Induces it to support the Muslims in other parts of the world. But 
the second seems to be more pragmatic. For, Palfistan, being the biggest 
Muslim country, has been and still is, looking forvjard for the leadership 
of the Muslim bloc* This could give Pakistan ample scope for manœuvering 
in its dealings with the two power blocs, because of the geo-political 
importance of the area covered by the Muslim world, especially the Middle 
East, where lie the greatest oil resources of the world*
Moreover, a solid Muslim bloc in the United Nations could be a major force 
and affect the bloc politics. But, as stated above, the only possible 
Internal rival is %ypt, and, externally, the Christian world and the Soviet 
Union* alike, are quite sensitive to it and disapprove any such move.
24* United Nations General Assembly Official Records. $rd Session, 
Part I, 149th Plenary Meeting, 27 September, 1948, p#212. 
(Hereafter cited as G.A.O.R.).
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EconomlQ Development;
The third objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is rapid economic develop­
ment* Pakistan is an underdeveloped countxy whose natux*al resources have 
yet to be exploited* Its severely limited finance and the low level of 
her income are serious curbs on her economic progress* Indigenous capital, 
public or private, is insufficient* Thus, the only alternative is to get 
foreign aid; therefore, the foreign policy is closely tied up with the 
urgency of economic development*
In 1947 Pakistan had some raw materials but practically no factories, 
because all of them were in the area now forming the Indian Union* Thus 
Pakistan started to supply raw materials, mainly jute and cotton, to India*
In 1949 as a result of the devaluation of sterling by Britain, India also 
devalued its rupee and asked Pakistan to do so* But Pakistan did not 
follow* The immediate effect was that the Indo-Pakistan trade came to an 
abrupt end* Threatened with economic strangulation, Pakistan made indus­
trialisation a "national interest"* Muslims who were feudal in outlook and 
tradition and deficient in skills of commerce, trade, banlcing, insurance, 
and manufacture, suddenly found great hidden talents for just these activities 
under the impact of national interest- The Korean War boom in raw material 
prices made Pakistan a hard currency area and cushioned the blow of the 
’rupee war* * The decision in 1949 not to devalue Pakistani rupee, econo­
mically right or not, paid handsome political dividends*
Tiie policy of industrialisation was pursued with a vigour unmatched in Asia 
and Africa, outside China and Japan. The political effect by way of 
economic determinism was revolutionary* By winning the edonomic war 
against India, Pakistan demonstrated its ability to adjust to change.
Prime Minister Liaqat All Khan’s speeches, during his visit to the United 
States/
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States and Canada in 1958, made it clear that at least ideologically
25Pakistan was pro-West and stressed the need for economic assistance*
26Later, Pakistan secured massive economic aid from the United States*, 
which was needed to put Pakistan’s industrial development on a par with 
India in the shortest possible time*
Keeping in view these national interests, Pakistan started its national 
with
existence/an independent foreign policy. A fair statement of this was made 
by Mr, Llaqat All Khan in March 1951 •
"Pakistan," he said, "was neither tied to the apron-
strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was it a
camp follower of the Communist bloc* It steered
clear from the inter bloc rivalry, and had an
absolutely independent foreign policy* Pakistan
had all along been uninfluenced by the inter bloc
struggle going on in the world and had supported the
cause which it considered to be just. The records
of the United Nations debates bear testimony to this
fact. Sometimes we agreed with the Western bloc and
sometimes with the Communist bloc, as the situation
and matter under discussion demanded, Pakistan
could pursue such an independent course because it was
not under the obligation of any foreign power. We
have not been assisted by any country in the world and
whatever we have achieved has been through our own.
resources. Therefore, the question of subservience
27in foreign policy did not arise. " '
25* Liaqat All Khan, Pakistans the Heart of Asia (Cambridge, Mass* ; 
Harvard Uhitersity^Preas%19587T"P'Ï2T""^ ™ ^^
26, The United States Economic Assistance between 1947 to 58 June, I965, 
amounted to billion, and Military Aid from 1954 to I965, /l*5 
2 billion. Quoted from Prank W, Trager, "The United States and 
Pakistan ; A Failure of Diplomacy", Orbls, IX, Ho,3*9 19&5* P*623*
27* Dawn (Karachi), 9 March, 1951*
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CHAPTER II
PAKISTAN’S MEMBERSHIP Bl THE UI^ ITED NATIONS
Under the circumstances narrated in the previous chapter, Pakistan came 
into being without any clear-cut legal International position.
The manner in which the transfer of power was effected by the Viceroy 
betrayed prejudice against Pakistan, No attempt was made to provide 
Pakistan with the minimum requirements for administration, defence and 
finance.
Referenda were held in the North West Frontier Province and in the districts 
of Sylhet in East Bengal, The result in both cases was overifhelmingly in 
favour of Pakistan, Kalat was advised to declare its independence along 
with the adjacent territories of Baluchistan, The Punjab was partitioned 
and in violation of the principle of partition according to the composition 
of population in contiguous regions, vast Muslim populated territories 
stretching up to the fringes of Amsitsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozpur were arbi­
trarily handed over to India, Assam was relinquished, Bengal partitioned, 
and India was granted corridors alllowing access to Jammu and Kashmir in the 
North and to Assam and Tripura in the East, The British Indian Govemimnt 
took evei^ possible opportunity to increase the imbalance against Paidstan. 
In no instance was the benefit of the doubt given to Pakistan in the 
division of territory or its other claims. The effect of British policy 
was to punish the Muslims for winning self-determination by giving them a 
weak and emasculated Pakistan,
This attitude of the Viceroy had been attributed partly to his personal 
contempt for Mr, Jinnah and partly to Mr, Jinnali’s decision to become the 
first Governor-General of Pakistan, in place of Mountbatten,
In/
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In the words of Ian Stephen,
" whatever the decision's causes, it did not smooth 
the path towards partition* Israay describes it 
as *a blow we had all felt*, he goes on, ’that the 
best hope of an orderly transfer of power, an 
equitable division of assets, and the establishment 
of friendly relations between the two Dominions would 
be for them to start off with the same Governor- 
General.* And Lord Mountbatten himself seemed 
personally riled by it,. Those brought in touch 
with him would, doubtless agree that his weakness - 
perhaps the only one - was a curiously sensitive kind 
of vanity* Murphy’s biography confirms this. That 
someone of his superb gifts should have had such a 
characteristic is odd; but evidently it was so. And 
it seemed noticeable at an Editor’ & Conference arranged 
the afternoon before Mr. Jinnah’s decision was announced.
Several of us inferred that the decision had not merely 
caused him political worry, but had hurt him. Perhaps 
he had set his heart on becoming dual Governor-General,
The rebuff knocked against his most vulnerable point, 
his pride.
Moreover, Nehxu.*3 friendship with Lord Mountbatten and the appointment of 
V.P. Menon - a Hindu - as the constitutional Advisor, influenced the Vice­
roy’s decision*
'* And we are told that Lord Mountbatten - up in Simla 
for a few days - then suddenly got *a hunch’ that 
the whole thing simply would not do; that he there­
upon “ Mr. Nehru being his guest at the time - rather 
against his staff's advice ’gave (Mr.) Nehru the chance 
of reading* it (but not, we may note Mr. Jinnah); 
that Mr. Nehru’s reaction was very adverse; and that 
a new draft was then rapidly evolved, largely based
on ideas put forward earlier by Menon as Constitutional 
.2Advisor. *'
The/
1, Ian Stephens, Pakistan (Londons Ernest Benn Ltd., I963), p.l76.
2. Ibid., p.161.
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The Congress Party’s long association with the British Labour Movement 
and Pandit Nehru and 2)r. Rajindra Prasad’s attachment to the Fabian Society, 
won the sympathy of the Labour Government, which tilted the balance of 
advantage in favour of congress*
This had been reflected in the Indian Independence Act and the Indian 
Independence (International Arrangements) O r d e r A s  one writer had remarked!
" V/hen partition first became an immediate issue, the 
country to be formed from the mainly Hindu provinces 
had been commonly referred to as "Hindustan", the 
Congress leaders, however, insisted that it should 
be called "India"; in their eyes, the process was 
not the cleavage of India into two new entities, but 
merely the secession of certain provinces and parts 
of provinces; from an India which would otherwise 
retain its identity*" ^
At the outset, there arose the general legal question of Pakistan’s place 
as successor in part to the rights and duties, national and International, 
of India as self-governing British Dominion and as founder member of the 
United Nations* Before discussing this question, it seems to be necessary 
to know, what are the general rules of International Law with regard to 
State Succession.
5* The Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order was 
promulgated by the Viceroy (Lord Mountbatten) on 6 August, 1947» 
See Government of India Gazette (New Delhi), 14 August, 1947*
4* E*W*R* Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India. 1945-47 (Londons 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd 1954 ) » PP • 174"*l75 . For a similar 
evidence see also H.V* Hodson, The Great Divide (London: 
Hutchison, 1969), p.298.
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State Succession:
Whenever there le a change of sovereignity it involves a disruption of 
legal continuity and rules of law are necessary to minimize the consequences 
of this disruption* These rules form a body of doctrine known as the law 
of State Succession*
There is no unani.mity among the writers on International Law, with regard 
to the succession of states; nevertheless, the following principles are 
generally accepted*
" A succession of International persons occurs when 
one or more International persons take the place 
of another International person, in consequence 
of certain changes in the latter*s condition*
Universal succession takes place when one Inter­
national person is completely absorbed by another, 
either through subjugation or through voluntary 
merger* And Universal succession further takes 
place when a State breaks up into parts, which 
either become separate International persons of 
their own or are annexed by surrounding Interaaational 
persons.
Partial succession takes place, first, when a part 
of the territoa^ of an International person breaks 
off in a revolt and by winning its independence 
becomes itself an International person; secondly, when 
one International person acquires a part of the territory 
of another through cession; thirdly, when a hitherto 
full sovereign state loses part of its Independence through 
entering into a federal state, or coming under suzerainty 
or under a protectorate, or when a hitherto not-full 
sovereign state becomes full sovereign.
5. L. Oppenheim, International Law. 8th ed., H. Lauterpaoht, 
(Lôndon* Longmans Green & Co#, 1955)» pp#157-150*
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It is also necessary to loiow what an International person is and what 
the status of British India had been in International Law. This would 
help in working out the application of the doctrine of State Succession 
with respect to India.
" The concept of International person is derived 
from the concept of the law of nations. As 
this is the body of ru3.es which the civilized 
states consider legally binding in their inter­
course, every state which belongs to the 
civilized states, and is therefore a member of 
the Family of Nations is an International 
Person."^ ,   .....
" A State proper - in contradistinction to colonies -
is in existence when the people are settled in a
country under its sovereign goveimment. The
conditions which must obtain for the existence of
a state are therefore fours people, country,
7government, and sovereignty, "
In view of this, the constitutional position of India, as a State, can be 
determined by a brief study of the evolution of the British Commonwealth 
of Nations. By the middle of the nineteenth century certain of the older 
British Colonies attained responsible government. But this had no effect 
upon the ancient doctrine of the corporate personality of the Crown, The 
Crown acted upon the advice of the Imperial Ministers and thus in the large 
and important field of the royal prerogatives, it was Whitehall that 
determined policy.
The transitional period in the life of the commonwealth extends from 1887 
to/
6, Oppenheim, Op,Cit., p.117,
7, Ibid,,
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to 1959» I.e. from the first colonial conference to the outbreak of the 
Second World War# During this period, the representatives of the more 
advanced colonies - in the regular meetings in the Imperial Conference - 
laid the foundations of the conventions upon which the complex structure 
of the Commonwealth rests. The formation of the Imperial Defence Council 
on the basis of partnership during the First World War, was a step in the 
direction of recognising the semi-sovereign status of these dominions of 
the Grown. A decisive stage was reached when the Dominions si^ed the 
Treaty of Versailles, I919#, albeit, under the United Kingdom signature. 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were allotted Mandates, but the 
Mandate was "conferred upon His Britannic Majesty for and on behalf of" the 
Government of particular Dominion.
At the Imperial Conference in I926, the famous Balfour Declaration, defined 
the principle governing the relations between the Dominion and the Mother 
Country.
" They are autonomous Communities within the British 
Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one 
to another in any aspect of their domestic or external 
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the 
Grown, and freely associated as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.
Finally, Dominion Status was defined by the Statute of Westminster in 1951. 
This did not touch the Royal prerogative, but merely removed - in respect 
of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand - the Constitutional 
inhibitions upon legislation that had remained from colonial days.
The Statute declared that no Act of the Imperial Parliament would henceforth 
extend to the Dominions without their o\m legislative consent. After this, 
these/
8. A.B. Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Dominion. 
1918-51. (Bondon* Oxford University Press, I932), p.14*
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these Dominions hecame completely independent International persons, and 
they made separate declarations of war from Britain in 1939*
As regards India*s constitutional position in the Commonwealth, with the 
exception of a limited amount of self-government through the Reforms of 
1909, 1919 and 1955» it virtually remained a colony, under the actual control 
of Whitehall, until 1947* when it became a self-governing Dominion,
V/hile other Dominions declared war separately in 1939* India followed Britain 
and on the same day Lord Linlithgow announced, in a message to Indian people, 
that India was at war with Germany.
The Congress Party in a resolution on I4 September, expressed its indignation 
at the Viceroy’s unilateral declaration of war. The resolution declared s
" that India could not associate herself freely in a 
war said to be fought for democratic freedom so long 
as that very freedom was denied to her and such 
limited freedom as she possessed was talcen away from 
her. The resolution stressed that the war measures 
had been talcen without the consent and against the 
wishes of the Indian people. The Congress was 
prepared to co-operate in order to remove Fascism 
and Imperialism, but first of all they invited British 
Government to declare in unequivocal terms what their 
war aims were in regard to democracy and imperialism 
and the new order that was envisaged and how, in
9particular those aims were going to apply to India.
It is noteworthy that India, like other Dominions became a member of the 
League of Noptions and a party to various conventions. It also had diplo­
matic relations with foreign states. It signed the Charter of the United 
Nations, but without any constitutional authority, as a ’State*. It is, 
therefore/
9. V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India. (Calcutta: Orient
Longman, 1957), P*6l.
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therefore,difficult to recognise that India was clearly a legal Inter­
national person before Independence.
India’s position in International transactions has been explained by a 
vjxiter, as under*
" The development of India’s separate status in 
treaty-making is roughly coincidental with 
that of the Dominions. As early as 1885, India 
gained the right of separate accession to and 
withdrawal from Commercial Treaties, although, 
the officers who participated in their negotia­
tion remained responsible to the British Cabinet 
through the Govemon-Ceneral, unlike the represen­
tatives of the Dominions who were responsible to 
their own legislatures. This situation prevailed 
until 1947."^^
10. D.P. O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International 
Law. Vol.I., (London* Cambridge University Press,' T967)V"p*50j
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Pakistan’s United Nations Memberships
In 1947 India became fdlly independent as a result of a somewhat special 
double dismemberaient operation; its territory was split into two parts 
and a constitutional change involving transfer of sovereignty was effected, 
forming two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan#
"India" comprising the territory of both India and Palcistan, had been a 
member of the League and an original Member of the United Nations# This 
development raised the legal question, as to who should inherit the United 
Nations Membership? The Dominion of India or Palcistan, or both of them? 
Did the division of India result in the extinction of the existing Member 
State? Was it a dismemberment or merely a secession?
An assessment of this issue can be made from the events which followed in 
the United Nations, at the eve of the partition of .British India.
On 11 August, 1947, Palcistan’s Charge d’affaires in Washington sent a 
telegram to the United Nations, claiming automatic Membership of the 
Organisation as legal inheritor of the previous British Indian Government. 
But he intimated in the same telegram that if the United Nations was not 
prepared to concede that right, Pakistan would submit an application for 
admission as a Member.
Pakistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a similar telegcam on 15th
August, 1947» when it came to his Imowledge that the Assistant Secretaiy-
General in charge of the Legal Department had given a decision in favour
of the Dominion of India, declaring that ’Pakistan becomes a new non- 
11
Member State'.
The manner in which the legal issue of transferring the United Nations 
membership/
11. U.H. Press Release. PF/475, 12 August, 1947#
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membership was decided by the Assistant Secretary-General, leads one 
to think that it was based upon discrimination and prejudice by the 
International Bureaucracy, can be judged from the following events»
Before self-goveminent in India, the United Nations Assistant Secretary- 
General for Legal Affairs had enquired from the Government of British India 
regarding the future status of Palcistan, under the Indian Independence Act* 
It was as a result of that enquiry that on 12 August, the Secretariat had 
given its legal opinion tlmt, as a result of the Indian Independence Act, 
it would be necessary for Pakistan to submit an application for membership#
12On 13 August, the press had reported that the Legal Department of the 
United Nations had decided that Pakistan constituted a new State, while 
India had been regarded as retaining the original Membership of British 
India. On 15th August, in a carefully prepared ceremony, the new flag 
of the Dominion of India was raised at the United Nations Headquarters.
The Assistant Secretary-General, making this decision quoted two cases 
in supports
" The situation," says Dr. Kemo (Assistant 
Secretary-General), "is that of a part of 
an existing State, breaicing off to form a 
new State. On this analysis there is no 
change in the International Status of India; 
it continues &b a State with all Treaty 
rights and obligations of membership in the 
United Nations. "
" In International law, the situation is 
analogous to the separation of the Irish 
Free State from Great Britain, and of Belgium 
from the Netherlands. In these oases, the 
portion/
12. New York Times. 13 August 1947, (under heading "Palcistan 
is ruled new State by U.N.").
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portion whioh separated was considered a new 
State; the remaining portion continued as an exis­
ting State with all the rights and duties which it 
15had before#
It is clear from this that Dr# Kerno based his 
decision on the ’continuing personality of States* 
in International Law* With respect to the con­
stitutional transformation, Dr. Kemo noted that 
♦the State of India had become a Dominion and 
accordingly had acquired a new status in the 
British Commonwealth of Nations, independence in 
external affairs, and a new form of Government
Three questions emerge from this statement of the Assistant Secretary- 
General s
(1) Was the Assistant Secretary-General qualified to make a decision 
that Pakistan constituted a new State, thus conferring original 
membership upon the Dominion of India?
(2) Was the Indian Independence Act « on which the Assistant Secretary- 
General based his decisions - binding upon the United Nations?
(3) Was there a dismemberment i.e. extinction of British India, as a 
State or a secession?
Firstly, it can be said with confidence, that the Assistant Secretary- 
General was not qualified to make a decision about the status of Pakistan 
in relation to the United Nations. For the duties of the Secretariat 
under the Charter and other Interviational Agreements, as mentioned by an 
International legal expert are;
" It/
13. U.N» Weekly Bulletin. August 19, 1947» p*26l, See also U.N. 
FressT^oiease. PM/473* 12 August, 1947*
14. Ibid,
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" It is a channel of commimioations, a
convenor of International Conferences* a
register of International Agreements, a
depository of major treaties and their
instruments of ratification, and finally,
an administrator of International itmds,
15property and personnel. "
These functions do not provide any authority to the Secretariat to malce 
a decision on the admission of a State*
After the announcement of the decision, the representative of Argentina, 
in correspondence and in the general Assembly, questioned the right of the 
Secretariat to determine an issue of this character. This he said was a 
matter for the General Assembly and the Security Council to settle.
In his view, Pakistan was already a member of the United Nations, since, with 
the Dominion of India, it inherited the original Membership held by the 
previous Indian Government* As the division had been achieved, in a legal 
fashion without war or revolution,
" The decision regarding Pakistan", the repre­
sentative of Argentina said, "had in fact been 
taken on the advice of the Secretariat, and he 
considered the decision as arbitrary and in 
violation of the International rights of States."
The Secretariat’s decision constituted an unfounded discrimination, since 
both the Dominions should have been regarded as original members or 
alternatively, both should have been considered as new Members* Moreover, 
as the Secretary-General had stated, the opinion of the Legal Department 
could /
15* Oscar Sohachter, ’The Development of International Law tlirough 
the Legal Opinions of the United Nations Secretariat*, in 
British Yearbook of International Law. Vol.XXV, 1948» P*94*
16. G.A.O.R* a 2nd Session, First Committee, 59th Meeting, 24th 
September, 1947» PP- 5 - 4»
41
could be Intended only for the internal guidance of the organisation; 
its use as an opinion of the United Nations was, therefore incorrect*
The representative of the Dominican Republic also agreed with the legal
argument of the :/lrgentinian representative that only the General Assembly
was competent to decide the status of Pakistan in relation to United
17Nations membership.
Secondly, the Assistant Secretary-General based his decision on the Indian
Independence Act, on the advice of the British Indian Government* It
should be noted that the Indian Independence Act did not bind the United
Nations to decide the status of Palcistan in accordance with this Act, in
that it was not a part of the law of the States concerned* The United
Nations, being an independent International body has to take guidance from
the Charter* Moreover, it was not a pre-condition for Independence, that
the United Nations Membership should devolve on the Dominion of India*
The Indian Independence Act - upon which the decision was made in favour
of India - states;
" Subject to the provisions of the sub-section
(5) and (4) of this Section, the territories
of India shall be the territories under the
sovereignty of His Majesty which, immediately
before the appointed day, were included in
British India except the territories which,
under sub-section (2) of this Section, are to
18be the territories of Pakistan*"
These provisions were made to facilitate the clear demarcation of the 
boundaries of the New Dominion^ and cannot properly be quoted as providing 
a continuous status for the Dominion of India,
17. Ibid., p*5*
18• Indian Independence Act, Article 2, Clause 1. 1947. 10 and 11 
Geo * 6 , Ch * 50 ( London : H*M. S tationed Of f ice, 1%7 ), P. 1 *
42
To overcome this wealmess in the Indian Independence Act, the Viceroy
(Lord Mountbatten) made another attempt to favour the Congress, The
Government of British India promulgated on 6 August, 1947» "The Indian
19
Independence (international Arrangements) Order" which provided, that 
membership of all International Organisations will devolve solely upon 
the Dominion of India; but the other Treaty rights will devolve upon 
both the Dominions* This was ambiguous and confusing, because it is 
contrary to the practice in International Law, regarding succession to 
International Treaties*
Thirdly, it was not a case of secession as interpreted by the Assistant 
Secretary-General, but the extinction or dismemberment of British Indian 
Empire, as has been explained below:
(1) The Indian case was rather a double dismemberment, India had been 
a colony of Great Britain: on 15th August 1947» it broke away from the 
British Empire and simultaneously split into parts. As in the Balkans, 
the principle of self-determination had been applied to States, Provinces, 
Districts and even to Tehslls in India, The two powerful units absorbed 
the different semi-independent States like Hyderabad, Junagardh, Bahawalpur, 
Khairpur, Kalat and soon the situation in India was that of anarchy, as 
described by Richard Symonds:
" The British are/^ust people. They have
left India in exactly the same state of
20
chaos as they found it* "
(2) The Assistant Secretary-General applied the principle of the 
"continuing personality of States" to "India", but ’India* as a ’State’ 
had/
19* The United Nations was informed about the promulgation of 
this Order on 27 August, 1947» when the questions with 
respect to India’s International status were raised in the 
First Committee of the General Assembly,
20, Richard Symonds, The Makina: of Palcistan (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1950), p*74.
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had never existed in the past, The terra ’India* had been used by 
Western people for the ’Indian sub-continent’, which contained so many 
states. It was only under British colonial rule that attempts were 
made to achieve the unity of the sub-continent, but even they could not 
create a unified India, Their administration was mainly confined to 
British India, and there were states which enjoyed autonomy under 
British Suzerainlty.
In view of this, to consider ’India* as a ’State* in International Law, 
was a misnomer and the principle of the continuing personality of states 
was not applicable,
(3) The cases, which the Assistant Secretary-General quoted, i.e. the 
separation of the Irish Free State from Great Britain and of Belgium from 
the Netherlands, to support his decision did not fit the Indian situation 
as a writer has remarked:
'* The proposition is founded upon two highly 
controversial instances, those of the Irish 
Free State and Belgium, and analysis of the 
practice upon independence discloses that it 
is by no means universally accepted or 
politically expedient. The real problem was 
functional, not logical, and the solution 
depended upon analysis of the Charter and the 
Implication of membership and not upon 
deduction from a generalized and abstract 
principle, which was at best insecurely 
established,
If the British had retained control in India and only a few parts breaking 
away from British India had formed Pakistan, then Dr. Kerno*s decision was 
applicable.
In the sub-continent, the original state (if any) was British India, with 
the/
21. O’Connell, Op.oit,, Vol.II, p.185.
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the British crown as the Sovereign. After the transfer of power in 
India by the British two new States came into being, with equal Sovereign 
rights, without the consideration that one had more area than the other.
The new Dominions started with their new flags and governments as separate 
International Persons. One chose to call itself by the name of Pakistan, 
but the other retained the old name India and employed the outgoing British 
Governor General. By this the Congress leaders derived a political bene­
fit in so f&æ as they got the original membership in the United Nations.
If they had adopted a different name, like the other Dominion, then it 
would have been necessary for them to put in a new application for United 
Nations membership. Through their skilful manipulations at the United 
Nations, under the guise of the word "India" and with the help of British 
Indian government they dodged the International Community.
The question of the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, came 
before the Security Council on 18 August 1947* The representative of 
Ib?ance in the Security Council supported Pakistan’s argument for automatic 
membership. He said;
" The question of Pakistan seems to me to be
a very special case, since this country was
22
already in the United Nations. "
But most members took the view that Pakistan should be admitted to member­
ship. Therefore, the Council adopted the resolution that the General 
Assembly admit Pakistan to the United Nations.
In the First Committee of the General Assembly the Argentinian represen-
25tative expressed the view that "India had ceased to exist as a State." 
Therefore, both India and Pakistan should either become members by inheri­
tance/
22. United Nations Security Council Official Records. 18th Meeting, 
18 August 1947V P*510, (Hereafter cited as S.C.O.R.)
23. G.A.O.R.« 2nd Session, First Committee, 59th Meeting, 24th 
September 1947» P*4*
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inheritance or apply for membership* But later on he submitted a 
different draft resolution that Pakistan should be declared a member 
from the date of partition and the position occupied by the representative 
of India in different United Nations organ should be understood as being 
occupied by the representative of the Dominion of India*
The Australian representative admitted in the First Committee that, "it
was true that British India had been an original member of the United
Nations. For purposes of International rights and obligations, it was
now, represented by the two new Dominions." But he accepted that, "since
India retained the membership of Economic and Social Council it seemed to
have been tacitly agreed that she had assumed the International rights and
24obligations of the former state." He submitted a draft resolution by which
the Assembly would decide to admit Pakistan as a new member.
The representative of Iraq expressed the most rational view. He said,
"Both Pakistan and India should be recognised as original members and as
26having been voting members from 15 August, 1947*"
In the debate, opinions were expressed favouring both the resolutions, 
but the Australian resolution was unanimously adopted. Pakistan was 
admitted to the United Nations by the General Assembly on $0 September 1947 
by 55 votes to 1, with no abstention. The negative vote was that of 
Afghanistan; but in October in the plenary meeting the representative of 
Afghanistan declared that he had withdrawn his negative vote.
In depositing Pakistan’s instrument of acceptance, the Pakistani represen­
tative Sir Zafrulla Khan made the following declaration which in substance 
reiterated/
24. Ibid., p.5.
25. Ibid.
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reiterated Pakistan’s view on the question of membership:
" In one sense the admission of Pakistan to 
the United Nations is not the admission of 
a new member# Until 15 Augu.st of this 
year, Pakistan and India constituted one 
State* On 15 August, they agreed to con­
stitute themselves into two separate 
Sovereign states* One chose to continue 
to call itself by the old name of India, 
which had applied to the whole of the 
country, and the other elected to call itself 
by the name of Palcistan#
In as much as Palcistan had been a part of
India, it was in effect under the latter name
a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles and
an original member of the League of Nations
............................ *.......... In
the same sense, Pakistan as a part of India,
participated in the San Francisco Conference
in 1945 and became a signatory to the United
Nations Charter* Therefore, Palcistan is not
a new member of the United Nations, but a
successor to a Member State which was one of
26the founders of the Organisation* ’’
At this moment, a question can be asked, why Pakistan did not seek to 
pursue the case oA legal grounds through the International Court of 
Justice, for inheriting the original membership as a co-successor to 
British India ? The answer is that from practical point of view, it 
was quite logical for Pakistan to submit an application for membership 
instead of pursuing the legal question of membership which surely would 
have prolonged the issue for quite some time, which was not in the 
interests of Pakistan* Because of the circumstances under which partition 
took place (as narrated earlier), expediency demanded that Palcistan should 
become/
26* G.A.O.R*, 2nd Session, 92nd Plenary Meeting, $0 September, 1947» 
p*511.
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become a member of the United Nations as early as possible, to safeguard 
its existence as well as other international rights and to participate in 
the deliberations of the International Organisation* For example, if 
Pakistan had not become a member of the United Nations quickly, it would 
have been difficult to pursue its case on Kashmir in the United Nations*
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CHAFER III
AMISSION OF NEVf MMŒER8
There are two main theories for the recruitment of Members for an 
International Organisation of sovereign states.
The first ie kno%m as the '‘principle of Universality” which advocates 
that the strength of any such Organisation depends on its including the 
greatest possible mmber of States; the fewer* the States outside it, the 
greater will be the number of the Members pledged to carry out its discipline 
and to perform the duties which it imposes.
The second method is called the “principle of Selectivity”» Its advocates 
maintain that as a rule, the strength of a public International Organisation 
depends not on its including the greatest possible number of States, but on 
its including the greatest possible number of "like-minded” States, such as 
can be entrusted to work together harmoniously and therefore efficiently.
It is clearly impossible to choose between the two rival principles on 
their theoretical merits alone. The choice must depend on the functions of 
the particular organisation for which the choice must be made in practice.
If the function malceo efficiency dependent on imiversai membership, selec­
tivity has little to commend it, A via media between the two extremes has 
been suggested by an American writer in the following words s
” Controversy over Membership questions is 
endemic in International Organisations, and 
it is complicated by the fact that genuine 
differences concerning the constitutional merits 
of principles governing Membership policy are 
subtly mixed with competing claims based upon 
calculations of political advantage. From a 
purely constitutional point of view, no 
principle can be singled out as the “right one” 
but the theoretical ideal might be formulated/
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formulated as the “rule of essentiality”«
According to this concept, membership policy 
should he rationally adopted to the functional 
purposes of each specific institution* States 
should he accepted or excluded, sought after 
as members or left alone, on the basis of 
judgment as to whether their participation is 
essential to or incompatible with the
1realization of the aims of the Organisation*”
For example, the membership of Norway might be deemed essential in the 
IMCO, a maritime shipping organisation but might not be,at the same time, 
essential for the Chad to be a member of this Organisation*
Membership in the leaguei
The League of Nations never formally accepted the principle of indiscrimi­
nate universality, as expounded by some states like Argentina.
It did, sometimes, ignore dubiously qualified or politically unpopular
states, but on the whole, it sought to encourage rather than to discourage
the potential applicants* This attitude of receptivity was developed from
“admission by invitation" as an alternative to application by would-be 
2
members *
Membership in the United Nations;
In the case of the United Nations, the Moscow Declaration of 1943 stressed 
that for a general or quasi-uni versai international organisation, univer­
sality was recognised as "an ideal towards which it was proper to aim,”
In the Charter of the United Nations, Article 4 which regulates the 
admission of new members, states!
” (l) Membership in the United Nations is open to all 
other peacG-lovjjig States, which accept the 
obligations contained in the present Charter and, 
in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and 
willing/
1. Inis L* Claude, Swords Into Ploughshares* 2nd ed, (New York; 
Random House, 1939mp*9ô7
2* Alexander Rudzinski, “Admission of new Members ; The United
Nations and the League of Nations”, International Conciliation* 
No.480, April, 1952, p.164#
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willing to carry out these obligations*
(2) The admission of any such State to Membership 
in the United Nations will be effected by a 
decision of the General Assembly upon the re­
commendation of the Security Council, "
Thus, there are five objective qualifications for memberships Statehood; 
“peaoe-lovingness"; acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter; 
ability to carry out these obligations? and finally, willingness to carry 
them out*
In certain eases, some of these qualifications, i.e. Statehood and “peace- 
lovingness” may cause genuine difficulties of interpretation. If these 
are to be decided by an impartial Tribunal - in the case of an applicant 
State - there is no problem, but in the United Nations, these are adjudica­
ted by the Security Council and the General Assembly which are, in compo­
sition and function, political organs. Both of these organs decide by 
majority vote, but in the Security Council the majority, however massive 
it may be, can always be stultified by a single negative vote of a perma­
nent member*
In this situation, it is a matter of secondary Importance whether a. given 
application for membership does or does not satisfy the five substantive 
requirements laid down in the Charter* For practical purposes, the 
decisive test will be whether the candidate is or is not acceptable, to all 
the permanent members of the Security Council. It is, thus, the attitude 
of permanent members rather thfm the provisions of the Charter which has 
been the sole obstacle to the achievement of universality in the United 
Nations.
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Tlie positions of the United States and the Soviet Union;
The deadlock on the admission of new members, which lasted until 1955» 
was the result of the policy of “competitive exclusion", adopted by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Each of them had at one time followed 
the notion that applicant states should be admitted en bloc, in order to 
achieve the ideal of Universality.
Within a few months after the establishment of the United Nations, 
applications for membership were received from * eight countries'. The
United States proposed in the Security Council the admission of all eight 
applicants, "to accelerate advancement of the Universality of Membership". 
This was, in effect, a "package proposal" that was rejected by the Soviet 
Union, which insisted upon a consideration of each application Individually# 
The result was, the admission of Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden; a Soviet 
veto against Ireland, Jordan and Portugal; and the failure of Albania and 
Mongolia to secure the required minimum of seven votes in the Security 
Council.
This precedent set the pattern for the future; henceforth, the Soviet 
Union proposed admission en bloc and the Western Powers demured.
States which desired admission can be divided into two groups; potential 
members of the Soviet bloc in the United Nations, which were denied 
necessary support of seven members of the Security Council; and potential 
adherents to the Western bloc, which were consistently blocked by the 
Soviet veto.
Thus the membership problem had been subjected to the "policization" which 
has become a characteristic feature of the United Nations. The Soviet 
policy/
5. The States were Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Jordan, 
Afghanistan, Ireland, Portugal, Iceland and Sweden.
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policy of preventing the admission of non-communist States unless Soviet 
proteges, was simultaneously accepted, and the American policy of denying 
seats to the Soviet Satellites even at the expense of States acceptable 
to the United States, acquired an importance for political prestige which 
exceeded their objective political significance*
Px’om the legal point of view the United States position was sound# The 
Charter lays down the conditions that would-be members should be "peace- 
loving" and be deemed to be "able and willing" to abide by the obligations 
of membership# Thus, the United States, by influencing its friends to 
cast a negative vote on the application of new Members, did not pass the 
legal bounds# Moreover, the United States criticism of the Soviet 
position was supported by an advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice that no member can properly justify its vote to exclude appli­
cants on grounds other than stated in Article 4 of the Charter; and that 
"every application for admission should be examined and voted on separately 
and on its merits#"^ '
The Soviet position, on the other hand, though wealc from the legal point 
of view, was clearly in accord with the constitutional ideal of Universality.
Professor Inis L. Claude has beautifully depicted the cold war picture 
on the Membership question, with regard to the positions of the United States 
and the U.S.S.R., as follows;
" The United States is to emphasise its political 
primacy in the United Nations by admitting only 
such states as are likely to follow American 
leadership; failing this, it is prepared to accept 
the exclusion of all candidates. The U.S.S.H., on 
the other hand, seems not to aim so much at excluding 
American/
4. Advisory Opinion of International Court of Justice, 28th May, 
194-8• Report of Judgments# Advisory Opinion and Orders. 1948. 
pp » 57-^ëT " ~
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American-sponsored applicants as at mailing 
sure that they will not be admitted without 
its o m  proteges.
For the United States, it is one group or
nothing; for the Soviet Union, it is both
groups or nothing. The United States seeks
a political victory; the U.S.S.R. seeks to
avoid a political defeat* The membership
struggle is a typical display of the political
tactics of a self-confident majority and a
5defensive minority. "
As Pakistan experienced a good deal of hardship for its membership in 
the United Nations it was well aware of the difficulties which other 
newly independent states had to face in the United Nations for their 
membership. Since becoming a member of the United Nations, Pakistan has 
taken a special interest in helping new States to gain admission.
The year 1947 * when Pakistan was admitted to the United Nations - was 
the beginning of the Cold War and there m s  a deadlock in the Security 
Council on the admission of new members. The first Soviet "package 
proposal" which came after the coming into force of the peace-treaties 
with Italy, Finland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in September 1947» was 
blocked. The Soviet contention was that the United Nations must either 
admit all these ex-enemy states, or none of them. Thus, the applications 
of Italy and Finland received a Soviet veto and the three East European 
"People's Democracies" failed to secure the required minimum of votes.
In an attempt to resolve the deadlock, some of the members tried to make 
acceptable varying interpretations of Articles 5 to 6 and 27 of the United 
Nations Charter.
The representative of Australia, while interpreting Article 27, expressed 
the/
5* Claude, op,cit., p.101.
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the view that since the Charter merely required a recommendation from 
the Security Council, the unanimity of five permanent members was not 
necessary. Therefore, the real decision has to be taken by the General 
Assembly and it was empowered to reverse a rejection by the Council#
The representative of Palcistan, declared that he could not agree with 
the views of the Australian representative#
" The question of membership in the United
Nations", he said "was dealt with in Articles
3-6 of the Charter# Article 4 provided that
the applicants should, in the judgment of the
United Nations as a whole, be able and willing
to carry out the obligations of the Charter#
It did not say that that judgment should be made
either by the Security Council or the Assembly
alone# The wording of paragx*aph 2 clearly
showed that the final decision should be taken
by the Assembly, subject to a recommendation
from the Council; the object of the Article
was that States should be admitted only with
6the approval of both. "
The representative of Paidstan stressed further the role of the Seourit.v 
Council, and said:
" If the Charter had considered that the function
of the Council was in any way inferior or
ancillary to a decision by the Assembly, it would
have been worded differently# It would have
stated that the Assembly should talce a decision
after considering the opinion of the Security
Council. The object of the Charter was clearly
that successful applicants should have the
7approval of both organs."
6# G.A.O.R., 2nd Session, First Committee, 100th Meeting, 8 November,
1947, p.360.
7# Ibid., p.361.
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In the same meeting, disapproving the attitude adopted by the Soviet 
Union, the representative of Pakistan said:
" •••••••» he did not believe that a member of
the Security Council was justified in opposing
the admission of a State which it agreed was
fully qualified, on the grounds that other
States were not also admitted# That was not
a valid argument and was contrary to the Charter#
No member was justified in talcing an unreasonable
attitude, simply because another delegation was
8being unreasonable# "
The representative of Pakistan also appealed to the permmient members of 
the Council to observe a policy of "reasonableness"j and supported a 
Polish proposal that the five permanent Members of the Security Council 
which had primary responsibility in the matter, should consult together 
for resolving the differences and arrive at a solution on the issue of 
membership•
In 1948, in the Special Session of the General Assembly, Palcistan supported 
Burma's admission to the United Nations; Burma was admitted unanimously#
In the third session, of the General Assembly, in 1948, the Ad Hoc 
Political Committee considered the application of Eleven States, which 
had been rejected by the Security Council, and recommended to the General 
Assembly to send back these applications to the Security Council for re­
consideration# It adopted ten draft resolutions# Pakistan submitted a 
proposal for the admission of Ceylon, which was adopted in the form of 
amendment to resolution 'J'# The General Assembly adopted all the reso­
lutions forwarded by the Political Committee# Pakistan voted in favour of 
all the resolutions*
The/
8# Ibid., p.362,
56
The representative of Pakistan declared in the General Assembly that 
his delegation would always support an application for admission to 
the United Nations, provided that:
“ The applicant was a sovereign state, that its 
statehood and sovereignty had been established 
and that its application was not a meæis of 
establishing legality of either of those factors#
Moreover, the applicant must be a peace-loving 
state, able and willing to discharge the 
obligations placed upon member states by the 
Charter,. His delegation would support such an 
application, irrespective of the bloc to which the
state would adhere after it had been admitted to
9membership# "
The question of the admission of Israel was included in the Agenda of the 
General Assembly on 7 March 194-9 and was referred to the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee by a vote of 51 to 18, with 17 abstentions. Palcistan voted 
against at both the occasions# Spealcing in the Committee, the represen­
tative of Pakistan stated :
" ......that the recommendation of the Security
Council did not comply with the terms of Article 
27 of the Charter as it had not received the 
concurring votes of the five permanent members 
of the Council. Moreover, the United Kingdom had, 
both generally and specifically, made it clear that 
its abstention could not be construed as an 
affirmation# He contended that the Committee had 
before it no Security Council decision which had been 
taken in accordance with the terms laid down in the 
Charter and proposed either returning the recommen­
dation to the Security Council or obtaining an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of 
Justice#
9# G.A.Q.R.# 3rd Session, 176th Plenary Meeting, 8 December, 1948,
P.791,
10# G.A.O.R.# 3^d Session, Part IX, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 
42nd Meeting, 3 May, 1949, pp#182-185#
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The representative of Lebanon presented a draft resolution for postponing 
Israel's admission until it accepted the General Assembly Resolution of 
11 December 1948 on Jerusalem and the refugee problem. Pakistan, with 
Brazil, Denmark, Syria, ‘Turkey and the United Kingdom supported it, but 
the draft resolution was rejected by the Committee by a vote of 25 against 
to 19 in favour, with 12 abstentions.
A draft resolution, jointly sponsored by Australia, Canada, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Panama, The United States and Paraguay, recommending that the 
General Assembly admit Israel to the United Nations, was adopted by 33 
votes to 11, with 13 abstentions.
The General Assembly, adopted the resolution recommended by the Committee
11
by a vote of 37 to 12, with 9 abstentions.
Palcistan voted against, along with other Muslim States except Turkey, 
which abstained.
Israel's failure to implement the United Nations Resolution was the osten­
sible reason for Pakistan's opposition* This was supplemented by 
Pakistan's Ideological policy to support the Muslim cause.
The general question of admission of members was also discussed in 1949# 
The Soviet Union repeated its "package proposal" but now included eight, 
other applicants, in addition to the five previous states. The deadlock 
in the Council continued. The general assembly again, by Resolution A to 
K 296 (iV), decided to recommend the applications of Austria, Ceylon, 
Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, South Korea, Portugal and Nepal, to the 
Security Council for reconsideration* Pakistan, voted in favour of all 
the resolutions.
11. The States which voted against Israel's admission to the United 
Nations were Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Palcistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Belgium, 
Brazil, Denmark, El Salvador, Greece, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom abstained.
G.A.O.R,, 3rd Session, 207th Plenary Meeting, 11 May, 1949#
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At the Fifth Session in 1958, the General Assembly had before it the 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and three draft 
Resolutions*
The joint draft resolution sponsored by Brazil, Canada, the Philippines, 
Sweden and Syria, requested the Security Council to keep the applications 
under consideration in accordance with the terms of Resolution 296 (IV).
It was supported by the representatives of France, Thailand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States*
A U*S*S*R, draft resolution recommended that the Security Council review 
the applications of Albania, Mongolia, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, 
Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, and Nepal for admission 
to the United Nations*
El Salvador, submitted a draft resolution calling upon the Security Council 
to reconsider the applications of Austria., Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Portugal and Nepal for admission to member­
ship in the United Nations and asked the Secretary-General to invite each 
of these Governments to send an observer to the Session of the General 
Assembly and its Committees.
A number of representatives including those of Argentina, Egypt and 
Pakistan who favoured all the three resolutions stressed the principle of 
the universality of the United Nations and expressed regret that so many 
countries which could malce a substantial contribution to the work of the 
United Nations were excluded for reasons which had nothing to do with the 
Charter.
After the debate, the General Assembly adopted the joint draft resolution 
by/
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12by 46 votes to 65» with 2 abstentions* The other two draft resolutions 
were rejected by the Assembly*
The International Court of Justice, in an advisory opinion on 8 March 1958» 
rejected the view of the Argentinian representative that the General 
Assembly can admit a new member after a rejection by the Council* This 
coincided with the view expressed earlier by the representative of Palcistan*
" However, the deadlock in the Security Council
continued and the great Powers, notwithstanding
the opinion of the Court, allowed themselves to
be guided by political considerations rather
than to consider all pending applications for
13membership on their merits* "
Speaking in the Assembly on the question of admission of new members, the 
representative of Palcistan asked:
" ••••**•* is there not a single applicant from among
those who have hitherto been blocked, or perhaps at
least one from each side, which may be regarded as 
fulfilling the conditions laid dom in Article 4f 
and whose admissbn may be recommended by the Security 
Council as a token of the fact that the permanent 
members of the Security Council are now prepared to 
move forward in respect of this question on some 
reasonable basis?
In the same Session, Indonesia was admitted unanimously to the United 
Nations*
In the Sixth Session of the General Assembly, the question of the admission
of new members was discussed in the First Committee* The representatives
of/
12. G.A.O.R*. 5th Session, 518th Plenary Meeting, 4 December, 1958,
Resolution 495 (V).
15. K* Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations (New York, 
Manhattan Publishing Company, i960), p.247*
14# G.A*O.R*. 5th Session, 285rd Plenary Meeting, 25th September, 1958,
p.97.
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of Australia, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Greece,
India, Iran, Iraq, the Netherlands, Niooragua, The Philippines, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria and The United States stated that in order to give 
the Organisation the universal character all the States which fulfilled 
the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter should be admitted.
The representatives of Pakistan, Iraq, Mexico and Norway, felt that the 
question of membership could not have a satisfactory solution unless the 
powers which had the right of veto feel the obligation to seek agreement,
A Peruvian draft resolution by which the Assembly would state that a State 
desirous for membership should be peace-loving and accept the obligations 
of the Charter; be willing to settle disputes by pacific means in Inter­
national law; according to the advisory opinion of International Court of 
Justice, no United Nations member is entitled to lay conditions, which are 
outside the scope of Article 4 of the Charter, on the admission of a new 
State; invite all States which had applied or may apply for membership to 
present to the Security Council and the General Assembly, all appropriate 
evidence relating to their qualifications under Article 4 of the Charter, 
and recommend that the Security Council reconsiders all pending applications 
as well as the new applications in the light of such facts as applicant 
States may present and that it base its action exclusively on the con­
ditions contained in the Charter and on facts establishing those conditions. 
The revised draft was adopted as a whole by $6 votes to 9» with 12 absten­
tions, Palcistan voted in favour of the resolution,
A U.8.S.R. draft resolution by which the Assembly would recommend that 
the Security Council consider the applications of Albania, the People's 
Republic of Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, 
Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and also Libya for membership in 
the United Nations was adopted as a whole by 21 votes to 12, with 25 absten­
tions.
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India, Egypt, Afghanistan, Burma, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Iraq and Syria 
from the non-aligned hloo voted for the resolution.
The representative of Palcistan abstained and while explaining his vote, 
said that he would have preferred that the Assembly's recommendations 
should cover all pending applications,
A joint draft resolution was submitted by Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Micoragua and was also adopted as a vdiole by the Committee by 
a vote of 41 to 6, with 11 abstentions.
The General Assembly considered the three resolutions forwarded by the 
Committee, The Peruvian draft resolution was adopted by 45 votes to 8, 
with 7 abstentions, A motion that the U,S,S.R. draft required two-thirds 
majority was adopted by 29 votes to 21, with 5 abstentions. The U.S.S.R, 
draft resolution was not adopted as it failed to obtain the required two- 
thirds majority. The third draft resolution was adopted by 36 votes to 3, 
with 14 abstentions, Palcistan voted in favour of both the resolutions.
In the meantime, Palcistan was elected a member of the Security Council on
13 December 1951» for a period of two years, to start its terra from 1st
January, 1952, On 6 Febnaary 1952, the question of the admission of
members was discussed. Two draft resolutions, one by France for the
admission of Italy and the other by the Soviet Union for the "simultaneous
3 5admission of fourteen States" were submitted.
The representatives of Brazil, Chile, France, and Greece opposed the 
U,S,S,R, draft resolution. The representative of the United Kingdom said 
that/
15, The fourteen States were 'Albania, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, 
Ceylon, Nepal and Libya* •
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that in the interests of the Organisation to broaden its basis, he would 
abstain on the U.S.S.R, draft resolution* In the voting, the French 
draft resolution recommending for the admission of Italy received 10 
votes in favour and 1 against, but was not adopted because of the Soviet 
veto*
The U*S,S*R* draft resolution was rejected by 2 votes in favour (the USSR 
and Palcistan) to 6 against, with 5 abstentions (Chile, France and the U.K.).
It should be noted that the Pakistan delegate, for the first time, moved
from its professed position of considering all the applications for member­
ship, separately, and voted in favour of the Soviet draft resolution for 
"simultaneous" admission of 14 States. The reason for this was explained 
by the representative of Pakistan at a later meeting of the Security Council. 
Maicing a reference to the U.S.S.R. draft resolution, he said:
" The Security Council will recall that my 
delegation voted in favour of the draft
resolutioni We did so for the following
reasons: First, voting for the U.S.S.R.
draft resolution seemed to us to be easiest
and quickest way out of the paralysis with
which the Council is seized as regards the 
question of the admission of new members.
Secondly, we believe that there are a largo 
number of countries in the list contained in 
the U.S.S.R. draft resolution whose admission 
to the United Nations would be a source of 
great strength to the Organisation. Thirdly, 
we believe that to be useful and real the 
United Nations must reflect as faithfully as 
possible the political state of the world ...
........................................If
there are States which do command a position of 
authority over areas, territories and peoples, 
we say that whatever view may be held as regards 
the Internal administration of those States, it 
is/
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is better for them to be within the purview
and orbit of the United Nations than outside it*
That is why we voted in favour of the Soviet
16Union draft resolution* "
On 0 June, 1952, in the Security Council, the U.S.S.R. proposed an item 
"simultaneous admission of I4 States" to be included in the provisional 
agenda. The U.S.S.R. also submitted a draft resolution to that effect.
The U.S.S.R. proposal to include the item in the agenda was rejected by 
the Security Council by a vote of 7 to 1, with 3 abstentions (China, Pakistan 
and the United Kingdom). The Council then adopted unanimously a joint 
proposal by Chile and the Netherlands which included the U.S.S.R. proposed
item - "The Admission of new Members: consideration of General Assembly
Resolution 306 (Vl)."
A Greek proposal to postpone consideration of the question was adopted by 
the Council by 8 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions (Chile and Pakistan).
A Palcistani-Chilean draft resolution urging the permanent members of the 
Security Council to consult each other on the basis of General Assembly 
request contained in Resolution 506 (VI), was considered unnecessary and was 
not put to vote, for the permanent members showed their readiness to hold 
consultations.
The U.S.S.R. draft resolution for "simultaneous" admission, submitted on 8 
June, 1952, was discussed by the Council between 2 to 8 September 1952.
The representatives of Brazil, China, France, Greece, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and The United States opposed the word "simultaneous". The Council 
then rejected the U.S.S.R, draft resolution by a vote of 2 in favour (U.S.S.R. 
and Pakistan) to 3 against, with 4 abstentions (Chile, France, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom).
16. S.C.O.R.. 600th Meeting, I6 September, 1952, para. I4, 15#
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Pakistan also submitted a draft resolution recommending the admission of 
Libya to the United Nations* Pleading the case of Libya, the representative 
of Palcistan appealed to the members of the Security Council :
" Our conduct with regard to the application of Libya
at this occasion", said Professor Bolchari, "is a
supreme test of whether we, as members of the United 
Nations consistently oariy out our own moral obliga­
tions* Apart from that, I think it would be a
wonderful spectacle for the world of today that in
three years* time a subject people should be helped 
by the United Nations first to achieve independence 
and sovereignty, and then to achieve full membership 
status along with the rest of us in this Organisation.
I do not think that anyone around this table should 
have the heart to mar that spectacle. Therefore, I 
strongly appeal to my colleagues to take an exceptional
view of the application of Libya and unanimously to
17support its membership. "
The representatives of Brazil, Chile, China, France, Greece, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States spoke in favour of the Palcistan draft
resolution. They pointed out that the General Assembly had adopted a
favourable decision, without a single opposing vote. Libya was fully
qualified for membership and the United Nations had a heavy responsibility
towards that country since it was responsible for Libya*s independence.
The representative of the Soviet Union reiterated his delegation's view 
that t
" Libya's application could not be regarded as a new
one and declared that the U.S.S.R. had never opposed
in the past and did not then oppose the admission of
Libya to membership in the United Nations on the same
18basis as other, equally eligible, States. "
The/
17. S.C.O.R., 600th Meeting, 16 September, 1952, para.26.
18. Ibid.
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The Palcistan draft resolution was not adopted because of the Soviet 
veto. The votes were 10 to 1, with no abstentions. The applications 
of Japan, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were also not recommended for 
the same reason.
The Soviet Union also submitted a draft resolution recommending the 
admission of North Vietnam to the United Nations. This was rejected by 
the Council by a vote of 10 against to 1 in favour (the U.S.S.R*), with 
no abstention.
Here, for the first time, in the Security Council, Pakistan voted against 
the admission of a State to the United Nations. The representative of 
Pakistan while explaining his vote said that in his Government's view 
North Vietnam was not fulfilling the qualification for membership, under 
Article 4 of the United Nations Ch^ arter.
In the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, in 1952, the question of 
the admission of members was considered by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. 
A five-power draft resolution, recoiamending the establishment of a Special 
Committee to male© a detailed study of the question of the admission of new 
members and report it to the 8th Session of the General Asa erably, was 
adopted as a whole by a vote of 45 to 5, with 8 abstentions. The repre­
sentative of India, speaking on this resolution, considered that it was 
difficult to see how a Special Committee such as proposed by the five- 
power resolution would yield better results than the Security Council.
If an agreement was possible, he said, there was no reason why it could not 
be achieved in the Council rather than in such a Committee. If agreement 
was not likely, there was no reason to establish a Special Committee to 
ascertain the fadt.
The/
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The representative of Pakistan, Chile and Haiti also considered that 
the agreement hy the Permanent Members of the Security Council was a 
pre-requisite of any solution*
Poland submitted a draft resolution by which the Assembly would request 
the Security Council to consider the applications of Albania, Mongolia, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, 
Austria, Ceylon, Nepal and Libya, in order to submit a recominendation on 
the "simultaneous" admission of all these States to the United Nations.
The representative of Pakistan stated that the States listed in the Polish 
draft resolution, fulfilled the conditions laid dovm by the Charter and 
deserved to be admitted. He therefore supported the draft resolution.
The representative of India also supported the Polish draft resolution, 
making it clear that he interpreted "simultaneous admission" to mean a 
series of admissions that took place at the same time, none of which was 
dependent upon the admission of one or several of the others. Although 
it provided neither an absolute nor a complete remedy, the proposal had 
the advantage of increasing the membership of the Organisation, thereby 
enabling it to be more representative, of the world as it was. Similar 
views were also expressed by the representatives of Argentina, Burma, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines and Syria. The Polish draft resolution 
was rejected by a vote of 28 against to 20 in favour, with 11 abstentions. 
Pakistan also supported resolutions for the reconsideration of the appli­
cations of Japan, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya and Jordan, which 
were adopted.
The General Assembly then considered the report of the Political Coiimiittee 
on 2 December, 1952* Resolution A (originally the five-power Central 
American draft resolution) for the eatablisliment of a Special Committee 
was adopted by a roll-call vote of 4® to 5» with 6 abstentions. The 
representatives/
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representatives of Burma, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Liberia and 
Pakistan abstained. Pakistan voted for the resolution's Part B to G which 
requested the Security Council to reconsider the applications of Japan,
South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya, and Jordan.
In the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, in 1953» the Ad Hoc 
Political Committee again discussed the question of the admission of 
members and passed a resolution for the establishment of a Committee of 
Good Offices. The representative of Pakistan, speaking about the deadlock 
on admission, stressed the Importance of the principle of the universality 
of the Organisation:
" The United Nations", he said "could not be a 
monopoly of the privileged nations at the 
expense and detriment of other nations. The 
Charter m s  based upon the principle of the 
peaceful co-existence of all political,
19economic and social systems of the world. "
Tkie resolution recommended by the Committee was adopted by the General 
Assembly. The Committee of Good Offices, with Egypt, the Netherlands 
arid Peru as members, was established. Palcistan voted in favour of the 
resolution.
In the Ninth Session of the General Assembly, in 1954* Australia introduced 
a draft resolution in the First Committee, jointly sponsored by Australia, 
Pakistan and Thailand, which was designed to break the "log jam" in the 
admission of new members and to which the Secretary-General had referred in 
his annual report with the suggestion that a beginning in breaking the dead­
lock might be made with some of those cases which did not directly enter 
into the balance between conflicting camps.
The joint draft resolution also provided that the General Assembly would 
note/
19# GjA#J?_»R# » 8th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 11th Meeting,
14 October, 1955» P#55#
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note that the signatories of the Geneva Agreement had expressed their 
Gonviotion that Laos and Cambodia were peace-loving states within the 
meaning of Article 4» able and willing to carry out the obligations of 
the Charter, and should, therefore, be admitted to the United Nations.
It would request the Security Council to take note of that declaration.
The Soviet bloc opposed the draft resolution.
Another joint draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Cuba and El Salvador 
asked again, recommending the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal and Portugal. By a United 
States amendiiient the name of the Republic of Korea and Vietnam were added 
to the list of applicants.
The U.S.S.R. repeated its draft resolution, by which the Assembly would 
recommend to the Security Council to reconsider the "simultaneous" admission 
of 14 States. This draft was also supported by Indonesia, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Sweden and Syria. But some representatives, including those of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran and Pakistan, stated that they would have 
voted for the U.S.S.R. draft resolution if it did not provide for 
"simultaneous" admission of a number of States.
A joint draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Cuba, El Salvador and 
India, provided that the General Assembly, j noting the growing general 
feeling in favour of the universality of the United Nations and the views 
of the Committee of Good Offices, would: (l) express appreciation of the 
work and efforts of that Committee ; (2) send back the pending applications
to the security Council, together with a full record of the discussions, 
for further consideration and positive recommendation; (5) suggest that 
the Council consider the desirability of invoking the provisions of para­
graph 2 of Article 28 of the Charter to help resolve the problem; (4) 
request/
20. Article 28, para 2 of the U.N. Charter provides that the Security 
Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members 
may, if it wishes, be represented by a member of the Government or 
other specially designated representative.
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request the Committee to continue its efforts; (5) and request the Council 
and the Committee of Good offices to report to the Assembly during the 
current session, if possible, and in any event, during the Tenth regular 
Session# This draft resolution, generally supported by the members was 
adopted unanimously by the Committee# An Indian and Indonesian motion 
not to vote on the other draft resolution was also adopted by a vote of 25 
to 24# with 6 abstentions# In consequence, no vote was taken on the other 
three draft resolutions* The General Assembly unanimously adopted the 
resolution recommended by the Committee*
In the Tenth Session, in 1955; the question was again discussed in the
First Committee. A 29-power draft resolution, introduced by Canada, and
co-sponsored by Pakistan, which sought to break the deadlock and to refer
the question back to the Security Council, was adopted as a whole by a roll-
call vote of 52 to 2, with 5 abstentions. This was adopted by the General
21Assembly, in the same form, by 52 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions.
In the meantime, the Soviet Union announced in the Security Council that
22it would withdraw its veto from the applications of sixteen states. The
U.S.S.R. then introduced a draft resolution to that effect, which was 
approved by the Security Council, by 8 votes to 0, with 5 abstentions 
(Belgium, China and the United States).
In the General Assembly, a 41“P0wer draft resolution, with Pakistan as 
co-sponsor was submitted for the admission of those sixteen states, whose 
admission had been recommended earlier, the same day, by the Security 
Council. The Assembly adopted it without any vote, since there was no 
objection.
21. G.A.O.R., 9th Session, 552nd Plenary Meeting, 8 December, 1955 
Resolution 918 (X). China and Cuba voted against, but Belgium, 
France, Greece, Israel and the United States abstained.
22. The Sixteen States were Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, 
Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Cambodia, 
Laos, Libya and Spain.
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The American abandonment of opposition in principle to "package deals" 
and both Soviet and American concessions regarding the content of the 
package, marked the end of the "Membership problem" which had existed 
for several years. Once the "log jam" had been broken in 1955* the new 
States, which emerged from the ashes of European Colonialism were hence­
forth admitted to the United Nations without any significant hinderanoe, 
with the exception of divided States which remained as an issue of the 
Cold War.
In 1956 and 1957» Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Japan, Ghana and Malaya were 
admitted to the Organisation. Palcistan co-sponsored resolutions for 
their admission. In 1957, the applications of South Korea, South Vietnam, 
North Korea and North Vietnam were discussed in the Political Committee. 
Pakistan supported redommending the applications of South Korea and South 
Vietnam, but abstained on those of North Korea and North Vietnam. The 
reason for abstention was explained by the representative of Pakistan in 
the following words:
" .......If however, a draft resolution was
presented that the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
accepted the obligation set forth in the Charter, 
particularly those of Article 1 and 4» the 
Pakistan delegation would examine those appli­
cations and vote in accordance with the principles
25he had just outlined. "
It should also be remembered that Pakistan voted in favour of the Resolution 
in 1950 which branded North Korea as an aggressor. Thus, on principle, 
Pakistan's abstention did not seem to be a deviation from its stand on 
admission of new members.
In 1958 and I96O, Guinea, Cameroun, Togo, Madagascar, Somalia, Congo, 
Dahoray,/
23. G .A .O .R ., 1 2 th  S e ss io n , S p e c ia l P o l i t i c a l  Com m ittee, 2 0 th  M e e ting ,
2 8 th  Ja nu a ry , 1957? P*9*
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Dahomy, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivoiy Coast, Chad, Congo (Leopoldville),
Gabon, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Mali, Senegal and Nigeria were
admitted as new members to the United Nations| Palcistan was a co-sponsor 
to the resolutions of fifteen of them. Welcoming the new States, the 
Pakistani representative said:
" «•••*•• on behalf of the Government and people of 
Pakistan, I warmly welcome the admission of the 
States of Africa and of Cyprus to the United Nations.
Belonging to a country which became free only a few 
years ago, we still retain the memoiy of the first 
©oatacy of becoming free. The tremendous upsurge 
of freedom which we have witnessed in the African
Continent during the last year or two now reaches
culmination in the admission of all these States 
to the United Nations.
In 1961, in the l6th Session, the General Assembly admitted Sierra Leone, 
Mongolian'People's Republic, Mauritania and Tanganyika to the United Nations. 
Pakistan voted for the admission of these states, except Mauritania on which 
it abstained; The reason being the claim by Morocco that Mauritania had 
been a part of it, even before the French gained control of the area. Now, 
Morocco has become independent; therefore, Mauritania should be restored 
back to it. But Ih’ench Colonial power was willing to give independence to 
Mauritania. It is necessary to mention that the population of Mauritania 
is also Muslim, Thus, Palcistan did not like to displease Morocco by voting 
in favour of Mauritania's admissbn, but at the same time, was happy that 
another Muslim State had come into being. The only course left for 
Pakistan was to abstain. The representative of Palcistan, explaining his 
abstention said that "futur*e developments would be only in the interests of 
the people of Mauritania."
In/
24. G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 865th Plenary Meeting, 20 September, 
i960, para,62.
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In 1962j Rwanda, Bnrundl, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Algeria, 
were admitted to the United Nations, Pakistan had been actively pleading 
the cause of Algerian Muslims in their struggle for independence. Thus, 
welcoming Algeria to the United Nations, the representative of Pakistan 
expressed his jubilation* He said;
" It is difficult for me to give adequate expression to
the emotions of joy and happiness we feel today as we
see the delegation of Algeria led by Prime Minister
Ben Bella, talce its rightful place in our midst* For
seven long years the people of Pakistan watched ■» often
with anguish, on occasions with anger, but always with
admiration and hope - the unflinching struggle of their
brothers across the ocean to breaic the shackles of
foreign bondage, become a free people and thus be
enabled truly to mould and shape their course of destiny#
Their sorrows were our sorrows? their sufferings found
an echo in our hearts. Today, as that long struggle
reaches culmination, with hearts elated with joy, we
welcome the representatives of Free Algeria here and
acclaim and salute the leaders of a people that fought
bravely, triumphed honourably and remained true to their 
25
cherished goal. "
In 1963 and 1964* Kuwait, Zanzibar, Kenya, Malawi, Malta and Zambia were
admitted. Then from I965 to I968, Gambia, Maldive Islands, Singapore,
Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, Barbados, Republic of Southern Yemen, Mauritius,
Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea were admitted as new Members to the United
Nations* Pakistan supported their admission* After the resolution of
of deadlock on the issue of membership, the newcomer states had been generally
out
admitted by aoclaimation witl/any significant hinderance.
Palcistands position, on the admission of new members had been almost completely 
consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter* It had 
supported the admission of all new states except Israel to the United Nations*
23" G.A.Q.R*. 17th Session, 1146th Plenary Meeting, 8 October, 1962, 
per*a. 168-170 •
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Pakistan* 8 policy on the Membership question had been mainly guided by 
its neutralistic attitude as it weighed each case on its merits. This 
seems to be in accordance with Pakistan's non-aligned policy which it 
followed from 1947 to 1952*
The Afro-Asian influence had been prominent because Pakistan fully identified 
itself with them by supporting the admission of all the new emerging States 
to the United Nations.
The Muslim influence had also been dominant on Pakistan's policy as 
Pakistan pleaded strongly the admission of all Muslim States to the United 
Nations by sponsoring and supporting resolutions. It has shovm a special 
fervour for the Muslim cause as it, first, vehemently opposed the creation 
of Israel and later opposed its admission to the United Nations.
The Cold War and alliance politics had not shown any effect on Pakistan* s 
policy. This might had been, because of the reason that when Pakistan 
joined the Western. Military Pacts in 1954 and 1955* the deadlock on the 
membership issue was on the verge of resolution. It had not sided with 
either of the blocs and had supported every measure which was talcen to 
widen the representation of the Organisation towards its goal of univer­
sality. This neutral attitude and respect for the United Nations Charter 
has been expressed by the Palcistani representative in the following words:
" It is regrettable that the efforts made during the 
last seven years had not culminated in a compromise.
The only visible change in the situation was that, 
instead of going to the root of the problem and 
diagnosing the real cause of the dilemma, an effort 
was now being made to violate the provisions of the 
Charter by twisting them right and left to serve the 
purposes of one party or the other. Such an attitude 
was Piysterical rather than practical. The peoples of 
the/
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the United Nations which had promised to respect 
the letter and spirit of the Charter, seemed 
determined to drift further and further apart*
Instead of practising tolerance and striving 
towards unity they seemed to have agreed to accom­
plish nothing# Such a deplorable state of affairs 
should be brought to an end if civilized and peace- 
loving nations were to survive. If an atmosphere 
of mutual understanding and reciprocal concession 
could not be created it was preferable to admit 
failure and to face its consequences rather than 
attempt flagrantly to violate the provisions of the 
Charter which should be preserved for posterity.
For the Pakistan delegation the provisions of the 
Charter stood inexorably in cold print and the ingen­
uous submission of certain members were unacceptable.
Any attempt to short-circuit the provisions of the 
Charter or to malce them serve partisan political ends 
would jeopardize the very foundations of the United 
Nations. There were no grounds for reading between 
the lines, however great the desire to attribute to 
certain articles more meaning than they actually 
contain*
Pakistan's position on this question had not been influenced by its power 
relation with India; As the question had been mainly a colonial one 
except for the admission of few European states. Therefore, there had not 
been any clash of interests between India and Pakistan* Their stand on 
this question had been almost similar.
Pakistan had also emphasised the importance of small states with respect 
to their role in the United Nations. It had attempted to make it clear 
that the United Nations, as an Organisation, should not be considered as a 
mistress of the Great Powers, but rather a Universal Organisation designed 
to promote the well-being of the human race through bénéficient co-operation.
26. G.A.O.R.* 8th Session, Ad. Hoc Political Committee, 4th Meeting,
5 October, 1953» p.13#
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CHAPTER IV
REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
A specific phenomena relating to the problem of the representation of 
China has been the principle of "Moralization”•
The United States, because of her International political interests, 
had become the main exponent of this view* It had repeatedly emphasised 
the importance of this principle for preserving the moral integrity of 
the United Nations and had firmly opposed 'the attempts of Governments to 
"shoot their way into the U.N." or to gain admission by "blackmail",' ^
The United States policy of non-recognition and non-admission vis-a-vis
Communist China constitutes a 'classic example of the "moralistic approach"
2to International politics*'
The U,b, Government, which has successfully prevented the Communist 
Government of China from occupying its place in the United Nations on 
moral and political grounds, has been accused of following a 'policy of 
contradiction' and applying double standards of morality* Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, who mainly defined the United. States position 
on the representation of China in moralistic terjninology, wrote in 195G, 
before becoming Secretary of State*
" If the Communist Government of China in fart 
proves its ability to govern China without 
serious domestic resistance, then it, too, 
should be admitted to the United Nations,
However, a regime that claims to have become 
the government of a country through civil war 
should not be recognised until it has been
3
tested over a, reasonable period of time* "
1. Inis L, Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, (2nd ed*), New Yorks 
Random House, 1959)» p.102,
2. Hans J, Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 3rd ed*, (New Yorks 
Knopf, 1963,), p.13.
3. John Poster Dulles, V/ar or Peace, (Londons Harrap & Co, Ltd*, 195G),
P.190.
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But in January, 1954» a-s Secretary of State, he expressed the opinion that 
the Nationalist's Government "represented the true aspirations and hopes 
of the Chinese people*"^
The hasic dilemma in American thinking concerning this question is well 
illustrated by the fact that the United States Government had insistently 
demanded that the Communist Chinese be branded unworthy to come to the United 
Nations as the real representatives of China, but, at the same time, it had 
supported the United Nations decision in 1955 that the Secretary-General may 
go to Peking for the release of imprisoned U,N. military personnel*
In the words of Professor Inis L* Claude s
" The fundamental tragedy of the moral!zation of 
membership issue is that it has been related 
consistently to a definite conception of what 
function the United Nations should perform in 
international relations* It has been a morali- 
zation in support of narrow and short-range 
political positions, (and in deference to popular 
opinion in the United States, rather than in align­
ment with a position concerning the possible and 
desirable constitutional development of the United 
Nations*
Palcistan's view?
Pakistan came into being in 1947 sind the People's Republic of China was 
established in October, 1949* In the two years that intervened between 
the establishment of the two states, the Pakistani attitude towards the 
Chinese/
4* Hearing before the U*S* Sènate, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Hearing 
Pt* I, at 20, cited in Quincy Wright, 'The Chinese Recognition 
Problem', in American Journal of International Law. Vol.49, 1955»P*331<
5* Claude, Op.oit., p*94*
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Chinese Civil V/ar was somewhat ambiguous# The Pakistani leadership,
though groomed in the traditions of parliamentary democracy and, therefore,
apprehensive of the communist victory in China, was not very enthusiastic
in its support for the existing Kuomintang regime# The reason for the
lack of any warmth on the part of Pakistan for Chaing Kai-Shek was that in
1942, during his visit to India, he had supported the Congress viewpoint
of a United India# This provoked immediate reaction among the Muslims#
Mohammed All Jinnah, in a statement regretted that "the Marshal (Chaing
Kai-Shek) should have indulged in generalities without understanding the
political situation in India and the constitutional adjustments which are
necessary" and that he should have expressed views "which may be exploited
6to the detriment of Muslim India#" Moreover, Pakistan, like most other
Asian countries, regarded the Chinese Revolution as the opening of a "new
chapter in Asian history* Its profound significance for the rest of Asia
arises from the fact that it is an indigenous revolution, bred essentially
in an Asian environment# Whatever the sources of its emotional aspiration,
7
it does not owe its birth and fruition to foreign influence."
Pakistan recognised the communist government in Peking on 4 January 1950, 
within a few days of India's decision to do so# The press communique, 
announcing the recognition expressed that the Government of Pakistan 
"trusts that friendly and cordial relations between China and Pakistan 
will be cemented in all spheres to their mutual advantage#"®
The defeat of the Nationalist Government and the establishment of a 
Communist/
6# Jamil-ud-Din Ahmed, ed#. Some Recent Speeches and V/ritings of 
Mr* Jinnah (Lahore* AshraZ^ Tÿ^^3j,'^^deTrj PP*337"33Q*
7# Mushtaq Ahmed, 'Pakistan's Policies in Southeast and East Asia', 
in PaidBtan Horizon (Karachi), Vol#4*, 1951, P*88#
8. Dawn (Karachi), 5 January, 1950*
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Gomimmist Chinese Government on the Malnlard of China, raised a delicate 
question, that of who should represent China in the United Nations. The 
question was of great significance, since China was a permanent member of 
the Security Council.
The United States view was that, since the Communists had gained control 
over the country by force, their government could not be recognised as a 
legitimate government. Moreover, the Western bloc was pessimistic about 
the future behaviour of the communist government with respect to its obliga­
tion as a member of the United Nations.
The question of Chinese representation came before the United Nations at 
the end of 1949* The Foreign Minister of the People's Government of China 
in a cablegram to the President of the General,Assembly, repudiated the 
legal status of the Nationalist delegate to represent China in the United 
Nations. In the Security Council, on 29 December, 1949» the representative 
of the Soviet Union endorsed the position taken up by the People's Govern­
ment of China, but the matter was not included in the agenda. In the 
meantime, the communist government was recognised by many states, communist 
as well as non-communist, as the general de facto government of China,
Professor Lauterpacht, in a letter to the London Times, published on 6th 
January, 1950» suggested by setting forth principles of International Law, 
that it was an obligation to recognise the new People's Government of China, 
The United Kingdom Government officially circulated this statement and 
recognised the People's Government of China on 10 January 1950.
At the 459th Meeting of the Security Council, on 10 January 1950, the repre­
sentative of the UwSS.R. submitted a draft resolution for not recognising 
the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of China, and for 
seating/
79
seating the People's Government in, its place# The representative of the 
Soviet Union wa,med that if the Council did not talce appropriate measures 
for seating the communist delegate and excluding the Nationalist Delegate 
the U.S.S.R. delegation would not talce part in the work of the Council.
The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was rejected by the Council by a vote of 3 in 
favour (India, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia) to 6 against, with 2 abstentions 
(Norway and the United Kingdom).
On 9 March 1950, the United Nations Secretary-General circulated a Memo­
randum on the legal aspect of the representation of States in the United 
Nations. The Memorandum stated that the primary difficulty in the current 
question of the representation of Member States in the United Nations was 
that the question of representation had been linked up with the question of 
recognition by Governments of member states. After arguing that the linlcage 
was unfortunate from the practical standpoint of legal theory, the memorandum 
concluded that the proper principle could be derived by analogy from Article 
4 of the Charter. Article 4 required that an applicant for membersWp must 
be able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership* The obli­
gations of membership could be carried out only by governments which, in 
fact, possessed the power to do so. Where a revolutionary government 
presented itself as representing a State, in rivalry to an existing govern­
ment, the question at issue should be which of these two governments, in 
fact, was in a position to employ the resources and direct the people of 
the state in the fulfillment of the obligations of membership. This, in 
essence, meant an enquiry as to whether the new government exercised effec­
tive authority within the territory of the state and was habitually obeyed 
by the bulk of the population; if so, the memorandum stated, it would seem 
to be appropriate for the United Nations Organs, through their collective 
action, to accord the new government the right to represent the state in 
the/
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the Organisation, even though individual members of the Organisation 
refused, and continue to refuse, to accord that Government recognition as 
the lawful government for reasons which were valid under their national
9
policies
After the rejection of the Soviet draft resolution, in the Security Council, 
the scene shifted to the General Assembly* At the opening meeting (277th 
.Plenary Meeting) of its fifth Session on 19 September 1950, the General 
Assembly was confronted with four draft resolutions on Chinese represen­
tation even before the Assembly had elected its president or organised for 
the work of the Session*
An Indian draft resolution noted that China was a member of the United
Nations and that "the obligation of a member  ........can not be carried
out except by a government which, with a reasonable expectancy of permanence 
actually exercises control over the territory of that Member and comimnde 
the obedience of its people", and called upon the General Assembly to re­
cognise that the Chinese Communist Government was the only such government 
functioning in "the Republic of China as now constituted" and to decide 
that it W8,8 entitled to representation in the General Assembly? it was 
rejected by a vote of 16 in favour to 33 against, with 10 abstentions.^®
The representative of Palcistan supported the Indian draft Resolution, and 
it was as enthusiastic as the representative of India in advocating the 
cause of the communist government of China.
The representative of Sweden stated that he would support the Indian draft 
resolution/
9* United Nations Memorandum, Security Council Document. No: S/1466,
9 March, 1950, text from International Organisation. May 1950, p.356*
10. Votes in favour were of Afghanistan, Burma, Bylo-Russian SSR, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, India, Israel the Netherlands, Norway, 
Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, Ultraine SSR, United Kingdom, U.S.S.R. and 
Yugoslavia. The abstaining states were Equador, Egypt, France, 
Guatemala, Lebanan, Suadi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Argentina and Canada.
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resolution on the grounds that the People's Republic had control over
nearly all the territory of China and therefore was the only de facto
Government of the country. No government was obliged to recognise the
situation de jure but it was an unequivocal fact that the Chinese were
no longer represented by the Nationalistic Government, now residing in 
11Formosa,
The Assembly then adopted in two parts an amended Canadian draft resolution 
'referring the question of Chinese representation to a special committee 
which should defer its report until the Assembly had considered the general 
question of "Recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a 
Member State", and resolving that pending the report by the Special Committee 
"the representatives of the National Government of China shall be seated in 
the General Assembly with the same rights as other representatives." The 
vote on the first part, that is to refer the question to a Special Committee 
was 38 to 6, with 11 abstentions, and on seating the Nationalist's repre­
sentatives, the vote was 42 to 8, with 6 abstentions. Pakistan abstained 
on the first part but voted against on the second.
Two Soviet draft resolutions calling for the exclusion of the Chinese 
Nationalist delegation "because they are not the representatives of China " 
(A/1569) and seating the Chinese communist representatives were defeated in 
the Assembly, by a vote of 38 against to 10 in favour, with 8 abstentions 
and by 38 against to 11 in favour, with 8 abstentions respectively.
Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolutions.
The representative of Pakistan, while speaking in the General Debate on 
the question of the representation of China, disagreed with the view 
expressed/
11. G.A.O.R., 5th Session, 277th Plenary Meeting, 19 September 1950#
P.15.
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expressed by the United States and declared that :
" The Western considerations are irrelevant to 
the issue. It was also irrelevant to consider 
whether the new Government was peace-loving or 
not and whether it is able and willing to dis­
charge its obligations under the Charter as 
required by Article 4* These provisions 
related to the admission of new members and not 
to the validity of representation with which
12alone the Assembly was concerned at the moment."
"The sole question", said Sir Zafrulla Khan is, "who is entitled to 
represent China?"
" The Government, from which the delegation present 
here purports to draw its authority has for months 
ceased to exercise jurisdiction over any portion of
the Chinese mainland. ...... ....... . . . . .
..... ...... the truth of the matter is that the
General Assembly is unwilling to concede the existence 
of a fact, not because the fact has not been established, 
but the majority regard it as unpleasent,• It is easy 
to conceive what the verdict would have been, had the 
position reversed, and it is this reflection that is 
so disquieting.
A similar opinion was expressed by Professor Quincy Wright, an American 
authority on International Law. Supporting ’ claim of the Communist
Government of China to membership, i n  the United Nations, he declared :
" While the United States may not be under a positive 
obligation to recognise the communist government as 
the government of China, that government appears to 
be the general de facto government of China and as 
such is alone capable of commuting China under 
International/
12. G.A.O.R.. 5th Session, 285 Plenary Meeting, 25 September 1950, 
p.96.
15. Ibid., p.97.
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International Law and alone entitled to represent 
China in International transactions; it would, 
therefore, appear that the United States should no 
longer support the representation of China by the 
Nationalist Government or oppose its representation 
by the Gomiminist Government in the United Nations 
and the Specialised Agencies.
He further emphasised that this was only a question of 'Credentials’ for 
the United Nations,
" while the communist government can be admitted to 
represent China through the normal process of 
accepting the credentials of its delegation in 
the various organs of the United Nations. It 
would appear that after such recognition, the 
Government of Formosa can only be represented in 
the United Nations, if it is admitted as the
1*5government of a new state by the normal process. "
Professor Inis L. Claude, an authority on International Organisations, has 
also supported the view expressed by the representative of Pakistan on 
the question of China's representation.
" The Chinese problem", he said, "which has been a 
cause oelebre in the United Nations since 1950, is 
technically a matter of credentials, closely tied 
to the problem of recognition.
The Special Committee created on the basis of the Canadian resolution 
consisted of the representatives of Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, 
the Philippines and Poland, It held meetings but failed to arrive at any 
solution and expressed its inability to maJce any recommendations to the 
Assembly on the representation of China.
14' Quincy Wright, 'The Chinese Recognition Problem', in the American 
Journal of International Law. Vol.49. (1955)» P*336.
15. Ibid, p.537.
16, Claude, Op,cit., p.104.
84
In the meantime, the Korean War - which started in June 1950 - had great 
affect on the issue of the representation of China in the United Nations.
Many of the Western States which in 1950 had voted in favour of admitting 
Communist China to the United Nations as the real representative government 
of the Chinese people, changed their opinion, because of China's partici­
pation in the Korean War# The United States resolution which branded the
People's Republic of China, as aggressor, had been adopted by the Assembly
17by a vote of 44 to 7» with 9 abstentions#
The United Kingdom representative who earlier was in favour of Communist 
China's admission to the United Nations supported the United States draft 
resolution which branded Communist China aggressor in Korea. He said that 
the fact that Peking Government had participated in the aggression in Korea 
was clear. To reject that paragraph, he stated, would be to undermine the 
whole moral basis of the United Nations.
Pakistan, on the other hand, voted in favour of that resolution which 
branded North Korea as an aggressor in the war but abstained on the resolu­
tion which sought to brand China as an aggressor. Pakistan also abstained 
on the resolution which sought to impose an embargo on North Korea and China.
As a Pakistani writer has remarked, "This inde%)endent approach to cold war 
issues paved the way for mutual friendship between Pakistan and China. The 
foundation of that friendship was so firmly laid that the latter developments 
in/
17* The votes in favour were of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethipia, France, Greece, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Nonfay, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Union of 
South Africa, The United Kingdom, The United States, Venezuela and 
Uruguay. Against were Burma, Bylorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, India, 
Poland, Ultraine SSR, and the U.S.S.R, Abstaining States were 
Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Paidstan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria 
Yemen and Yugoslavia. This Resolution 498 (V) was adopted at $27th 
Plenary Meeting on 1 Pebruanqy, 1951,
85
in Palcistan's foreign policy did not destroy it."^®
In April 1951» Pakistan also exchanged diplomatic representatives with the 
Peking Government#
In the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in 1951» the question of 
China's representation was discussed in the General Committee# Thailand 
proposed an oral draft resolution for postponing the consideration of the 
question and against its inclusion in the agenda; it was adopted by 11 
votes to 2, with one abstention# The recommendations of the General 
Committee were considered by the General Assembly at its 342nd Plenary 
Meeting on 13 November 1951» The representatives of Burma and the U.S#S#R* 
strongly pressed for the inclusion of the item in the agenda# The repre­
sentatives of Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and 
the United States spoke in support of the recommendation of the General 
Committee# These representatives recalled that by Resolution 498 (V) of 
1st February 1951» the General Assembly had condemned the Central People's 
Government for committing an act of aggression in Korea • That government 
could hardly be held to qualify for admission into the very Organisation 
against which it was engaged in aggression. After the discussion, the
recommendations of the General Committee were adopted by the Assembly by
1937 votes to 11, with 4 abstentions# Pakistan voted against the resolution#
The question of the representation of China was not discussed by the General 
Assembly at the 7th Session in 1952.
At the Eighth Session of the General Assembly, in 1953# the representative 
of/
18, A Staff Study, 'Pakistan's Relation with the people's Republic of 
China', in Pakistan Horizon. Vol.14, (1961), p.217#
19# The States which voted against were Afghanistan, Burma, Bylorussian 
SSR, Czechoslovakia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Poland, Ulcralne SSR, 
U.S.S.R# and Yugoslavia# The abstaining States were Egypt, Sweden, 
Syria and Yemen.
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of the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution at the Plenary Meeting, 
for seating the representative of the People's Republic of China.
At the same time, the representative of the United States moved a draft 
resolution for the postponing of a discussion on the admission of the 
People's Republic of China, for not removing the representative of the 
Republic of China from the United Nations? and for voting first on the 
United States draft resolution.
,The proposal to vote first on the United States draft resolution was adopted
by 40 votes to 8, with 8 abstentions and the United States draft resolution
was then adopted by a vote of 44 to 10 with 2 abstentions. A proposal, 
not to vote on the Soviet draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 35 to
11, with 11 abstentions. Pakistan voted in favour of the United States
resolution. India, Burma, Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc voted against the
United States resolution.
The change in Pakistan's position in 1953» with respect to the representation 
of China in the United Nations had been the result of a change in Palcistan's 
foreign policy. The change in Pakistan's foreign policy was the need of 
the hour, as Professor G.¥. Choudhury has explained*
" In the Years 1947"*1952, when Pakistan tried to maintain 
non-involvement in the East-West Gold V/ar, it felt 
isolated and friendless. This increased her sense of 
insecurity, and she felt the need of the support of 
some bigger power. The link with the Commonwealth and 
friendly relations with the Muslim countries could not 
solve the problem of security and they failed to give 
Palcistan the freedom from fear which Is needed for a 
country's progress and stability. This led to the 
abandonment of the policy of non-alignment, and in 1955 
there opened the second phase of Pakistan's foreign 
policy. 'India and Palcistan as factors in each other's 
foreign/
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foreign policy and relations* became more
prominent and the shadow of the East-West
Cold War was oast over the disputes of the
two countries. "The quest for security,
the search for friends and allies, and the
anxiety to maintain territorial integrity,
led Palcistan to pursue a policy of alliance
with the West, particullarly with the United
States." In the early part of 1954» Pakistan
accepted new International commitments which
drastically redefined her position in world 
20affairs.
Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the United 
States in May 1954 and joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation 
(BEATO) in September, 1954" In February 1955» Pakistan also joined the 
Baghdad Pact.
In the following years, at the 9th, 10th and 11th Sessions of the General 
Assembly, in 1954» 1955 snd 1956 respectively, the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States presented draft resolutions similar to those of the 8th Session of 
1955" Each time, the United States draft resolution was adopted for 
postponing discussion on the question of China's representation to the 
United Nations. Palcistan consistently voted for the United States resolu­
tions. Many delegates, like those of India, the United Kingdom and 
Yugoslavia, maintained their respective positions.
The formation of SEATO was a direct provocation to China, Peking Radio
described it as "an aggressive military alliance hostile to the people of
21China and various Asian countries."
Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, who was an advocate of non-alignment, 
used/
20. GoW. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relation with India (1947-1966). 
(London* Pall Mali Press/T968]," p.255.
21. The Statesman (New Delhi), 5 September, 1954*
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used Palcistan's participation in these Pacts as a propaganda tool to 
discredit her among the Afro-Asians.
It is interesting to note that whereas India and the Soviet Union lodged 
strong protest notes with the Pakistan Govemment against its membership in 
the Pacts, China did not bother to send even a formal note of disapproval to 
Pakistan's new policy* The reason for this was that China had foreseen 
the convergence of interest with Pakistan and had felt that friendly relations 
with Pakistan would be useful in a possible clash with India in the future, 
which was trying to pose as a rival for Asian leadership*
Moreover, Pakistan's Ambassador in Peking, Major-General Raza, explained to 
the Chinese leaders, the reasons which had prompted Pakistan to join the 
SEATO and other Western sponsored military Pacts* ' Pakistan's Prime Minister, 
Mohammed All Bogra further assured Mr* Chou En-lai, in the Bandung Conference 
in April 1955» that SEATO was a defensive alliance as far as Pakistan was 
concerned and that Palcistan had entered into the Pacts to defend itself from 
aggression and not because of any hostility towards China, Thus, Mr. Chou 
En-lai announced at a meeting of the political committee of the Bandung
Conference that the Pakistani Prime Minister has assured him that although
Palcistan was a party to a military treaty,
Palcistan was not against China, Pakistan had no 
fear that China would permit aggression against her.
As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding 
although we are still against military treaties. The 
Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured that if the 
United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not
be involved in it ...............  .... .. I am
grateful to him for this explanation because through
22these explanations we achieved mutual understanding, "
An understanding between China and Palcistan of the convergence of interests 
vis-a-vis/
22, Mew York Times. 25 April, 1955<
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vis-a-vis India has been further confirmed by a revealing note of
Professor Eushbrook Williams, He States;
" Following on the Bandung Conference . Karachi
received - as I have been assured on unimpeachable
authority - a private message from Peking. The
Chinese People's Government assured the Government
of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of
interests between the tim countries which could
imperil their friendly relations but that this
position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations,
in which a definite conflict of interests could be
23expected in the near future. "
This understanding in Bino-Pakistani relations was maintained in the
following years, for, in October 1956, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, U.S.
Suhrawardy visited China and in December 1956, Mr. Chou En-lai visited
Palcistan, By the communique which was issued in Karachi, the two Prime
Ministers declared that "there is no real conflict of interests between
the two countries." They added that the "difference between the
political systems of Pakistan and the divergence of views on many problems
should not prevent the strengthening of friendship between their two 
24countries. "
In July, 1957» Mao Tse-tung made a statement that
" The Government of China was going to be neutral
on its attitude to the rival claims to the States
of Jammu and Kaslvnir and that in his view it would
be wise for other communist countries also to
25maintain strictneiitrality on the issue. "
To Pakistan, the attitude of a nation on Kashmir is "the touchstone by
26which friendship and animosity are tested." Pakistan, therefore, abstained 
on/
25. L.P. Eushbrook Williams, The State of Palcistan (London: Faber and 
Faber, I962), p,120.
24. K.S. Hasan, Documents on the Forei,w Policy of Palcistan: China,
India and Pakistan, (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International
MfSrsT^T966^ 365. See also Dawn 25th December, 1956
25. Dawn9 (Karachi), 21 July, 1957*
26. Werner Levi's 'Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China*, Pacific
Vol.35 (1962), p.222.
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on the United States resolution on the question of Chinese representation 
in tlie General Assembly in 1957* It appears from this voting behaviour 
in 1957» that the Government of Palcistan adopted a neutral policy on the 
Chinese issue, similar to that which Chairman Mao announced on Kashmir.
Thus, it is clear that Palcistan was following a policy of 'give and take* 
in the pursuit of its national interests.
In 1958» at the 13th Session of the General Assembly, the Chinese question 
was considered by the General Committee, at the request of India, The 
representative of the United States proposed a draft resolution whereby 
the Assembly would: (a) decide to reject the request of India for inclusion 
of the item in the agenda, and (b) decide further not to consider at its 
13th Session, any proposal to exclude the representatives of the People's 
Republic of China, The United States draft resolution was approved by the 
General Committee by 12 votes to 7» with 2 abstentions«
The General Assembly discussed the Committees report on 22nd and 23rd 
November 1958. Two amendments to the Committee's United States sponsored 
resolution were submitted jointly by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India, 
Indonesia, Nepal and the United Arab Republic. By these amendments the 
nssembly would (l) accede to, rather than reject, the request that the 
item on the representation of China be put on its agenda, and (2) delete 
the provision not to consider any proposal to exclude the representatives 
of China or seat the representative of the communist government at the 13th 
Session. These amendments were rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 40 
against to 29 in favour, with 12 abstentions and 4I to 29, with 11 absten­
tions. The Assembly then adopted the Committee's recommendations by 44 
votes to 28, with 9 abstentions, Pakistan voted for the resolution.
The change in the voting attitude of Palcistan in 1958, again in support 
of the United States resolution is not clear from the speech, of Pakistan's 
delegate/
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delegate in the United Nations* The possible assumption is that 
because of instability of the coalition government at Karachi, the new
government of Malik Firoz Khan Noon was too concerned with internal
\
problems of party politics to pay attention to foreign policy* Therefore, 
the decision to vote for the United States resolution might have been 
based on the personal view of the Pakistani delegate at the United Nations.
At the 14th Session of the General Assembly, in 1959» the United States 
proposed a draft resolution similar to that of the 15th Session* Nepal 
introduced two amendments by which the General Assembly would (l) accede 
to rather than reject the request that the item on the representation of 
China be put on the Assembly's agenda, and (2) delete the provisions not 
to consider any proposal to exclude the representatives of the Republic of 
China or to seat the representatives of the People's Republic of China at 
the 14th Session* These amendments were rejected by the Assembly by a 
vote of 41 against to $0 in favour, with 11 abstentions* The voting was 
identical to that of the IJth session* Pai^ lstan voted for the United 
States resolution*
It is necessary to mention that in October 1958» General Mohammed Ayub Khan 
came to power by a military coup d'etat* Ho was the main supporter for 
the policy of alignment with the United States in 1954* The Military 
Government, therefore, reverted to the old policy of supporting the United 
States resolution, i.e. that discussion on the question of representation 
of the People's Republic of China be postponed. In the same year, the 
political events in the Indo-Pak sub-continent took a dramatic tuzvi because 
of the revolt in Tibet and because of the first major clashes on the Sino- 
Indian border*^ *^
27. After the revolt in Tibet, the Dalai Lama fled and took political
asylum in India. This put serious strain on Indo-Chinese relations.
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President Ayub Khan made an offer to India for joint-defenoe of the sub­
continent? a step which seemed to run counter to the policy followed 
consistently by the previous governments of doing nothing to provoke the 
ire of the government of China* But the offer was made with the rider 
that outstanding disputes between the two countries, especially the dispute 
over Kashmir, should be satisfactorily settled*
Prime Minister Nehru of India rejected the offer out of hand with the
remark "joint-defence against whom?" He asserted that "the real motive
28behind Pakistan's offer was not joint-defence but Kashmir*"
In spite of this offer, no criticism came from Peking* It seems evident
that China's silence was the result of Sino-Palcistan understanding and that
China deliberately gave Pakistan this opportunity for maximum political
29manœuverability on the Kashmir question* After the rejection of the 
joint-defence offer by India, within a few months Pakistan and China agreed 
in principle for the demarcation of Azad Kashmir - Sinlciang border.
In the 15th Session of the General Assembly in I96O, the United States 
proposed a draft resolution similar to that of 1959 and Nepal also sponsored 
similar amendments. After the rejection of the Nepalese amendments, the 
General Assembly adopted the United States draft resolutions as a whole, 
by 42 votes to 34, with 22 abstentions, Pakistan voted for the resolution.
The/
28. Times of India (New Delhi), 2 May, I96O,
29. China must have felt that if Palcistan got Kashmir as a gift, there 
would be no problem to secure the strategic areas in Ladakh from 
Palcistan, Moreover, China had made long term calculations for 
rapprochement with Pakistan. The two nations had co-operated 
before and even during the American alliance* China had earmarked 
India as a major enemy on the Western flank for both idological and 
strategic reasons. To wealcen India at the proper time, the co­
operation of Palcistan had long been contemplated. For details, see 
Russell Brines, The Indo-FaldLstani Conflict. (London: Pall Mall, 
1966), P.183.
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The support for the representation of the People's Government of China in 
the United Nations gradually increased after the resolution of deadlock 
on the admission of members. This was because of the admission of new 
Afro-Asian States• The support was more than double in I96O, as it has 
increased from 16 in 1950 to 34 iu I96O. On 15th July I96I, Manaur Qadir 
then Palcistan's Foreign Minister, announced that "the Government of China
30
had agreed in principle to the demarcation of its border with Pakistan."
This was a diplomatic off ensue against India,s rejection for co-operation and 
settlement of the Kashmir problem.
In the l6th Session of the General Assembly, in 196I, there were two draft 
resolutions on the issue of Chinese represeniation submitted by the U.S.S.R 
and the United States,
By the operative part of the U.S.S.R. draft resolution the Assembly would:
(a) resolve, 'to remove immediately from all United Nations organs the 
representatives of the Chiang Kai-Shek clique who are unlawfully occupying 
the place of China in the United Nations' ; and (b) invite the government 
of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to partici­
pate in the work of the United Nations.
The second, a five-power draft resolution, was submitted by Australia, 
Colombia, Italy, Japan and the United States. By the preamble to this 
text, the Assembly would: (a) note that a serious divergence of views 
existed among members concerning the representation of a founder member 
named in the United Nations Charter; (b)recall that the matter had been 
repeatedly described in the Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital 
and crucial and that its inclusion in the agenda had on many occasions been 
requested/
30. Dawn (Karachi), I6 July, I96I.
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requested under the Assembly's rules of procedure as an item of an impor­
tant and urgent character; and (c) further recall the recommendation made 
in Assembly resolution 596(v) of I4 December 1950, that 'whenever more than 
one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a member 
state in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of 
controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the 
light of the purposes and principles of the Ch^ ixter and circumstances of 
each case.*
By the operative part of the five-power draft resolution, the Assembly
would decide, in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, that any proposal
to change the representation of China was an 'important question* and, there-
51fore required two-thirds majority.
It is interesting to note that the United States draft resolution to declare 
the representation of China as an 'important question* was a departure from 
her previous policy to postpone the discussion of the question. The reason 
for this was that after the resolution of the membership deadlock, a good 
number of Afro-Asian States were admitted to the United Nations. The 
emergence of Afro-Asians as an important new bloc in the United Nations 
changed the balance of voting in the General Assembly. This required that 
the United States should adopt such measures which could withhold in future 
the admission of communist China to the United Nations.
On 12 December I96I, Colombia, Ceylon and Indonesia submitted an amendment 
to the U.S.S.R. draft resolution, by which they sought to replace the oper­
ative paragraph of the U.S.S.R. text by this new paragraphs that "the 
representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China be 
seated/
31. Article 18, para.2., of the U.N. Charter, states: "Decision of 
the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a 
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."
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seated in the United Nations and all its organs," After a lengthy 
debate the Assembly voted on the two draft resolutions and améndments 
on 15 December 196I. It decided by a vote of 6l to 21 with 20 absten­
tions to vote first on the five-power draft resolution. The five-power 
draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 6l to 34» with 7 
abstentions. Pakistan voted against the resolution.
The assembly then rejected the three-power amendment to the U.S.S.R. draft 
resolution by a vote of 45 against to 30 in favour, with 29 abstentions. 
The U.S.S.R. draft resolution was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 
48 against to 36 in favour, with 20 abstentions^^ Pakistan voted in 
favour of the draft resolution. This change in Pakistan's attitude was 
in accordance with her foreign policy because the official reason given 
for Palcistan's vote for the United States sponsored resolutions in the 
past was "that the Government wanted to defer a decision on the represen­
tation of Communist China until this change was more nearly unanimously 
favoured ,"
Since the United States, recognising this favourable change in voting for 
Communist China, embarked upon a more secure path by sponsoring resolution 
requiring a two-thirds majority, Pakistan's change of vote was not 
surprising because it was waiting for a sijnilar voting situation.
It is worth noting that India, which was very active and vocal for the 
representation of communists in the United Nations from 1950 to 1959» 
adopted/
32, The States which voted for the U.S.S.R. draft resolution were 
Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Bylo-Russian SSR, Cambodia, 
Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethipia, Finland, Ghana, 
Guinea, Hungaiy, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Mongolian People's 
Republic, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan. Poland, Romania, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Ulcraine, SSR, The U.S.S.R., the
United Kingdom, U.A.R., Yemen and Yugoslavia
33. Werner Levi, 'Palcistan, the Soviet Union and China', Pacific
Affairs. Vol.35., I962, p.219.
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adopted en attitude of silence from I96O, although it voted against the 
United States resolutions. This seems to he due to the deterioration of 
Indo-Chinese relations. On the other hand, Pakistan was becoming more 
active in support of the Chinese cause in and outside the United Nations,
For ex-President Mohammed Ayub Khan, on his visit to the United States, 
openly declared for China's representation in the United Nations, when he 
said:
" We had, of course, all along been of the view that
China had a right to be in the United Nations, I
had made my position clear during my visit to the
United States, I had publicly stated it was only
fair to allow the People's Republic of China to
occupy her legitimate position in the United Nations,
And for this I was criticised in the American press
which felt that as a guest in their country I should
not go openly against the American position on the 
54question. "
As mentioned earlier, the agreement was reached in principle between Palcistan 
and China for the demarcation of their common border in Azad Kaslimir. India 
protested to China that Palcistan v/as not legally authorised to reach an 
agreement idth China since Kashmir was a part of India. The Chinese govern­
ment, in reply to an Indian protest note on Sino-Paicistani border talks, 
rejected the Indian contention that the Government of China have ever 
accepted India 's sovereignty over Kaslimir. It stated s
" ........ this allegation is totally untenable; when
did the Chinese government accept without any reser­
vation the position that Kashmir is under Indian 
sovereignty? The Indian government could not cite 
any official Chinese document to prove this arbitrary 
contention. But, basing itself solely on the guess 
and impression of Indian diplomatic officials who have 
been to China, insisted that Chinese government 
authorities had made statements to that effect. This 
is not only a unilateral misrepresentation of the fact 
but a conclusion imposed on others, to which the/
34* Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1967)» p.162.
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the Chinese government categorically object.
The talk on border demarcation between Pakistan and China opened in Peking 
on 12 October 1962, a few days before the outbreak of war on the Sino- 
Indian border. The Indo-Chinese war of October-November 1962 brought about 
a drastic change in the situation. Massive military aid from the United 
States to India changed the balance of power in the sub-contient.
Pakistan regarded Western military aid to India as a direct threat to its 
security. Pakistan thus protested to the United States and refused to 
recognise the American justification for the supply of arms to India. A 
Pakistani writer has summed up well the situation in the following words:
” In 1962 it looked as if American policy in South 
Asia had turned a full circle. V/hen the United 
States signed the Mutual Defence assistance 
Agreement in May 1954» it was followed by deterioa- 
tion in Indian-Amerioan relations and an improvement 
in India’s relations with China. %en the United 
States decided to extend military aid to India in 
the walce of the Sino-Indian border war in October,
1962, relations between the United States and 
Pakistan took a sharp turn for the worse, and 
relations between Pakistan and China were lifted to 
a higher level of cordiality, :But a reappraisal of 
American policy towards India and Pakistan, wa,s 
going on ever since President Kennedy came to power 
in 1961. Even before, some of the liberal intel­
lectuals in the Democratic Party had put forward 
the view that India, being the most Influential and 
powerful democracy in Asia, should be supported by 
the West in the ideological and power struggle that
was taking place in Asia between the Pree World and
I I56the Communist Power like China.
An/
55» Peking Review, 8 June, I962, pp.12-15*
56. Khalid B. Sayeed, Ihe Political System of Pakistan (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Gompany,^9W) »" ™
An emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan was called 
to discuss the "emergency situation arising out of large scale supply 
of arms to India.” In the course of debate, Mohammed Ali Bogra, the 
then Foreign Minister - who, as Prime Minister in 1955» wa.s the Chief
Architect of Alliance policy with the United States - stated*
” The present au^entation in India’s military
strength and warlike stores and the assistance
now being extended by our friends to India is
going to seriously aggravate the situation
against us and to our great disadvantage* This
is a matter of grave concern to us and we cannot
57afford to accept this position complacently*
The Palcistani Foreign Minister further declared*
” In International relations there can be no
eternal friends, nor can there be entemal
enemies* The only thing eternal is the
national interest.........   ••**•*.
If friends let us down, we shall not consider
them as friends. Friends that stand by us
58we shall stand by them.
In the United Nations, the General Assembly, discussed the representation 
of China between 22nd and 50th October 1962. The Soviet Union submitted 
a draft resolution by which the General Assembly would consider it necessary 
to restore the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the 
United Nations and bear in mind that only the representatives of the 
government of the People’s Republic were competent to occupy China’s place 
in the United Nations and all its organs. The Assembly would also resolve 
”to remove the Chiang Kai-Shek representatives from all United Nations 
Organs” and to invite representatives of the government of the People’s 
Republic/
57* Palclstan National Assembly. Debates. 1962, Vol.2*, (Karachi* 
Goverpment of Palcistan, 1962,) p.4.
58. Ibid., p.10.
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Republic of China to occupy Chinde place in the United Nations and all 
its organs*
The representatives of the Republic of China, Australia, the Central 
African Republic, Colombia, the Congo (Uraaaaville), Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, 
the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Thailand, and the United States 
expressed opposition to the U*S*S*R, draft resolution*
The ÏÏ.S.S.R. draft resolution was supported by the Soviet bloc and the 
Afro-Asian non-aligned States.
In the debate the representative of India observed that the People's 
Republic of China had committed "flagrant, massive and premediated 
aggression" on the Eastern and Western sectors of India's territory, while 
glibly talking of peaceful negotiations. His delegation believed that 
the only effective way to check "Chinese military adventurism" was to make 
it accept its responsibilities as a member of the Organisation and thereby 
be subject to the views and disciplines of the United Nations.
In the voting the U.S.S.R* Draft was rejected by the Assembly by 42 votes 
in favour to 56 against, with 12 abstentions. Palcistan actively supported 
the U.S.S.R. draft resolution for the representation of People's China to 
the United Nations.
On the other side, Pak-American relations reached their lowest ebb. In 
spite of vehement protests from Pakistan, the American Military aid to India 
continued. This American attitude of 'wholesale indifference' led to a 
full reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy. The result was that Palci- 
8tan turned to China for military assistance and support. The Border 
Agreement between Palcistan and China was signed on 2 March I965. This 
smoothed/
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smoothed the path for further collaboration and proved Schelling's 
dictum that:
" in bargains of mutual convenience, especially
where there is not even a pretence at the sharing of 
fundamental values between the parties, it was the 
letter rather than the spirit of the bargain that 
counts, and loyalty to partners is Involved only 
slightly, if at all,
Pakistan thus, became an active supporter of the Chinese cause in the 
United Nations and since then the relations between Pal-cistan and China 
became closer than ever before.
On 17 July, 1965» Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Z*A.Bhutto, declared 
in the National Assembly in the course of a debate on foreign policy, 
that an attack on Pakistan by India would involve the "largest state in 
Asia".^^ These remarks were interpretted in the press as referring to 
China.
In October I965, Bhutto, when asked about China's assurance of support 
to Pakistan in case of a war with India, replied: "There is no assurance, 
there is no agreement between China and Pakistan on this matter . ....
but there is a strong assumption*
Ihrther collaboration between the two countries took plaCe by signing 
an Air Transit Agreement and a Barter Trade Agreement. The United States
before the signing of *bhe Agreement announced that it was "an unfortunate
4-2breach of Free World solidarity," The instant American reaction was 
that/
Some Critical Issues, in International Stability mid Progress :
U.S. ^teres'ts and Instruments (Nex7 York; The Assembly. 1956!). p.l40.
40. Paltistan National Assembly. Debates I963, Vol.2 (Karachi* Govern- 
ment "of Scistaii), pV
41. Morning News (Karachi). 9 October, I965.
42. D a m . (Karachi), 7 July, I965.
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that the United States government immediately decided to defer a /4«5
million loa,n which it had promised to Pakistan to build a new airport at 
45Dacca,
At the 18th session of the General Assembly, in 1965» a joint Albanian 
and Nepalese draft resolution - similar to that which the U.S.S.R. sub­
mitted at the 17th Session in I962 - for the representation of People's 
Republic of China was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of 4I in favour 
to 57 against, with 12 abstentions. Pakistan voted for the resolution.
The question of the representation of China was not discussed at the 19th 
Session of the General Assembly in I964,
In 1964, Chou-IGn-lai, visited Pakistan. At a dinner in honour of the 
visiting Prime Minister, President Ayub Khan indirectly criticised the 
United States for its military aid to India when he said "massive military 
preparations have never been the answer to international differences" and 
expressed that "we believe that the Sino-Indian boundary disputes can also 
be resolved through peaceful negotiations."^^ Both the leaders expressed 
the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the 
wishes of the people of Kaslirair as pledged by the United Nations resolutions.
President Ayub Khan returned the visit in March 1965» During his visit
the Pakistani President declared "friendship with China is for us a long
45 /term policy and not a matter of expediency." The joint communique once
again mentioned that the Kashmir issue should be resolved by the exercise
of the right of self-determination by the Kashmiri people, under the United
Nations/
45" New York Times. 5I August, I965. 
44* New York Times, 21 February, I964. 
45" Da%m, 6 March, I965.
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Nations supervision as pledged by India and Pakistan. The President of 
Pakistan also "reiterated the firm belief of the Government and People of 
PaJcistan that the People's Republic of China should be restored its lawful 
rights in the United Nations and any scheme to create "Two Chinas" is 
bound to fail."^^
This again brought forth bitter reaction from the United States, as a 
result of which President Ayub Khan cancelled his visit to the United States 
in April, I965* The proposed meeting of the Aid to Palcistan Consortium 
scheduled for July I965 was postponed at the request of the United States. 
Pakistan did not succumb to American pressure; she rather realised that 
under the circumstances, Pakistan's interests converged more with China 
than with the United States, since both Pakistan and China considered India 
their common enemy. Pakistan felt that China was the only major power on 
whom Pakistan could rely for assistance in case of an outbrealc of war with 
India* This assumption that China alone might be a reliable friend in any 
confrontation with India provéd correct during the Indo-Pakistani war of 
1965* During the war, while the United. States looked on as a neutral - 
an unsympathetic neutral in the eyes of Pakistanis - China declared its 
open support for Pakistmi and branded India as an aggressor.
The United States, on the other hcuid, instead of coming to the assistance 
of Pakistan under the 1959 Mutual Security Agx-eement, decided to stop all 
military aid following the I965 war. Although the American decision was 
directed against both India and Pakistan under the policy of "even-handed 
treatment", this in reality was hEirmful only to Paliistan, which for over a 
decade had received military equipment solely from the United States. All 
of a sudden, when Pakistan's main source of military supplies dried up, 
it turned to China for some of its military requirements and got from China 
MIG fighters and tanks.
In/
46. Pekin# Review, 12 March, I965, pp.9-10"
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In the Tvjentieth Session of the General Assembly in 1965, the question
of the représentation of China was again discussed. Tvjo draft resolutions
were presented on 15th November I965. A procedural text was submitted
by eleven States, including the United States. By this, the Assembly
reaffirmed the validity of the decision it took on 15th December I96I, in 
adopting resolution I688 (XVl), to the effect that in accordance with 
Article 18 of the Charter of the United Nations "any proposal to change 
the representation of China is an important question.
The eleven-power draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by 
a roll-call vote of 56 to 49» with 11 abstentions. Pakistan voted against. 
The President of the General Assembly announced that after the adoption of 
this resolution, any resolution for restoring People's Republic of China 
her rights in the United Nations would require a two-thirds majority.
A substantive draft resolution submitted by twelve powers, including
Paltistan, for restoring all the lawful rights to the People's Republic of
China in the United Nations and for expelling the representatives of Chiang
Kai-shek from the United Nations was rejected by the Assembly by a vote of
4847 against to 47 in favour, with 20 abstentions.^
An important development in this Session was that France, which continuously 
voted with the United States on this issue, openly advocated that the People's 
Republic of China should be given her rightful place. The representative 
of France said that the problems of Asia and disarmament could not be solved 
without the participation of communist China.
The/
47. Article 16, para.2,, of the U.N. Charter states "Decisions of 
the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a 
two-thirds majority of the members present and voting."
48. The States which voted in favour were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria, 
Burma, Bylorussian SSR, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Ceylon, 
Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, 
IiT*ance, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan. Poland, Romania, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syria, Uganda, 
Ukraine SSR., U.S.S.R., U.A.R., United Kingdom, Tanzania, Yemen, 
Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
104
The representatives of Pakistan, Burma and Nepal stated reasons for 
seating the representatives of the People's Republic of China and also 
stated that they shared the view that the whole question was simply one 
of credentials to be decided by a simple majority. There was only one 
China, they said, and that was the People's Republic of China.
The voting record of the Tifentieth Session shows that the support for the 
representatives of Communist China in the United Nations increased enor­
mously; the votes cast in favour and against the draft resolution were 
equal, i.e. 47 to 47» with 20 States abstaining. This was the optimum 
or the high water mark of Chinese support in the United Nations, but it 
left unchanged the representation of China. As regards the Sino-Pak 
relations, they were excellent. Chairman Liu Shao-chi of the governiaent
of China visited Pakistan in the Spring of I966 and was received with great
mass jubilation.
The joint communique declared:
" ...... the Kashmiri people's right of self-
determination must be respected and that the problem of
Kashmir should be settled in accordance with
the wishes of the Kashmiri people as pledged
to them by both Palcistan and India  ......
....       The Chairman reaffirmed
the firm support of the Chinese government and
people to the righteous stand of the Paltistan
government on this dispute and the just struggle
of the Kashmiri people for their right of self- 
49determination."
During the same visit, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi declared that :
" If the aggressor dared to attack Palcistan again, China 
will stand resolutely by her side and give all assis­
tance to the people of Pakistan in order to defeat the
50aggressor."
49* Pekin# Review. 8 April.,. I966, p.6. 
50. Dawn, 51 March, I966.
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On their part, the Pakistani leaders also reaffirmed their support for 
the representation of China in the United Nations.
In the Twenty-first Session of the General Assembly, in I966, three draft 
resolutions were submitted :
(1) A 15"Power draft resolution by which the Assembly would again 
affirm the validity of its decision in Resolution 1668 (XVl) 
of 15 December I96I, that in accordance witi Article 18 of the 
United Nations Charter "any proposal to change the representation 
of China is an important question."
(2) An 11-power Afro-Asian draft resolution with Pakistan as a co­
sponsor, was for restoring the lawful rights of the People* s 
Republic of China in the United Nations and for expelling the 
representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek government from the 
United Nations.
(5) Third was a 7-power draft, submitted by Italy, suggesting a 
’study Committee’ of the member states (number unspecified) 
for laiowing the intentions of the Peking government with respect 
to the United Nations and for resolving the deadlock on the issue.
The representative of Prance, supporting the 11-power draft resolutions
expressed the view that the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of
China must be restored to it in the United Nations. The restoration of
the rights of China, he said, was not an important question in the meaning
of Article 18 of the Charter. The proposal of an Ad hoc Committee to
study the question was not realistic, since the results of similar procéd­
aiures in the past was well-loiown.
The/
51. G.A.O.R., 21st Session, 1473rd Plenary Meeting, 22nd November,
1966, p.4.
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Ihe representative of Canada advocated that while the People's Republic 
of China be given her permanent seat in the Security Council, Chiang Kai- 
shek’s regime should be allowed to represent a second China in the General 
Assembly.
In urging the 11-power draft resolution the representative of Pakistan 
whose delegation had co-sponsored the resolution, stressed that it was in 
the interest of the United Nations to seat the People’s Republic of China 
because without its participation in the work of the Organisation, it would 
not be possible to solve such important problems, as that of disarmament.
He emphasised that there was only one China - the People’s Republic of 
China. The theory of "two Chinas" was untenable as China was one and 
indivisible.^^
Similar views were expressed by the representatives of Algeria, Congo,
Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, and Syria.
After the debate the 15-power draft resolution was adopted by 66 votes 
to 48» with 7 abstentions. Palcistan voted against.
The 11-power draft resolution, which now required two-thirds majority, was 
rejected by the Assembly by roll-call vote of 46 in favour to 57 against, 
with 17 abstentions,. Pakistan supported the resolution.
The 7“*power draft was also rejected by a vote of 34 in favour to 62 against 
with 25 abstentions. Palcistan voted against.
In the 22nd and 23rd Sessions of the General Assembly, in 1967 and I968 
respectively, similar (tliree) draft resolutions were presented. Only 
the resolution asking for a two-thirds majority was adopted. The other 
two/
52. Ibid.,
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two draft resolutions were rejected# The only development was that the 
support for the representatives of communist China in the United Nations 
gradually decreased# Pakistan consistently voted for the representation 
of communist China* Spealcing on the question, the representative of 
Palcistan again expressed the view that the issue was not an "important 
question" under the terms of the Charter, but one of "credentials" to be 
solved by a simple majority vote. In stressing the importance of the 
principle of Universality, he pointed out that without the participation 
of the People’s Republic of China in the work of the United Nations, such 
important questions as disarmament and those relating to the maintenance 
of peace and security could not be solved. He also expressed the view 
that, as a member of the Organisation, the People’s Republic of China 
could contribute a great deal to the economic and social development of 
the w o r l d . A t  the 23rd Session of the General Assembly in 1968, 125 
votes were cast on the question of the representation of China, but 
support for the representation of communist China was only 44f As 
compared to 1950 the 5th Session, when the question came before the 
General Assembly for the first time, the total votes cast were 59 and 
only 16 states voted for the People’s Republic of China’s representation 
in the United Nations* The high water mark of support for the repre­
sentation of China was reached in 1965, when 47 votes were cast in favour 
and 47 against. In spite of the big increase in the number of members 
of the Organisation the status of the representation of China remained 
unchanged.
Palcistan*s position on the question of the representation of China in 
the United Nations presents an interesting picture of Palciffltan’s voting 
attitude. It provides a good example of the different kinds of moti­
vations and considerations which influence the policy of a small state 
in its interaction with big powers.
53# United Nations Monthly Chronicle. Vol.IV, Number 11, Dec, 1967,
pT35\
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Pakistan’s policy on this question between 1950 and 1952 had been 
influenced by its non-aligned approach; she supported resolutions which 
recommended the representation of China in the United Nations by the 
communist government in place of the Nationalist Government of China#
This was due to the fact that Palcistan followed a non-aligned policy from 
1947 to 1952.
Pakistan's policy on this question from 1953 to I968, has been mainly 
influenced by its power relations with India* Prom 1953 to 1956 and 
fron 1958 to i960, Pakistan voted for the United States resolutions for 
postponing discussion on the question,# This period coincides with 
Palcistan’s alliance with the United States and her close relations with 
the United States; at this time Pakistan received massive United States aid# 
Palcistan's position on the question of Chinese representation might seem 
to have been influenced by alliance politics and United States aid. But 
the reality of the situation is that Palcistan has not followed the United 
States line. Two things prove this contention* Firstly, Palcistan voted 
for those United States resolutions which asked for postponing discussion 
of the question. She never voted against resolutions admitting communist 
China to the United Nations. If Pakistan was influenced by the United 
States then it should also have voted against resolutions which asked for 
the admission of communist China.
Secondly, the relations between Palcistan and China - as explained in the 
previous pages - has continuously developed year by year, without any 
protest from China against Palcistan*s participation in the Western Alliances 
and even to President Ayub Khan's joint-defence offer to India in 1959* 
Occasionally the leaders in both countries have expressed full accord and 
solidarity with each other on different Important issues. This gives the 
Impression that Pakistan's voting for the United States resolutions has 
been/
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been with an understanding with the Chinese government* China allowed 
Pakistan to exploit the United States by voting for its resolutions and 
to procure more and more aid which was in Pakistan’s national interest*
But when Palcistan foimd that the United States policy was going against 
her national interest she started upon open co-operation with China* This 
belief is confirmed by Werner Levi, who says:
" Pakistan voted until i960, for the Western sponsored 
resolutions postponing consideration of the represen­
tation of China* The official reason given was that 
the (palcistan) government wanted todefer a decision on 
the representation of communist China until this change 
was more nearly unanimously favoured* Actually, the 
period during which Palcistan voted with the West co­
incided with the period of closest relations with the 
United States, when these relations were subjectto 
some critical evaluation, but also again coinciding with 
a more favourable voting situation for the communist 
government, Pakistan in December I96I, voted in favour 
of considering seating the communist government in the 
United Nations*
The Afro-Asian and Muslim influences have not affected Pakistan’s policy 
on the question of the representation of China. This was because 
Pakistan's most vital national interests were directly involved; the fear 
of India dominated Palcistan*s policy with respect to this issue*
In essence, it can be said that Pakistan's China policy has been dictated 
by the state of Sino-Indian and Indo-American relations*
54" Werner Levi ’Palcistan, the Soviet Union and China', Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.35» 1962, p*219*
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CMPTER V
SrÆF-DETEIMINATION
The concept of self-determination has been defined at various times, as 
the right of self-government, the right of minority groups to determine 
their ooti fate. In the United Nations, however, it has been associated 
with the right of colonial people to independence.
One of the earliest expressions of this concept is found in the opening
sentence of the American Declaration of Independences
" V/hen in the course of human events it becomes 
necessary for one people to dissolve the 
political bonds which have connected them with 
another, and to assume among the powers of the 
earth, the separate and equal station to which 
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle 
them ....... "
A few years later, in France, the principle appeared in even clearer terms 
in the early democratic phases of the Revolution. The Declaration of the 
Rights of Mail and the Citizen proclaimed, "Men are born and remain free and 
equal in rights   .....   the aim of all political association is the pre­
servation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man."
Just as modern democracy became a vital political force in the last half 
of the eighteenth century as a consequence of the American and French 
Revolutions, similarly, self-determination emerged as an ideal having great 
influence in guiding the destinies of men in the beginning of the Twentieth 
century. In fact the very idea is an outgcoivth of the democratic theory 
of consent of the governed, and of popular sovereignty.
Even after World War I, when the growing acceptance of International respon­
sibility/
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responsibility for dependent peoples resulted in the first effort, under
the Mandate System of the League of Nations, to institutionalise this
responsibility, the principle of self-determination for colonial peoples
was still slow to gain acceptance. Article 22 of the Covenant stressed
not the principle of self-determination but the principle that s
" The well-being and development of such peoples 
form a sacred trust of civilisation."
This gentle and evolutionary approach was suddenly shaken by World War II.
In 1942, at the insistence of President Franlclin D. Roosevelt, the Atlantic
Charter proclaimed,
" The right of all people to choose the form of 
Government uhder which they live."
The proclamation of this right in such sweeping terms quickly brought the 
colonial powers face to face with the practical problems involved in imple­
mentation.
Thus, despite acceptance of the principle of self-determination the Big 
Powers, while drafting the Dumbarton Oalc Proposals, made no mention of it. 
However, when it came to writing the Charter at San Francisco, a different 
situation prevailed. Many of the fifty participating nations were either 
newly independent states or small ones which had frequently been subjected 
to the power and influence of stronger nations. For them the Atlantic 
Charter constituted the promise of a new era and they were determined that 
it should dawn without delay. National independence, then was the 
watchword for the Asian and Arab delegations. Thus, the phrase 'self- 
determination* was incorporated in the Charter, in connection with dependent 
people•
Self-determination is mentioned specifically - in Chapter I, which asserts 
as one of the purposes of the United Nations: " To develop friendly 
relations/
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relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples*"
Chapter IX, Article 55» also emphasises the importance of this right 
as follows:
" with a view to the creation of conditions of stability 
and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote;
(a) higher standard of living, full employment, and 
conditions of economic and social progress and 
development*
(b) solutions of international economic, social, 
health and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational co-operation; and
(c) Universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion* "
The Charter put a moral obligation on all United Nations Members for the
achievement of this right in Article 56, which states:
" Allmembers pledge themselves to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the Organisation 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in 
Article 55* "
The principle of self-determination as enunciated in the Charter has been 
supported by eveiy member nation. This unanimity, however, is like a 
declaration from all political candidates to oppose sin* But endorsing 
a principle and agreeing on the manner of its implementation, especially 
with respect to dependent territories, are two different things, as has 
been/
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been frequently demonstrated in the United Nations,
Prom the beginning two schools of thought have developed. One consisting 
of the view of the Asian-Arab States, together with most of the Latin 
Americans, strongly supported by the Soviet bloc, which have been committed 
to the eradication of the last vestiges of colonialism. They have conceived 
self-determination as an Instrument which would enable all colonial peoples 
to attain political independence• They have, therefore, maintained that 
self-determination is a right which cannot be denied, that this right is 
embodied in the Charter, and that the signatories are committed to its 
fulfilment. Their arguments run as follows: The administering powers
have assumed the obligation of promoting self-government in dependent 
territories. The United Nations itself must ensure that this obligation is
carried out. Furthermore, the right of self-determination is basic to a
peaceful and orderly world and to friendly relations among nations; denial 
of this right is likely to endanger international peace.
The view of the opposing camp, consisting mainly of the colonial powers, 
has vigorously protested this whole thesis. They have asserted that it 
was an attempt to discriminate against colonial powers. It represented 
an indirect effort to revise the provisions of Chapters XI, XII and XIII 
of the Charter.
The assumption of more extensive responsibility by the United Nations, 
they said, constituted Intervention in the domestic affairs of an adminis­
tering power in violation of Article 2(7). Moreover, self-determination 
is a political principle and its application must be subordinated to other 
principles, particularly to the principle for the maintenance of peace.
The exercise of self-determination without limitation or safeguards would 
be a source of friction and might disturb the friendly relations among 
States.
To/
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To brake the drive for self-determination, some of the colonial powers 
tried to give it a wide and diffuse interpretation to make its imple­
mentation more difficult.
Belgium introduced its celebrated thesis, according to which "self-
determination cannot be restricted to colonial people; it refers to
all individuals, including ethnic, racial or cultural minorities incor-
1porated within the existing State."
Another colonial power, the United States sought to "Universalize" the
principle to include restoration of sovereignty to formerly independent
states, particularly those people whose right to govern themselves has
2
been taken away from them by the Soviet Communism," But, as mentioned 
earlier, to endorse a principle and to agree on its implementation are 
two different things ; the United States has been caught in a similar 
paradox. Secretary of State, John Poster Dulles, while emphasising the 
dignity of human persons and the respect for the right of self-determination 
said at San Francisco ;
" Dignity cannot be developed by those subject' to
alien control, however benign. Self-respect is
not fully felt by those who have no right of
their ovm in the world, who live on charity and
who trade on sufferance. Regard for justice
rarely emanates from those who are subject to
such grave injustice as the denial of freedom.
Fellowship is not the custom of people who are
%
denied fellowship* "
1, "The Sacred Mission of Civilization: To Which People should the 
Benefits be Extended? The Belgian Thesis". (Published by The 
Belgian Government Information Centre, New York, 1953)*
2. The U.S. Participation in the U.N., Report by the President to 
the Congress, 1952, Department of State Publication 5^34 
.Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), P*138.
5. Cited by Sir Zafnilla Khan in the course of a debate, G.A,0,R., 
6th Session, 543rd Plenary Meeting, 14 November, 1951» p.115*
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The United States has paid much lip service by making lofty slogans 
for the freedom of people. But the real position of the United States 
on colonialism, has been described by Professor Beland M. Goodrich, in 
the following words:
" Instead of appearing as the uninhibited leader 
of the attack on old style colonialism, the 
United States found itself in the unfortunate 
position of having to defend one of the 
traditional interests of colonial powers, the 
interest in national security, against proposals 
to give greater recognition and protection to 
the special interests of native peoples.
In the United Kingdom, the Labour Party Government which was responsible 
for the freedom of India and Pakistan in 1947, was in favour of granting 
this right. As early as 1945, the Party’s colonial platform had called 
for the development of political self-government "and the attainment of 
political rights not less than those enjoyed or claimed by those of British 
democracy,"
In 1944, the Annual Conference of the Party declared:
" In all colonial territories the first alms of the 
administration must be the well-being and education 
of the native inhabitants; Their standards of 
life and health; their preparation for self- 
government without delay there must be a
sincere determination on the part of those respon­
sible for colonial administration to put native 
interests first in the priorities they organise 
...... In regions such as Mrica, South-East
Asia, and the South West Pacific, where neighbouring 
colonies are administered by different governments, 
we /
4* Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations (l,ondon: Stevens and
Sons Limited, I96O), p.298.
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we strongly recommend the early creation of
Regional Coxmcils to co-ordinate economic
policy - trade, transport, etc. - with a.
view to maicing the interests of the Colonial
5peoples primary beyond all doubts. "
The Conservative Party, on the other hand, held the opposite view on colonial 
questions. But over-all British Policy was against granting self- 
government rapidly to colonial territories.
To give practical effect to the principle of self-determination as a legally 
binding doctrine, attempts were made to incorporate it into the draft 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The General Assembly, by its 
resolution of 4 December, 1950» called upon the Economic and Social Council 
"to request the Commission on Human Rights to study ways and means which 
would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination and to 
prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly at its 
Sixth Session." Pakistan actively supported the resolution with other 
Asian and Arab States.
In the 1951 Session of the General Assembly, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Syria and Yemen proposed a draft resolution that the General Assembly itself 
should draw up an article on the right of self-determination and Insert it 
into the draft Covenant. By the provisions of the draft resolution the 
Assembly would decide that the Covenant on Human Rights should include the 
statement "all peoples shall have the right of self-determination". More­
over, the Assembly would direct the Commission on Human Rights to assert 
that "all states including those having responsibility for the administration 
of non- self-governing territories, should promote the realisation of that 
right/
5. Labour Party. Report of the 43rd Annual Conference (Londons 
Labour Party, 1944), p.9*
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right in relation to the peoples of such territories*" The Assembly 
requests further that the Commission on Human Rights "prepare recommendation 
concerning International respect for the self-determination of peoples and 
to submit these recommendations to the General Assembly at its Seventh 
Session."
The inclusion of an Article on the right of self-determination they felt, 
was a logical fulfilment of the objectives of the United Nations Charter, 
because it was a pre-requisite to the enjoyment of all other human rights 
and, therefore, must be included in the Covenants on Human Rights,
They argued that the right was being violated principally in the case of 
non- self-governing peoples, many of whom live in ignorance of the very 
existence of the right, while others, who are politically more conscious, 
were being deluded by promises of independence or self-government to be 
achieved under the guidance of the colonial powers at some indeterminate 
future date. The incorporation in the Covenant of the right of self- 
determination in the Covenant would thus help in the fulfilment of the 
objectives of Chapter XI, XII and XIII of the Charter.
The leading opponents of this move were Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Greece, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
Self-determination, it was said, was a collective right, and as such had no 
place in Covenants devoted to the rights of individuals. The United States 
representative, Eleanor Roosevelt, despite a previous statement that the 
United States was anxious that the principle of self-determination of peoples 
and nations stated in the Charter be reaffirmed in the Covenant, felt that 
this task should be left to the Commission on Human Rights.
The first operative paragraph in the Afro-Asian draft resolution was voted 
on in parts. The clause containing the terms under which the article should 
be/
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be drafted was passed by a vote of 36 to 11, with 12 abstentions. The 
States which voted against were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, The United Kingdom and the 
United States.
Argentina, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Norway, 
Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, abstained.
The resolution as a whole, was adopted by a vote of 42 to 7» with 5 absten-
,. 6 tions.
In the 7th Session, the General Assembly passed Resolution 637(VIl) by a 
vote of 40 to 14, with 6 abstentions. This resolution stressed that the 
United Nations should "uphold the principle of self-determination of peoples 
and nationë;" should "recognise and promote the realisation of the right of 
self-determination of the people of non- self-governing and Trust Territories 
who are under their administration"; and should grant this right on a demand 
for self-government on the part of these people, the popular wish being 
ascertained in particular through plebiscites or other recognised demo­
cratic means, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations."
A separate proposal calling on the Human Rights Commission tlirough the 
Economic and Social Council, to study additional ways and means of ensuring 
International respect for the right of people to self-determination, was 
adopted by a vote of 42 to 7* with 8 abstentions.
The Commission on Human Rights, adopted two resolutions, jointly sponsored 
by Chile, China, Egypt, India, Palcistan and the Philippines. The first 
resolution recommended for a Commission to be established by the General 
Assembly, to conduct a full survey of the status of the right of peoples 
and nations to self-determination "including permanent sovereignty over their 
natural/
6. G.A.O.R.. 6th Session, 375th Plenary Meeting, 5 February, 1952
Resolution 545*(Vl).
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natural wealth and resources", and to maJce recommendations where necessary 
for strengthening that right*
The second resolution proposed that the General Assembly establish another
Commission for the realisation of the right of self-determination falling
7within the scope of Article 14 of the Charter,
But when these resolutions came before the Economic and Social Council, 
for approval, it refused to pass them on the contention that it is not 
within its jurisdiction*
This attitude of the Council, was criticised by some of the States at the
1954 Session of the General Assembly* A new resolution was thus introduced
by Afghanistan, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Greece, Haiti, Indonesia,
Iraq, Liberia, Mexico, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and
Yemen, This reaffirmed the first resolution passed by the Human Rights
Commission, that the Assembly established a Commission to conduct a full
survey of the status of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination
"including permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources,"
An amendment submitted jointly by Peru, Brazil and the United States to the
last paragraph, by which the Assembly should give due regard to "the rights
and duties of states under International Law" was adopted by a vote of 25
to 14, with 19 abstentions. The resolution as amended, was adopted by the
8Assembly, by a vote of 41 to 11, with 5 abstentions.
The General Assembly, by another resolution, requested the Commission on 
Human/
7* Article 14 states "subject to the provisions of Article 12, the
General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment 
of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to 
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, 
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of 
the Present Charter, setting forth the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations,"
8. G.A.O.R,, 9th Session, 512nd Plenary Meeting, December 14, 1954» 
Resolution 857(lX),
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Human Rights to complote its recommendation and also requested the Economic 
and Social Council to transmit these recommendations to the General Assembly 
at its next regular Session*
In the Commission and the Ecosoc, three specific proposals were eventually 
evolved, which were transmitted by the Ecosoc to the General Assembly by 
its resolution (586 D XX) 29 July, 1955*
Two of these proposals were made by the Human Rights Commission in 1954 
and reaffirmed in 1955* The first recommended that the Assembly set up 
a Commission to conduct a survey of the right of peoples and nations to 
"permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources" and to make 
recommendation thereon*
The second suggested that the Assembly establish a Commission to examine 
alleged denials or inadequate realisation of the right of self-determination, 
to provide its good offices in such situations and to report the facts, if 
necessary, to the Assembly*
The Third proposal originated in the Council itself and called for the 
establishment of an Ad Hoc Commission to "conduct a thorough survey of the 
concept of self-determination"•
Consideration of these recommendations were postponed at the Assembly's 
tenth, eleventh, and twelfth sessions, in 1955* 1956 and 1957 respectively*
At the Thirteenth Session, in 1958* the matter was referred to the Assembly's 
Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee*
In support of the Council's proposal for a survey of the concept of self- 
determination, the representatives of Denmark, France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom/
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United Kingdom felt it necessary to mat:e a study* of the concept of self- 
determination. Such a study, they said, would help remove existing 
differences of opinion about the applicability of the principle of self- 
determination and define the scope of that principle.
The United States put forvmrd an amendment to the Council's proposal so 
that the contemplated Ad Hoc Commission should not engage in academic 
discussions of such terms as "peoples" and "nations" but rather in an 
examination of the concept of self-determination and ••••...• the means, 
within the framework of the United Nations Charter, for promoting conditions 
favourable to the attainment of self-determination by peoples desiring it."
But this amendment was later withdrawn.
The majority of the Committee's members, however, opposed the Council's pro­
posal and the United States amendment thereto. Among them were Afghanistan, 
Bulgaria, Ceylon, Chile, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Romania, the U.A.R., 
the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.
They argued that reference in these two texts to self-determination as a 
"principle" ignored previous resolutions of the General Assembly and Article 1 
of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, which clearly recognised 
self-determination as a fundamental right.
After a long debate, the voting on all three proposals took place on 25rd 
November, 1958#'
The Committee rejected the proposal of the Economic and Social Council by a 
roll-call of 48 against to 16 in favour, with 8 abstentions.
The first proposal of the Human Rights Commission was adopted by a roll-call 
vote of 52 to 15, with 4 abstentions. The Committee agreed that it should 
be left to the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly to determine the 
composition of the proposed Commission.
V
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A Yugoslav proposal to postpone action on the second proposal of the 
Human Rights Commission until the 14th Session of the General Assembly 
was adopted by 39 votes to 7» with 24 abstentions*
At the Plenary Meeting the General Assembly decided that the Commission
contemplated in the first proposal of the Human Rights Commission, as
approved by the Third Committee, would be composed of representatives of
nine member states to be chosen by the President oh the basis of geographical
distribution, and that the Commission would report to the 29th Session of the
Ecosoc in 1960# The President thereupon appointed Afghanistan, Chile,
Guatemala, The Netherlands, the Philippines, Sweden, the H.S.S.R., the H.A.R.
and the United States* This was adopted by the Assembly by 52 votes to 15
9
with 8 abstentions*
These efforts of many years ultimately bore fruit* The right of 'self- 
determination* was incorporated in the Covenants on Human Rights. The 
right of self-determination was made specifically applicable to non - self- 
governing and Trust territories as well as to the metropolitan states* The 
means of determining the will of the populations were also spelled out and a 
system of international accountability and supervision was also provided for, 
through annual reports and the operations of the Human Rights Committee.
But the real landmark in the mounting pressure against colonialism occured 
in i960, when the General Assembly passed the "Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*"
Eortythree African and Asian States introduced a draft resolution, which the 
General Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote and with only 9 abstentions.
9. G.A.O.R., 13th Session, 788th Plenary Meeting, 12 December, 1958, 
Resolution I314 (XIIl).
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The States which abstained were Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, 
France, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.
V/liat was established was a Common Judgment of colonialism and those who 
abstained in the voting were, for the most part, the "diehard colonialists.
After proclaiming the need of bringing a "speedy and unconditional end to 
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations", the resolution declared 
that;
" The subjection of peoples to alient subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial 
of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment 
to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.
A].l peoples have the right to self-determination; 
by virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.
The inadequacy of political, economic, social or 
educational preparedness, should never serve as a 
pretext for delaying independence.
All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds 
directed against dependent peoples shall cease in 
order to complete independence, and the integrity of 
their national territory shall be respected.
Immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and non- 
self-goveming territories which have not yet 
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the 
peoples of those territories, without any conditions 
or reservations, in accordance with their freely 
expressed/
10, The United States apparently was in favour of the Declaration but
abstained in response to British pressure. See "il^he United States in 
the U.N. i960 : A Turning Point. Supplementary Report, Committee on 
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 
1961, pp.20-21. Quoted in Goodspeed, S.S., 'The Nature and function of 
Internat!onal Organ!sation. 2nd ed., (Oxford Univ.Press, New York, 
p.556.
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expressed will and desire, without any distinction 
as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable 
them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.
All states shall observe faithfully and strictly the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Present 
Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference 
in the internal affairs of all States and respect for 
the sovereign rights of all people and their territorial 
integrity. "
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Position of Paid stan:
Pakistan being in the vanguard of the era of decolonization has been 
particularly concerned in the United .Nations with questions involving 
the right of self-determination ox* self-government* It has been anxious 
that the countries still under colonial rule should also become indepen­
dent. Until that happens, said Sir Zafrulla Khan, in the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, "the people of Pakistan would not be able either
to enjoy or to appreciate to the fullest extent their o\m recently achieved
11freedom and sovereignty."
Pakistan’s active interest in pleading the cause of the dependent people 
can be ascribed to the following reasons;
Firstly, being a newly independent state, it had experienced the
sufferings of colonial rule, that it was her desire to contribute to the
United Nations efforts for eliminating this major cause of conflict from 
the world.
Secondly, the question of Kashmir, to which Pakistan is a party, had 
been recognised by the United Nations, as a clear case for self-determinatior 
of the Kashmiri people. Thus, Pakistan’s support for the right of self- 
determination of non- self-governing people, indirectly gives much support 
to Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. It was out of respect for that right
that Pakistan bitterly opposed the partition of Palestine.
Palcistan had also supported the right of self-determination of the people 
of Indonesia, and wholeheartedly advocated the case of Tunisia, and 
Morocco to self-government. It had also advocated, with other Afro-Asian 
states, speeding up the pace of granting self-government to other dependent 
peoples/
11. G.A.O.R., 4th Session, 227th Plenary Meeting, 24 September, 1949» 
p.59.
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peoples in Africa and Asia.
Pakistan had played an important role in the emancipation of colonial 
people. She had been a member of the Special Committee on non- self- 
governing territories established at the §th Session. Pakistan’s 
representative, Sir Zafrulla lüian worked as bhe Chairman of Committee 
No.II, which made recommendations for a solution of the Palestine problem 
Pakistan had also been a member of the Commissions for the preparation of 
Libya's independence and to ascertain the will of the people of Eritrea.
After mailing this general survey of Pakistan's participation on colonial 
questions, i.e. self-determination, the question of Algeria is now under- 
taicen for a case study.
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The Question of Algeria
On 5 January, 1955» the representative of Saudi Arabia in a letter to 
the President of the Security Council, brought to the Council's attention, 
under Article 35(’0» the grave situation in Algeria, which, he said, was 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
In an attached memorandum, he charged that the French Government was 
employing military operations in Algeria to liquidate the national uprising 
against colonial rule and oppression.
On 29th July, 1955» Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen 
requested that "the question of Algeria" be included in the agenda of the 
10th Session of the General Assembly.
The General Committee examined on 22nd September, the request for 
inclusion on the agenda. The representatives of Pakistan, Iraq and India 
at their request, were Invited to talce seats at the Committee's table.
The representative of France, wMle opposing inclusion of the item on the 
agenda stateds
" Algerian affairs were essentially within his 
government's domestic jurisdiction. Algeria 
was an integral part of Metropolitan France, 
and had been so since 1834* Any Algerian, 
whether a Moslem or a Christian, was a French 
citizen and from the age of 21, an elector.
It was, therefore, clear that Article 2(?) of 
the Charter applied to Algeria. The fact that 
Algeria had been conquered was immaterial since 
that had been true also of other provinces of 
France. The right of self-determination of 
peoples was referred to in Article I of the 
Charter/
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Charter only as a purpose; no special method 
for attaining it was laid dox-m. The omission 
of any specific provision in the Charter granting 
the Assembly*s competence in that respect was 
significant, for it xfould be impossible, in the 
language of Article l(2), to "develop friendly 
relations among nations" by means of controver-
15sial resolutions arising out of stormy debates. "
The representatives of Egyi>t, Iraq, Palcistan, Thailand, India, and the 
U.S.S.Ko pleaded for inclusion of the item in the agenda. In support of 
their claim, they cited the following arguments.
The situation in Algeria had x-zorsened and severe repressive measures had 
aggravated the difficulties between France and the Algerian Nationalists,
Since 1st November, 1954» war had, in fact, broken out in Algeria. The 
situation had deteriorated further since the Afro-Asian group had requested 
inclusion of the item. International concern regarding the situation in 
Algeria had been demonstrated by the fact that it had been brought to the 
notice of the Security Council by the Saudi Arabian delegation and by the 
stand taken by the Banduing Conference urging the French Government to seek 
a peaceful solution. Article l(2) and (4), Article 10, Il(2) and 14 of 
the Charter were cited to justify inclusion of the item in the agenda and 
to establish the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the question. 
Regarding the contention that Article 2(7)^^ precluded intervention, it was 
noted that -until 1850 Algeria had been independent, maintaining diplomatic 
and treaty relations with numerous states. Only 30 years later had Algeria 
been completely conquered. Its current status was defined in 1870 by the 
French/
13. United Nations Yearbook. 1955» p.65.
14. Article 2(7) of the U.Ii. Charter states: "Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any such State or shall require the members to submit such matters 
to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII",
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French Government, without, however, the Algerian people being consulted* 
Despite theoretical equality, in practice the Algerians did not enjoy the 
same rights as Frenchmen. Moreover, the General Assembly had always 
claimed competence in questions involving human rights, among which the 
right of self-determination was fundamental. Finally, inclusion of the 
question could not in any way constitute intervention within the meaning of 
Article 2(7), and did not prejudge the question of competence.
The representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and New Zealand 
stated that, under Article 2(7), the United Nations was precluded from inter­
vening in the Algerian question. The case of Algeria, an integral part of 
France, was different from that of Morocco or Tunisia, which were French 
Protectorates. It was clear that the sponsors of the item sought Assembly 
sanctions for a course of action intended to bring about fundamental changes 
in the composition of the French Republic that obviously constituted inter­
vention in the internal affairs of ^rarce.
The representatives of Haiti and Ethiopia doubted whfether the question 
of Algeria was similar to the questions of Tunisia and Morocco from the 
standpoint of international law and expressed fears lest discussion of the 
matter should jeopardize the progress already made in the negotiations 
on North African problems.
The General Committee then decided by 8 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions 
not to recommend the item for inclusion in the agenda. This decision of 
the General Committee was over-ruled by the General Assembly. The report 
of the General Committee was examined by the General Assembly and the 
different representatives expressed views similar to those they expressed 
in the Committee.
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The representatives supporting inclusion of the item in the agenda held 
that discussion of the question did not amount to intervention within the 
meaning of Article 2(7). The position would be different if France were 
required to submit the matter to settlement. But such was not the case; 
what the record of the General Assembly showed in comparable instances 
concerning the Union of South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, or West Irian 
was that the Assembly had invited the parties to get together in order to 
resolve their problems.
The argument that Algeria was a part of "Metropolitan France" was not valid 
in terms of political thinking or even of Jurisprudence. If such an 
argument xfere sustained, the very basis of the existence of more than 
one-third of the Members of the United Nations would stand challenged, 
since at one time or another they had been dependent territories of 
"metropolitan" Powers. Algerian sovereignty had resided in the rulers of 
Algeria and their subjects before their subjugation, and their rights 
should be considered inalienable. The issue, therfore, was not one of 
intervention in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, but of the 
discussion of plain, straightforward colonial problem.
As regards the expediency of discussing the question in the United Nations, 
it was a matter of political judgement, and the influence of the debate on 
a possible settlement depended upon the way the matter was handled. 
Meanwhile, the discussion would assist in allowing some of the pent-up 
steam to be released without explosion. Algeria was not really an 
integral part of France and the Algerian Arabs did not enjoy all the rights 
of French citizenship. More than nine million Algerian Arabs were rep­
resented in the French National Assembly by only 15 Arab deputies, and in 
the Council of the Republic by only 7 Arab Senators. If the Algerian 
"departments"/
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"departments" were dealt with as French metropolitan "departments" they 
should he allowed to send 125 or I30 deputies to the Council of Assembly 
and a proportionate number of senators to the Council of the Republic.
The facts were that Algeria x/as not represented"on the same basis" as were 
the various parts of Metropolitan France and it governed as a colony.
Article 2(7), it xfas argued, xfas never intended to be an over-riding pro­
vision of the Charter and a stumbling block against which the aspiration 
of people striving for freedom were to be shattered. Even within the 
framework of Article 2(7), the principle of domestic jurisdiction xvas not 
supposed to "prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII". In this connection, it was questioned whether the General 
Assembly would not consider the continuous strife and bloodshed in Algeria 
as being a real threat to international peace and security.
The recommendations of the General Committee not to include the Algerian 
question in the agenda was voted upon at the 530 Plenary Meeting and was 
rejected by a vote of 28 to 27, with 5 abstentions,^^
After the vote, the representative of France declared that this was against 
Article 2(7) and that his government xmuld not consider legal any recom­
mendation which the General Assembly might make, He then left with his 
delegation and ceased to attend the meetings of the General Assembly and 
all its standing committees. On 25 November 1955, the First Committee 
adopted an Indian Procedural motion, by which the Assembly decided not to 
consider/
15* The States which voted against were Afghanistan, Argentina, Volivia, 
Burma, Bylo-russia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Greece, 
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, 
Palcistan, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, 
Ukraine SSR, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Yemen and Yugoslavia. G.A.O.R.,
10th Session, 530th Plenary Meeting, 50 September, 1955#
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consider further"the question of Algeria", in the 10th Session of the 
Ggneral Assembly,. This was adopted by the General Assembly without 
objection on the same day*
Meanwhile, the xfar in Algeria x^ as going on furiously. The representatives 
of thirteen Asian and African States including Palcistan drew the attention 
of the Security Council to the grave situation in Algeria as a violation 
of fundamental human rights and asked for an early meeting of the Security 
Council, under Article 35(l) of the United Nations Charter to consider the 
situation arising out of military action taken by France, The Security 
Council, in its meeting on 26 June, decided by 7 votes to 2 (U.S.S.R. and 
Iran), with 2 abstentions (China and Yugoslavia) not to include the item in 
the agenda.
The question of Algeria was then included in the agenda of the General 
Assembly*s 11th Session at the request of 15 Afro-Asian States, including 
Pakistan.
The representative of Pakistan, spealcing in the General Debate, expressed 
his serious concern at the sad happenings in Algeria when he said:
" We are deeply concerned about the tragic happenings, 
in Algeria, of whose claim to freedom Pakistan is a 
staunch supporter. If wiser counsels do not prevail 
and the forces of repression that have been let loose 
in North Africa are not checked, the whole of that 
area will be submerged under chaos and anarchy* In 
respect of several of these grave situations, this 
Organisation has stood aside helplessly and watched 
the situation groxf worse. My delegation feels that in 
such situations, the United Nations should bring in to 
play its resources of reconciliation, clearly enuncia­
ted in its Charter.
16. G .A .O .R .. 11th Session, 601st Plenary Meeting, 29 November,
1956, p.415.
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The question x/ae discussed in detail in the First Committee. Three 
draft resolutions were introduced; one was sponsored jointly by 18 Afro- 
Asian States, including Pakistan, by which the General Assembly, having 
regard to "the situation of unrest and strife in Algeria" which was 
"causing much human sufferings and disturbing the harmony between nations" 
and recognising "the right of the People of Algeria to self-determination
t
according to the principles of Chartel x/ould % request France to respond 
to the desire of the people of Algeria to exercise their fundamental right 
of self-determination; invite France and the people of Algeria to enter into 
immediate negotiations with a view to the cessation of hostilities and the 
peaceful settlement of their differences in accordance with the Charter; 
and ask the Secretary-General to assit the parties in conducting such 
negotiations and to report the Assembly's 12th Session.
The second draft resolution xfas sponsored by Japan, the Philippines and 
Thailand. By this, the Assembly would express the hope that the Algerian 
people would endeavour through appropriate negotiations, to bring about the 
end of bloodshed and the peaceful settlement of the present difficulties.
It would do so having regard to "the situation of unrest in Algeria" which 
was causing "much human suffering and loss of lives" and believing that 
"the unsatisfactory situation now prevailing in Algeria" might be 
"normalized by the joint efforts of France and the Algerian people to find 
an equitable solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations."
A six-power draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 
the Dominican Republic, Italy and Peru. By this draft resolution, the 
Assembly having heard the statements of French and other delegations and 
having discussed the question of Algeria, would express the hope that a 
peaceful and democratic solution of this question x/ould be found.
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Supporting the 18-power draft resolution the representative of PFdcistan 
said:
" Pakistan's attitude is not anti-Western, but 
her country stood for the right of peoples to 
self-determination. Moreover, the Palcistan 
delegation understood perfectly that the 
national aspirations of a non- self-governing 
people could be fulfilled by the free associa­
tion of the territory with the metropolitan 
country, but no such association would be fully
valid without the consent of the population,
17concerned. "
When the three draft resolutions were put to vote, the representative of 
Prance declared that he would not participate in the voting. The 18- 
power draft resolution was voted on paragraph-by-paragraph by a roll-call 
vote. The first operative paragraph was rejected by 34 votes against to
33 in favour, with 10 abstentions and the second paragraph xms rejected by
34 votes against to 35 iii favour, with 9 abstentions. In view of this, 
the draft resolution as a whole was not voted by the Committee.
The six-power draft resolution xms then adopted by a vote of 41 to 33» 
with 3 abstentions. A motion by New Zealand not to vote on the 3-Power 
draft resolution Xfas rejected by the Comiiiittee by a vote of 43 against to 
24 in favour, with 10 abstentions. The three-power draft resolution was 
subsequently adopted as a xvhole by a roll-call vote of 37 to 2?» with 13 
abstentions. Palcistan voted in favour of the resolution.
The General Assembly discussed the report of the First Committee on 15th 
February, 1957* A new 9-power draft resolution x/ith a conciliatory text, 
submitted by the sponsors of the 6-power and the 3~P0wer draft resolutions 
was/
17. G.A.O.R., 11th Session, First Committee, 830th Plenary Meeting,
4 February, 1957, p.l73"
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was adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 70 to 0, with no abstention, as 
resolution 1012 (Xl), urging for a peaceful, just and democratic solution, 
in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
In the 12th Session of the General Assembly, in 1957, the question of 
Algeria was included in the agenda at the request of 21 Afro-Asian States, 
including Pakistan. In the First Committee, the representative of France, 
stated that the fact that France has not objected to placing the Algerian 
question on the agenda should not be talcen that it had changed its position 
about United Nations intervention in the matter. The î'fench delegation 
was participating, he said, in order to make known the efforts that were 
being made to bring about a peaceful settlement and to refute the calumnies 
directed against France. The representative of France further stated that 
the moral and material support to the Algerian rebels came from Egypt, the 
Arab League, Morocco and Tunisia. He asserted that the countries furnishing 
assistance were violating the United Nations Charter, the provisions of the 
Assembly's "Essential for Peace" resolution, and the principles of peaceful 
co-existence adopted at the Bandung Conference.
The offer of good offices from Morocco and Tunisia could not be accepted, 
he said, for both the countries were under pressure of the Algerian rebels.
The representatives of Argentina, Australia, Cuba, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Peru, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom expressed the view that the 
United Nations had no right to intervene in the matter, since the matter 
fell under Article 2(7) of the Charter.
The representatives of Albania, Bylorussia, Ceylon, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine SSR, Uruguay, U.S.S.R. and Yemen, maintained that the 
United/
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United Nations ws.s competent to deal with the Algerian problem. The 
question of competence, they said, could not be decided by the unilateral 
declaration of a Member State, As French rule in Algeria had originally 
been installed by military intervention, its present character could be 
regarded only as colonial occupation maintained xfithout regard for the 
wishes of the Algerian people. Furthermore, the struggle in Algeria had 
developed into a war and had endangered peace and security in the area, it 
was both the right and the duty of the United Nations to continue its quest 
for an equitable solution.
The representative of Palcistan in supporting the cause of the Algerian 
people said, "As regards the interest of the Colons, they could be durably 
guaranteed only through a generous understanding xvith the majority of the 
Algerian people.
Two draft resolutions were submitted in the First Committee; one was 
sponsored by seventeen Afro-Asian States. By this draft resolution, the 
General Assembly would regret that the hope for a solution, as expressed in 
its resolution 1012 (Xl) of 15 February 1957» had not yet been realised. 
Recognising that the principle of self-determination was applicable to the 
Algerian people and noting that the situation in Algeria continued to cause 
much suffering and loss of human life, the Assembly xrould call for negotia­
tions in order to arrive at a solution in accordance with the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations Charter.
The second draft resolution was sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Italy, Peru and Spain. Under the term of this draft 
resolution, the General Assembly, bearing in mind the situation in Algeria 
which/
18. Colons means French Settlers in Algeria. G.A.O.R.. 12th Session, 
First Committee, 920th Meeting, 4 December, 1957» p.301.
157
which continued to cause much suffering and loss of life, would: talce note
of the attempts which had been reported to the Assembly to settle the 
problem both through the good offices of Heads of States and by French 
legislative measures; and express the hope once again that, in a spirit of 
co-operation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution would be foimd, 
through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations.
Two amendments were submitted jointly by Canada, Ireland and Norway, to 
the 17-power draft resolution. By the first amendment, the Assembly recog­
nised that the Algerian people were entitled to work out their own future 
in a democratic way (rather than recognise that the principle of self- 
determination was applicable to the Algerian people)• By the second 
amendment, the Assembly, instead of calling for negotiations for a solution 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, would pro­
pose effective discussion in order to resolve the troubled situation and in 
order to reach a solution in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the charter.
The sponsors of the 17-power draft resolution did not accept these amendments. 
Thus, the 17-power draft resolution and the three-power amendments were put 
to vote. The amendments were voted first and were adopted as a whole by a 
vote of 37 to 56, with 7 abstentions. The draft resolution as amended was 
then put to vote. It was not adopted, the votes being 57 to 37 with 6
abstentions. Pakistan voted against the amendments and later against the
resolution.
On behalf of the sponsors of the 7-power draft resolution, the representative 
of Argentina stated ±hat the draft resolution wouM not be pressed to a vote,
but the sponsors reserved, the right to introduce it at the plenary meeting. 
The/
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The First Committee was therefore unable to recommend to the General 
Assembly the adoption of any resolution on the question of Algeria.
In the General Assembly, when the report of the First Committee was 
presented a joint draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, the Dominican Republic, India, Iran,Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Norxfay, Peru, Spain and Thailand. By this draft resolution, the Assembly 
again expressed its concern over the situation in Algeria. It took note 
of the good offices offer made by the King of Morocco and the President of 
Tunisia, and it expressed the wish that, in a spirit of effective co­
operation, pourparlers would be entered into, and other appropriate means 
used, xvith a view to a solution of the Algerian question, in conformity 
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. This was
adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 80 to 0. France did not participate 
19in the voting.
On 15th July, 1958» twenty-five Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan, asked 
that the question of Algeria be put on the agenda of the IJth Session of 
the General Assembly. The item was included in the agenda of the General 
Assembly on 22nd September 1958 and was considered by the First Committee 
between 8 and 13 December, 1958.
In the debate in the First Committee, the representatives of Afghanistan, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Bylo-russia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Malaya, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Turkey, Ukraine SSR, U.S.S.R., U.A.R., and Yugoslavia expressed regret at 
France's decision not to participate, in the debate, on the question of 
Algeria and its refusal to accept the offer of mediation made by Tunisia 
and Morocco. They urged for the immediate cessation of hostilities in 
Algeria, and for negotiations between the two parties.
19* G.A.O.R.. 12th Session. 726th Plenary Meeting, 10 December, 1957»
as Resolution 1184(XIl).
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Belgium, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Portugal, Spain and the Union of 
South Africa argued that Article 2(7) of the Charter, debarred the United 
Nations from dealing with the Algerian question. They further emphasised 
that United Nations intervention will make the solution of the problem 
difficult, for General de Gaulle had declared to solve it in an honourable 
manner.
On 12 December, 17 Afro-Asian States submitted a draft resolution by which 
the General Assembly, recalling two previous resolutions 1012 (XI) and 
1104(XIl), recognising the right of the Algerian people to independence, 
and talcing note of the 'vjillingness of Provisional Government of the Algerian 
Republic to enter into negotiations with France, would urge that the two 
parties concerned negotiate with a view to reaching a solution in conformity 
with the Charter of the United Nations.
On 13 December, Haiti submitted two amendments to the 17-power draft 
resolution. By the first amendment, the Assembly, instead of "recognising 
the right of the Algerian people to independence", would recognise "by 
virtue of Article l(2) of the Charter, the right of the Algerian people to 
decide for themselves their own destiny". By the second Haitian amendment, 
the Assembly, instead of taking note of the willingness of the Provisional 
Government of the Algerian Republic to negotiate, would take note, "that 
both the French Government and the Algerian leaders have affirmed their wish 
to enter into negotiations".
When the 17-power draft resolution and the Haitian amendments were put to 
vote, the first Haitian amendment was rejected by a vote of 48 against to 
13 in favour, with 19 abstentions. Haiti did not press its second amend­
ment to a vote. The 17-power draft resolution was then adopted by a roll- 
call vote of 32 to 18, with 30 abstentions.
In/
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In the Plenary Meeting of the Assembly, Ceylon proposed to delete the 
paragraph in the First Committee's resolution "taking note of the willing­
ness of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic to enter into 
negotiation with France". This was adopted by the Assembly, by a vote of 
38 to 0, with 43 abstentions. The draft resolution as amended xvas then 
put to a roll-call vote. It received 35 votes in favour to 19 against, 
with 28 abstentions. It xfas not adopted having failed to obtain the 
required two-thirds majority. Pakistan, with other Afro-Aaians, voted in 
favour of the resolution.
On 10 July, 1959» twenty-two Afro-Asian States, including Pakistan, brought 
to the attention of the Security Council, the situation in Algeria, as a 
threat to international peace and security and an infringement of the basic 
right of self-determination and constituted a flagrant violation of other 
fundamental human rights.
On 14 July, the same twenty-two Afro-Asian States joined by India, Japan 
and The Philippines requested the inclusion of the Algerian question on 
the agenda of the 14th Session of the General Assembly. The General 
Assembly included the question in the agenda on 22 September and referred 
it to the First Committee which considered it between 30 September and 7 
December, 1959*
On 2 December, a draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, 
Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Palcistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, 
U.A.R., Yemen and Malaya.
By the operative paragraph of this 22-poxver proposal, the General Assembly 
would "urge the two parties concerned to enter into pourparlers to determine 
the/
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the conditions necessary for the implementation as early as possible of 
the right of self-determination of the Algerian people, including conditions 
for a ceasefire".
By the preamble of this text, the Assembly would, among other things, having 
discussed the question of Algeria, recall previous resolutions on the 
question, recall Article l(2) of the United Nations Charter; recognise the 
right of Algerian people to self-determination; express deep concern with 
the GontinuancQ of hostilities in Algeria; state that the present situation 
in Algeria constituted a threat to international peace and security; and 
note with satisfaction that the two parties concerned had accepted the right 
of self-determination as the basis for the solution of the problem.
In addition to the sponsors, the draft resolution xfas supported by the 
U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Cuba and Venezuela.
The representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Dominican Republic, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United 
States considered that the adoption of a resolution by the Assembly would 
hinder the progress of a solution rather than help it.
On 7 December, the draft resolution was voted on by parts. The first 
three paragraphs of the preamble xmre adopted by a vote of 59 to 4» with 18 
abstentions. The fourth paragraph recalling Article l(2) of the Charter 
xvas adopted by 59 votes to 5, with 19 abstentions. The sixth paragraph
was adopted by 6l votes to 1, with 19 abstentions. OJhe draft resolution as
a ifhole, x^ras adopted by a vote of 58 to 26, with 17 abstentions.
The General Assembly considered the report of the First Committee on 12 
December. The representative of Paid.stan stated that, in order to achieve 
as much harmony as possible, the Afro-Asisn group had substantially modified 
the/
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the text of the resolution adopted by the First Committee, to meet the 
various objections expressed in the Committee. He then submitted a new 
draft resolution whereby the General Assembly, having discussed the question 
of Algeria, would recall its two previous resolutions on Algeria; recall 
Article l(2) of the Charter; express deep concern with the continuance of 
hostilities in Algeria. By the operative part of this nexf text, the 
Assembly xfould: recognise the right of the Algerian people to self-
determination; and would urge the holding of pourparlers with a view to 
arriving at a peaceful solution on the basis of the right of self-determin­
ation, in accordance with the principles of the Charter.
This new text, said the representative of Pakistan, represented an effort 
on the part of the Afro-Asian nations to go as far as possible towards 
respecting the views of those opposed to certain parts of the First 
Committee's draft resolution, particularly those referring to the scope of 
the pourparlers and to the number of parties which were to talie part in 
them.
The representatives of Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, Italy, Peru, Spain and 
the United Kingdom, hoxfever, differed and stressed that, in the present 
circumstances, any resolution on the substance of the matter would be 
likely to make an early solution of the problem more difficult.
At the request of the representative of Pakistan, the Assembly decided to 
give priority to the new draft resolution, which was voted on in parts.
All the paragraphs were adopted, but when the resolution as a whole x^ as 
put to vote, it received 39 votes in favour, 22 against, with 20 absten­
tions. It was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two- 
thirds majority.
On/
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On 20 July, i960, twenty-five African and Asian States, including Pakistan, 
requested the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda of the 15th 
Session of the General Assembly,
At the unanimous recommendation of the General Committee, the General 
Assembly referred the item to the First Committee; the First Committee 
considered it between 5 and 15 December, I960,
On 9 December, a draft resolution was submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, 
Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,
D,A.R., and Yemen# Ceylon, Nepal and India also joined later. By this 
24"’POwer proposal, the General Assembly, among other things, xfould:
(1) recognise the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and 
independence; (2) recognise the imperative need for adequate and effec­
tive guarantees to ensure the successful and just implementation of the 
right of self-determination on the basis of respect for the unity and 
territorial integrity of Algeria; (3) recognise further that the United 
Nations had a responsibility to contribute towards its successful and just 
implementation; and (4) decide that a referendum shou].d be conducted in 
Algeria, organised, controlled and supervised by the United Nations, whereby 
the Algerian people would freely determine the destiny of their entire 
country,
Canada, Gabon, Nexf Zealand, Peru, Turkey and the United Kingdom objected 
to the draft resolution on the grounds that it attempted improperly, to 
impose a referendum on a sovereign state and would encourage extremists 
both in France and Algeria, to persist in their present course, malcing a 
solution more difficult.
The representatives of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay felt that 
operative paragraph four went beyond the powers of the General Assembly,
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ïliG representatives of Finland, Ireland, Norx/ay and Sweden emphasised that 
the popular referendum should be held under the auspices of the United 
Nations.
On 15 December, 196O, the First Committee adopted the 24™power draft 
resolution as a whole by a roll-call vote of 47 to 20, with 28 abstentions.
When the Committee's resolution was considered in the Plenary Meeting, on 
19 December, two amendjnents were submitted by Cyprus and Cameroun, the 
Congo (Brazzaville), Ivory Coast, Dahomy, Gabon, Upper Volta, Madagascar, 
Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad respectively. 
According to the first amendment, instead of "deciding" that a referendum 
"shall be held" in Algeria, the Assembly should "recommend" that it be held; 
it also should be "under the auspices of the United Nations", rather than 
"organised, controlled and supervised by the United Nations".
The second amendment was in two parts. The first part of the amendment 
proposed to replace operative para^aph four by a new paragraph, by which 
the Assembly would Invite the parties involved in the conflict to enter 
immediately into negotiations, without preliminary conditions, on a cease­
fire and the circumstances for the organisation of the referendum on self- 
determination, including mutual guarantees for the parties concerned and 
international guarantees.
second
The/part of the 11-power amendment x-fas intended to add a new operative 
paragraph by which the Assembly, with a view to facilitating contacts and 
the progress of the negotiations, xfould recommend the establishment of a 
special International Commission, the composition and members of which 
xfould be determined in agreement with the parties involved in the conflict.
The/
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The first paragraph of the 11-power amendment was rejected hy the 
Assembly by 31 votes in favour to 39 against, with 25 abstentions. The 
Second paragraph was also rejected by a vote of 22 in favour to 39 
against, with 35 abstentions. Cyprus's amendment received 53 votes in 
favour, 27 against, with 17 abstentions. It was not adopted as it did 
not receive the necessary two-thirds majority.
The Assembly then voted on the draft resolution recommended by the 
Committee. Operative paragraph 4 was voted on separately and received 
40 votes in favour and 40 against, with 16 abstentions. It was not 
adopted having failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. The 
resolution as a whole, and as amended by the rejection of operative para­
graph four, was then adopted by a roll-call vote of 63 to 8, with 27 
20abstentions. '
On 11 August, 1961, 31 Asian and African States including Pakistan again 
requested that the question of Algeria be placed on the agenda of the 
l6th session of the General Assembly.
On 25 September, I96I, the Assembly included the item in the agenda and 
referred it to the First Committee which, on 30 November I96I, deferred 
discussion to I4 December in order not to disturb the ceasefire talks which 
were then being held in regard to Algeria. This item, thus, was considered 
by the First Committee between 14 and 19 December I96I.
In the Committee, opening the debate, the representative of Palcistan 
expressed admiration for those xfho were engaged in the struggle x^ raged by, 
and/
20. G.A.O.R., 15th Session, 956th Plenary Meeting, 19 December I96O,
as Resolution 1575 (XV).
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and on behalf of, the Algerian people# He also expressed his government's 
appreciation for the skill, perseverance and steadfastness with which 
President de Gaulle was seeking to solve the problem# Noting that important 
results had already been achieved - such as the recognition of the right to 
independence for Algeria and the preservation of its territorial integrity, 
including the Sahara - he observed that the only real obstacle standing in 
the way of the solution of the problem appeared to be the protection of the 
right of the European minority# He hoped that the present occasion would 
be the last on which the United Nations would be called upon to deal with 
the question of Algeria and that negotiations between the parties directly 
concerned would be resumed as soon as possible#
A draft resolution, sponsored by thirty-four Asian and African States, 
including Pakistan, was submitted. By this draft resolution, the General 
Assembly would call upon the two parties to resume negotiations with a view 
to implementing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and 
independence respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria.
Cuba, the U.S.S.R# and other East European States supported the cause of the 
Algerian people.
The representatives of various French speaking African States, Latin 
American Members, and some Western European Members pointed out the special 
character of the Algerian problem and xirelcoraed the efforts made by President 
de Gaulle for a just and lasting solution. They regretted that the draft 
resolution had not indicated the need for appropriate guarantees for the 
JSuropean minority in Algeria.
The United States representative objected to the reference to an "Algerian 
Government", xvhich he said, xvas not recognised by the majority of Member 
States; /
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Statesj such a referencep he felt, might infringe on the prerogatives 
and responsibilities of the negotiators on both sides®
The 34-power draft resolution was put to vote on 19 December I96I and was 
adopted by the Committee by a vote of 6l to 0, with 38 abstentions* The 
General Assembly approved the First Committee*s recommendations by a vote
PI
of 62 to 0, with 38 abstentions*
On 15 November 196I, the representative of Pakistan submitted another draft 
resolution, on the statue of Algerians Imprisoned in France, as a matter 
of great urgency and importance* He pointed out that several thousand 
Algerian prisoners in France were on a hunger strike and the matter which 
was essentially a humanitarian question, should be dealt with urgently.
The draft resolution was co-sponsored by thirty-six Afro-Asian States*
The representative of France said that the question had been presented only 
for propaganda purposes to discredit France#
The representative of Morocco emphasised that the present resolution only 
meant that the General Assembly should add its voice to the appeals already
made to Fx*ance by several Heads of States, including the King' of Morocco
and the President of Pakistan as well as various International Organisations, 
on the question of Algerian prisoners*
A motion by the representative of Pakistan to suspend debate on the question 
under discussion and for the Immediate consideration of the newly submitted
draft resolution, was accepted without objection*
The representative of PaJcistan, speaking in support of the draft resolution, 
stated/
21. G.A.O.H*. 16th Session, 1085th Plenary Meeting, 20 December, I96I, 
as Resolution 1724 (XTl).
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stated that the steps talcen by the sponsors of the draft resolution were 
essentially prompted by humanitarian considerations and had no propoganda 
purpose, He paid tributes to the liberal policies of President de Gaulle 
expressed his conviction that an appeal addressed to his government would 
not be in vain.
Reservations regarding the draft resolution were expressed by representa­
tive of the ünited States, who said that his delegation, although it was 
most concerned to see the Algerian prisoners treated according to the 
highest humanitarian standards, had doubts about the possible results of 
the proposed action and about the procedure followed. The draft resolu­
tion was adopted by a roll-call vote of 62 to Ü, with $1 abstentions.
22Almost all the Western powers abstained.
Although the United Nations could not directly solve the Algerian problem, 
the discussions in the different United Nations organs were an important 
factor that paved the way for the solution of the problem. After a cease­
fire agreement between the French government and the Algerian Nationalists, 
the problem was finally solved at Evian on 18 March 1962, after a long 
negotiation. Algeria, thus, became independent and was consequently 
admitted to the United Nations on 8 th October, 1962.
On the question of Algeria, the feeling for Afro-Asian identification and 
for the Muslim brotherhood had been mainly effective in shaping Pakistan's 
policy in the United Nations.
From 1955 np to I96I, Pakistan, with other Afro-Asian States, asked for the 
consideration of the Algerian question by the United Nations and sponsored 
resolutions recommending solution of the Algerian question on the basis of 
the right of self-determination.
22. G.A.O.H., 16th Session, 1055th Plenary Meeting, 15 November I96I, 
as Resolution l650(XVl).
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support
This outrlghi/to the Algerian people had been in conformity with Pakistan's 
stated policy on human rights and self-determination, namely that all 
colonial people struggling to be free should be helped* This position 
was also in consonance with Pakistan's ideological policy to champion the 
cause of the Muslim people,
Pakistan was not influenced by the Western bloc on the question of Algerian 
self-determination, in spite of the fact that she was a member of SEATO, and 
associated with France as a partner in military alliance. All the Western 
powers - with whom Pakistan was aligned - consistently voted against or 
abstained on the Afro-Asian resolutions and supported France, They did 
not negate the principle of self-determination, but took shelter behind 
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter asserting that the question was 
one of domestic jurisdiction as Algeria was an integral part of metropolitan 
ffance. It is interesting to note that all the colonial or semi-colonial 
powers supported France on the question of Algeria. The United States 
though professing to be anti-colonial, also voted in support of France.
As the Algerian question was common for all the Afro^Asiâns, being a 
colonial question therefore Pakistan and India had followed an identical 
policy. But the Pakistan delegate in the United Nations had been more 
active than that of India and some other Afro-Asian States on the question 
of Algerian self-determination.
The manner in which Pakistan pleaded the cause of Algeria, for self- 
determination and human rights, represent Pakistan's independent and 
impartial approach to colonial questions, Pakistan's policy on this 
question also shows Pakistan's firm belief in the United Nations Charter, 
as a guide for the peaceful solution of international problems.
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CHAPTER VI 
PEACE-KEEPING
"Peace-keeping** as applied to the United Nations is a term which has been 
given a variety of meanings. They range from the missions which have been 
undertaken by International Armies dom, even more inclusively, to the 
activities of an individual who has been sent to the field on some political 
t8.sk,**^ It is, therefore, an accurate description of the activity by which
the United Nations has established its presence in certain situations of 
actual or potential conflict.
In an organised society, the task of keeping the peace is of primary impor­
tance, because only on the basis of peace and security can a legal order be 
developed.
Centuries-old projects and plans for eliminating war and preserving peace 
were viewed with complacency by historians until recent times. They aroused 
nothing more than historical curiosity and at best were regarded as interes­
ting utopias, noble in spirit but quite unrealistic.
Occasional efforts at enforcing peace were made in the form of the ’’King's 
peace" by the Anglo-Saxon rulers and the 'Universal peace Organisation' as 
propogated by King George of Bohemia, But the actual fruition of the plans 
came only in the twentieth century.
The horrible experience of World War I emphasised the need and the importance 
of an International Institution which could keep peace in the world. The 
traditional peaceful settlement methods employed for centuries, usually by 
Third/
1, Alan James, The Politics of Peace-keeping (London; Chatto and Windus, 
1969), p.i.
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Third States, were supplemented by a variety of new adaptations exercised 
mainly by organs and agencies of the new International Organisation, i.e$
The League of Nations*
Peace-keeping by the Leamie:
Article 10 of the Covenant of the League stressed that the Members were 
obliged "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence" of all League 
Members# Under Article 12(l), the Members agreed that if there arose 
between them any dispute which might lead to a breach of the peace, "they 
will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to 
enquiry by the League".
Peace-keeping by the United Nations ;
After the failure of the League, the supreme objective before the framers 
of the Charter of the United Nations was the maintenance of peace#
Article l(l) of the Charter declares that one of the basic purposes of the 
United Nations is "to maintain international peace and security", and "to 
bring about the peaceful means, and in conformity with the principle of 
Justice and International Law, adjustments and settlements of International 
disputes". According to Article 2(4) "All members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri­
torial integrity of political independence of any State", Chapter VI of 
the Charter stresses the need for pacific settlement of disputes. Article 
33(l) lists the traditional techniques of peaceful settlement and commits 
States to select from them s The Article states "The parties to any dispute, 
the continuance of which Is likely to endanger the maintenance of Inter­
national peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle­
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means 
of/
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of their own choice," Under Article 56(1) the Security Council may, at 
any stage of a dispute c5f the nature referred in Article 53 o r of a 
situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment. By Article 57(2), If the Security Council deems that the 
continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance 
of International peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action 
under Article 56 or to recommend such terms of settlement as, it may consider 
appropriate,
The General Assembly has also been given the responsibility for the mainten­
ance of peace under Article ll(2), which states,
" The General Assembly may discuss any questions 
relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security brought before it by any 
Member of the United Nations, or by the Security 
Council, or by a State which is not a Member of 
the United Nations in accordance with Article 
35» paragraph 2, and, except as provided in 
Article 12, may make recommendations with regard 
to any such questions to the State or states 
concerned or to the Security Council or to both."
Under Article 14, the Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful 
adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, that it deems likely to 
impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.
The authority of the Assembly to make recommendations for the maintenance of 
peace, and for peaceful adjustments of disputes, seems to include peace­
keeping measures. Thus, as a practical matter, two-thirds of the Members 
of the Assembly can initiate peace-keeping activities.
To avoid deadlock in the Security Council, for initiating peace-keeping 
measures/
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measures, the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution adopted in 1958, gave 
additional authority to the General Assembly. According to this 
resolution*
" If not already in session, the General Assembly 
can meet in special emergency session within 
twenty-four hours if so requested by a majority 
of the United Nations Members or by the affir­
mative vote of any seven Members of the Security 
Council•
If the Security Council, due to a lack of unanimity
of the permanent Members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility in any case where there
appears to be a threat to peace, breach of the
peace, or an act of aggression, the Assembly is to
2consider the matter immediately. "
'In essence, the resolution granted to the Assembly, the right to act in
place of the Council when that body failed to 'exorcise its primary
responsibility,' in a case 'where there appears à threat to the peace,
3breach of the peace, or act of aggression.*
Peaceful settlement of dispute, as used by the League and then by the 
United Nations, has developed into the concept of 'preventive diplomacy' 
which has emerged from the operating experience of the United Nations.
This concept is associated with the name of late Dag Hamraerskjold, as 
collective security is connected to that of Woodrow Wilson. It is an 
outcome of the experience of the Second Secretary-General in International 
Statesmanship and of his theoretical interpretation of the role which he 
conceived the Organisation should play, in the actual or potential Cold 
War era.
2. United Nations Yearbook. 1958, p.194*
3* Stephen S, Goodspeed, The Nature and Functions of International 
Or/ranisa,tion (New Yorkl Oxford" Univer Press, 1967,'), PP*227- 
228.
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Hammerskjold, defined the concept of Preventive Diplomacy
" as United Nations intervention in an area of 
conflict outside of, or marginal to, the sphere 
dominated by Cold War struggles, designed to 
forestall the compeltive intrusion of the rival 
Power blocs into that area* He began with the 
acknowledgement that "it is extremely difficult 
for the United Nations to exercise an influence 
on problems which are clearly and definitely 
within the orbit of present day conflicts between 
Power blocs," Having thus conceded that the 
Organisation could not effectively intervene in 
the central arena of the Cold War, he turned his 
attention to the periphery, asserting that "the 
areas which are not committed in the major conflicts 
are still considerable." These areas, he suggested, 
provided "the main field of useful activity of the 
United Nations, in its efforts to prevent conflicts 
or to solve conflicts."
He described this activity as the filling of vacuums 
by the United Nations or the localization of con­
flicts in the no-man's-land of the Gold War, with 
the relatively uncommitted members of the Organisation 
serving as its agents for this purpose. By under­
taking such activity, he believed, The United Nations 
might prevent the extension and the exacerbation of 
the Cold War. Preventive Diplomacy, in short, was 
conceived by Hammerskjold as an International version 
of the policy of containment, designed not to restrict 
the expansion of one bloc or the other, but to restrict 
the expansion of the zone permeated by bloc conflicts; 
it was put forward as a means for containment of the 
Cold War.
The Middle Eastern and the Congo crises of 1956 and I96O were the major
elements/
4. Inis L* Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, (London; University 
of London Press LtdL',' I964) » P• 28
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elements which inspired Hammerskjold to expound the concept of Preventive 
Diplomacy. Before that, United Nations activities in other cases of 
peace-keeping, e.g. United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) 
in Palestine, United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan 
on Kashmir, the United Nations FJpecial Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOÏ-ffî) 
in Greece, were uses of more traditional forms of pacific settlement 
technique. Although this new approach to peace-keeping known as preven­
tive diplomacy started from the United Nations Suez experience, most of 
the wording that has been used in describing the functions of the United 
Nations Emergency Force fits the familiar category of peaceful settlement. 
Pacific settlement lays emphasis upon the problem of discouraging resort 
to war as a means of solving disputes* Its main technique is to impose 
delay, to institute a "cooling off" period so that tempers may subside 
and temperate judge_^ ment may prevail. As Leonard Woolf put it, one of 
the reasons for the peace-keeping utility of an international conference 
is that
" it prevents excitement by being so intolerably 
dull. IVhen a score of diplomatic gentlemen 
have been sitting aroimd a green baize table 
discussing an international question for a 
fortnight, they have killed all interest in 
that question for at least a year. "
Pakistan's role in Peace-Keeping;
Paidstan, from the date of its membership, had actively participated in 
peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. Pakistan was elected 
a Member of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans in 1947 
and worked until it was dissolved in 1954 at the request of the Greek 
Government. This was the maiden United Nations experience in the field 
of/
5» International Government, p.134» quoted in Claude, Op.cit., p.201*
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of keeping peace and the Special Committee discharged its function quite 
successfully.
Pakistan was also elected a Member of the Peace Observation Commission, 
which was established in I95O under the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution* 
Pakistan contributed personnel to the United Nations Force in the Congo 
(ONUC) and was elected a Member of the Conciliation Commission.
In West Irian, in 1962, Pakistan supplied the entire bulk of United Nations 
Force, which completed its mission successfully.
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Suez;
On 26th July 1956» President Nasser of Egypt proclaimed the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal Company and placed in the hands of an Egyptian operating 
authority management of the Canal traffic, which, in 1955» amounted to 
some 14,000 ships with a net tonnage of some 107 million tons. The 
decree provided for compensation on the basis of the market value of the 
shares on 25 July upon receipt of all the assets and property of the Canal 
Company. Nasser gave the assurance that nationalisation of the Canal would 
not affect the international commitments of Egypt with regard to the Canal 
and the freedom of navigation in it. President Nasser's announcement for 
nationalisation came after the United States and the United Kingdom, on 
20 July 1956, had withdraini offer of help in financing the construction of 
the Aswan High Dam. He declared then that the revenue from the Canal 
would be used for building the Aswan Dam.
After the nationalisation of the Canal, France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States agreed, in talks at London between 29 July and 2nd August 
1956, that the Egyptian action threatened "the freedom and security of the 
Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888", and the United Kingdom 
issued invitations to a Conference in London of parties to the 1888 
Convention^ and of other nations largely concerned with the use of the Canal. 
The purpose of the Conference was to consider steps to establish operating 
arrangements, consistent with legitimate Egyptian interests, under an 
International system designed to assure operation of the Canal as guaranteed 
by the Convention.
Meanwhile, Egypt had seized the Canal, its installations and all property 
of/
6. The Members of Constantinople Convention of 1888 were Egypt, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, The United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union.
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of the Canal Company in Egypt. France and the United Kingdom countered 
by refusing to pay tolls to the new Egyptian authority* Together with 
the United States, they blocked all Egyptian accounts, including those of 
the Canal Company.
Egypt refused to attend the London Conference, stating* that it had been 
convened without consulting lïlgypt to discuss the future of an integral 
part of that nation's territory. Egyp>t proposed Instead a conference of 
the 45 users of the Canal to reconsider the Constantinople Convention of 
1868 and to confirm and guarantee freedom of navigation through the Canal,
7Twenty-two powers attended the Conference, While commenting on the 
possible success of the Conference, The Economist declared, "a blessing 
to count as the Conference began was that there was no diametrical oppo­
sition between Asia and the West on the Suez issue. The five "Bandoeng 
States" - Japan, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Ethiopia - had decided to 
give the Big Three's projects the benefit of the doubt and to come to 
London. Further, although over twenty Asian and Soviet bloc states (plus 
Yugoslavia and Panama) had accepted President Nasser's plan for a different 
kind of Conference, one of them - India - was doing diplomatic overtime in
Cairo to make sure that negotiations between East and West shall not
0become impossible,"
As regards Paidsten's position with respect to the nationalization of 
the Canal by liîgypt, its view from the beginning was that Egypt was within 
its rights in nationalising the Company.
At the London Suez Conference, which was held between 16 and 24 August, 
1956,/
7# The 22 States were Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, 
German Federal Republic, Iran, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, The United 
Kingdom, The United States, the Ü.S.S.R., Spain, Indonesia and India.
0. The Economist (London), 22 September 1956, p.944#
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1956, Pakistan's Foreign Minister introduced a number of amendments to 
the draft resolution submitted by Mr. John Foster Dulles, which were accep­
ted. By these amendments « which emphasised the sovereign rights of Egypt, 
Pakistan sought to make the terms of "the resolution acceptable to Egypt.
9
Seventeen of the 22 powers who attended agreed on proposals to be presented 
to Egypt. The proposals adopted at the Conference were knox-m as "The 
Palcistan Plan".
This proposed a definite system to guarantee at all times and for all 
powers free use of the Canal, with due regard to the sovereign rights of 
Egypt. The system xms to assure* efficient operation and development of 
the Canal, and a free, open and secure international waterxfay; insulation 
of that operation from the politics of any nation; an equitable financial 
return to Egypt, increasing as the Canal x\tas enlarged and used by more 
shipping; and Canal dues as low as was consistent with the above provisions. 
To achieve these results, a Suez Canal Board was to operate, maintain and 
develop the Canal, the Board to include Egypt and to make periodic reports 
to the Unfed Nations. There would be an Arbitral Commission to settle 
disputes and effective sanctions which would treat any use or threat of 
force to interfere with the operating of the Canal as a threat to peace and 
violation of the Charter.
At the Conference, India offered a compromise solution between the position 
of the majority and that of exclusive control and management of the operation 
and the development of the Canal by Egypt. It proposed a consultative body 
which/
9. The 17 States were Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, German 
Federal Republic, Iran, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, The United Kingdom, 
and The United States. Spain agreed that the United States 
proposal, as amended, should be put to Egypt, but requected that 
if agreement were not reached, recourse should be had to a Spanish 
proposal for international participation in an Egyptian, body 
administering the Canal.
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which would advise Egypt in accordance with the interests of the users 
of the Canal and would maintain contacts with the United Nations. This 
proposal xms not accepted by the Conference; only Ceylon, Indonesia and 
the U.S.S.R. supported it.
The 18-power plan was presented to the Egyptian Government in Cairo on 
5 September 1956, by a five-nation Committee headed by the Prime Minister 
of Australia. On 9 September the Committee reported rejection of the 
Plan by the Government of Egypt, which, it stated, resisted any control 
or management of the operation and development of the Canal by argrbody 
other than itself. In a memorandum of 10 September, Egypt stated that 
the essence of the proposal was the establishment of International, in 
place of Egyptian, control over the Canal and stipulations for sanctions* 
Egypt proposed instead the establishment of a negotiating body represen­
tative of the different user views to seek solutions for questions relating 
to freedom of navigation of the Canal, its development and equitable tolls. 
This proposal of Egypt had been accepted by 21 States. After the rejection 
of the Western proposal by Egypt, there was some talk, in Western circles 
to use force to bring the Canal under International control, Pakistan's 
view on this was expressed in a statement by the Foreign Minister, who 
declared that Palcistan would "not associate itself in any way whatsoever 
with the use of force.
Ad regards the proposed Users Association, the Pakist£uii Foreign Minister, 
before his departure for London to attend the Second Conference, declared*
"If the Canal User's Association have any intention
of enforcing their will, that in our view, would
be against the United Nations Charter, and we, as
United Nations Member, are pledged to resolve our
11disputes peacefully. "
10, Palcistan Tim
11. Pakistan Tim
3 (Lahore) 1? September, 1956. 
s, 19 September, 1956.
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The Second London Conference, held between 19 and 21 September, considered 
the Egyptian proposal but rejected it as too imprecise to afford a useful 
basis for discussion# The Conference provided for an independent authority 
i.e. the Suez Canal Users Association; fifteen of the eighteen confering
nations became members of this Association. Pakistan did not become a
member. The Association xms designed to assist its members in the exercise 
of their rights as users of the Canal in consonance with the 1888 Convention 
with due regard for the right of Egypt. This xvas again rejected by 
President Nasser. As regards the Canal Users Association, Pakistan opposed 
its formation. Speaking in the Conference the Paiüistani Foreign Minister 
declared that the formation (of the User's Association) might lead to an 
incident leading to the use of force, in spite of the desire of the Sponso­
ring Powers to avoid it. "Even if that were not to come to pass, the 
people of Pakistan, as indeed people throughout Asia and the Middle East, 
rightly or x^ rrongly, believe that it might* They also believe that the
present proposal means an imposed settlement, to which we have declared our
opposition all along". He therefore suggested that the User's Association 
plan should be dropped, and that instead, the User nations, acting as a
body, should initiate direct negotiations with Egypt. Should the Egyptians
12refuse to negotiate the matter should be taken to the Security Council.
After these negotiations outside the framework of the United Nations had 
failed to produce a solution, the parties brought the problem before the 
United Nations. The Security Council discussed the question in a series 
of meetings but could not reach any conclusion.
Israel, x-fhioh was hard hit by Nasser's refusal to pass the Israeli bound 
ship tiirough the Canal, made use of the tense situation - of course with 
the/
12. Commonwealth Survey. Vol.2., No.20., 2 October, 1956, p.802.
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the oonivance of Britain and France - and invaded the Sinai Peninsula of 
Egypt on 29 October, 1956. The United States asked for an immediate 
meeting of the Security Council to consider "steps for the immediate 
cessation of the military action of Israel in Egypt". The Council met 
on 30 October to consider the situation. The United States introduced a 
draft resolution by which the Council would: call for an immediate Israeli
withdrawal behind the established Armistice Lines; call upon all Members 
to refrain from the use of force dr thr*eat of force in the area, to assist 
the United Nations in ensuring the integrity of the Armistice Agreements 
and to refrain from giving any military, economic or financial assistance 
to Israel so long as it had not complied with the resolution; and request 
the Secretary-General to keep the Coimcil informed on compliance with the 
resolution and to make recommendations for the maintenance of International 
peace and security in the area* A suggestion for the addition of another 
paragraph, whereby the Council would call upon "Israel and Egypt immediately 
to cease fire" was accepted by the United States. The amended United States 
draft resolution received 7 votes in favour to 2 against (United Kingdom and 
France) with 2 abstentions. It was not adopted because of the British and 
French veto.
The representative of the United Kingdom informed the Council that the 
British and French Governments had that afternoon addressed urgent comrau- 
nications to Egypt and Israel, to stop all war-like action by land, sea 
and air forthwith and to withdraw their military forces to a distance of 
10 miles from the Canal. They had also asked the Egyptian Goveminent to 
agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into key positions 
at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez* If, on the expiration of twelve hours, 
either or both Governments had not undertalcen to comply with these require­
ments, British and French forces would intervene in whatever strength might 
be/
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be necessary to secure compliance* This, in fact, was an ultimatum to 
Egypt# Because of this ultimatum Egypt asked for an evening meeting of 
the Security Council# V/lien the Council resumed discussion on 31 October 
1956, the Anglo-French forces had already started their air attack on 
military targets in Egypt#
The reaction in Pakistan to the Anglo-Prenoh-Ioraeli Invasion of Egypt
was sharp# There were widespread demonstrations in support of Egypt.
Hundreds of young men volunteered themselves to fight arm-in-arm with the
Egyptians against the aggressor. In a statement issued on 3 November,
the Palcistan Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, said "that his Government
'unreservedly condemn* the violation by the United Kingdom and France of
the sovereignty and territory of Egypt, a Muslim country towards which
13Pakistan has always entertained fraternal feelings."
In the Security Council, the representative of Yugoslavia submitted a 
draft resolution xfhereby the Security Council, taking into account that 
the lack of unanimity of its permanent members had prevented it from 
exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of International 
peace and security, would call an emergency special session of the General 
Assembly, as provided in the Assembly's "Uniting for Peace" resolution 
577(v), in order to make appropriate recommendations. The Yugoslav draft 
resolution x^ as adopted by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions*
The first emergency special session of the Assembly , met on 1st November, 
1956 and adopted the agenda by 62 votes to 2, with 7 abstentions. The 
United States introduced a draft resolution by which the Assembly would: 
urge, as a matter of priority, that all parties involved in hostilities In 
the/
13# Commoiwealt]i Survey. Vol.2., No.25, 13 November, 1956, p.963»
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the area should agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, 
halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area; urge the 
parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind 
the Armistice Line, to desist from raids across the Armistice Line into 
neighbouring territory; and to observe scrupulously the provisions of 
the Armistice Agreements; recommend that all Member States should refrain 
from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and, in general, 
refrain from any acts which x^ ould delay or prevent the implementation of 
the present resolution; (a) urge that, upon the cease-fire being effective, 
steps should be tal^ en to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom 
of navigation; (b) request the Secretary-General to observe and report 
promptly on compliance with the resolution to the Security Council and to 
the General Assembly, for such further action as they might deem appropriate 
in accordance with the Charter*
The United States draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 64 
to 5, with 6 abstentions,^'^
In pursuance of paragraph 5 of this resolution, the Secretary-General 
reported, on 3 November, that the Egyptian Government had accepted the 
resolution stating that it could not implement the resolution in case 
attacking armies continued their aggression. He reported further, that 
the Governments of France and the United Kingdom continued to maintain their 
view that police action must be carried through urgently to stop the 
hostilities which were now threatening the Suez Canal, to prevent a resum­
ption of those hostilities and to pave the way for a definitive settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli war which threatened the legitimate interests of so 
many countries. They would stop military action provided that, among 
other things, the Egyptian and the Israeli Governments agreed to accept a 
United/
14» G.A.O.R.. First Emergency Special Session. 662nd Plenary Meeting, 
2 November, 1936, as Resolution 997 (ES-l). The opposing votes 
were of Austradia, France, Israel, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom. Belgium, Canada, Laos, Netherlands, Portugal and the 
Union of South Africa abstained.
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United Nations force to keep the peace, the force to be established and 
maintained until an Arab-Israeli peace settlement x-jas reached and satis­
factory arrangements agreed upon in regard to the Suez Canal, both agree­
ments to be guaranteed by the United Nations. The Secretary-General, 
reported further that the Gaza strip and the Red Sea Islands of Tiran and 
Sinafir had been occupied by Israeli military forces and that air operations 
over B^rptian territory had continued xfithout interruption.
India, jointly ■with 18 other African and Asian countries, including Pakistan, 
submitted a draft resolution according to which the General Assembly, 
noting with regret that not all the parties concerned had yet agreed to 
comply with Resolution 997(ES-1), xfould: (l) reaffirm that resolution and
once again call upon the parties immediately to comply with its provisions; 
(2) authorise the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the pai’ties 
concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of ‘the 
movement of the military forces and arms into the area and request him to 
report compliance, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of 
the resolution; (3) request the Secretary-General, with the assistance of 
the Chief of Staff and the members of UNTSO, to obtain compliance of the 
xfithdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice Lines#
Canada also submitted a draft resolution, by x/hich, as amended, the Assembly 
bearing in mind the urgent necessity of facilitating compliance with 
resolution 997(E8-l), would request the Secretary-General to submit within 
48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations con­
cerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and 
supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of 
that resolution#
The Canadian and the 19-power draft resolutions were put to vote in the 
early/
166
early morning of 4 November# The Canadian draft resolution was adopted 
by 57 votes to 0, with 19 abstentions, as resolution 99®(E8-1)# The 19- 
power draft resolution was adopted by 59 votes to 5» with 12 abstentions# 
Palcistan strongly supported the resolutions#
On 4 November, the Secretary-General reporting on implementations of the 
resolutions stated that only Egypt had accepted the cease-fire resolution 
of 4 November# He also reported about the information from the Chief of 
Staff of MTSO, that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had informed him on 4 Nov. 
that the General Armistice Agreement no longer had validity and that he had 
been asked to order UNTSO personnel out of the Gaza area#
The Secretary-General also submitted the first report on the plan for an 
emergency international United Nations force# He reported his conclusion 
that without waiting for his final report, the Assembly should decide that 
a United Nations Command for "an emergency international force to secure 
and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the 
terms" of its resolution 997(E8-l) of 2 November 1956 should be established; 
that the Assembly should further appoint, on an emergency basis, Major- 
General Bums, at present Chief of Staff of UNTSO, to be Chief of Staff of 
the nexf command; that General Burns in that capacity should be authorised 
immediately to organise the necessary staff of officers from the observer 
corps of UNTSO and in consultation with the Secretary-General, from various 
Member States, drawn from countries, which were not permanent members of 
the Security Council.
A draft resolution was submitted the same day by Canada, Colombia and Norv;ay, 
whereby the General Assembly would note with satisfaction the first report 
of the Secretary-General and establish a United Nations Command for an 
emergency International Force to secure and supervise the cessation of 
hostilities/
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hostilities in accordance with all the terms of resolution 997(E8-1), 
of 2 November, and authorise immediate recruitment of Officers by General 
Burns, who was appointed Commander# The draft resolution was adopted on 
5 November, by 37 votes to 0, with 19 abstentions as resolution 1000 (ES-l). 
Pakistan voted for the resolution#
On 5 November 1956, the Security Council met at Soviet request to discuss 
Soviet draft resolution calling for armed action by United Nations Members, 
under Article 42 of the Charter, to curb the aggressors in Egypt# The 
Council rejected by 3 votes in favour to 4 against, with 4 abstentions, 
the inclusion of the item in the agenda#
In a commuai o at ion to the Secretaay-General on 5 November, Israel informed 
him that it agreed unconditionally to a cease-fire and that since morning 
all fighting had ceased between Israel and Egyptian forces*
The United Kingdom, in a note to the Secretary-General, also announced that 
Anglo-French forces would observe a cease-fire in Egypt from midnight 6th- 
7th November, 1956*
The Secretary-General submitted his plan for the emergency force on 7th 
November# The General Assembly discussed and adopted a 7-power resolu­
tion for immediate implementation of the Secretary General's report on the 
United Nations force and setting up a 7-Power advisory committee consisting 
of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Palcistan to assist 
the Secretary-General#
Another draft resolution (A/3309) was introduced by Ceylon on behalf of 
19 Afro-Asian States Including Palcistan, by x/hich the Assembly would re­
affirm its resolutions of 2nd, 4th and 5th November; call upon Israel, 
the /
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the ünited Kingdom and France to xfithdraxf their forces from Egyptian 
territory and request the Secretary-General promptly to report on com­
pliance with the resolution* It was adopted by 65 votes to 1, with 10 
abstentions *
On 10 November, 1956, a United States draft resolution for placing on the 
agenda of the 11th Regular Session of the agenda of the Emergency Special 
Session was adopted by a vote of 66 to 0, with 2 abstentions#
In the 11th Regular Session of the General Assembly, on 25 November 1956, 
20 Asian-African States, including Pakistan, submitted a draft resolution, 
by which the Assembly would; (l) note with grave concern that its 
repeated resolutions calling for withdraxml had not been complied with; 
and (2) reiterate its call for compliance forthwith. This was adopted 
by the Assembly, as revised, by 65 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions, as 
Resolution 1120 (Xl)#
The representative of Pakistan, speaking in the Assembly, said;
" For the last few years a feeling of disillusionment
had been growing amongst the smaller nations of the
world regarding the United Nations# They had
begun to feel that this Organisation, that came into
being with such high hopes and such faith, born out
of bitter suffering and great trial, xfas after all
nothing better than holy alliances for the unholy
purposes of the past and that it was almost futile
to hope that justice regardless of power politics,
could be had at the hands of the United Nations ;
but; by taking at least hold and prompt action in
this case of Israel and British-French aggression, the
United Nations has redeemed itself# It has restored
the faith of the small peoples of the world in its 
13integrity# "
15» G.A.O.R.. 11th Session, 592nd Plenary Meeting, 25 November, 1956,
P.270.
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As regards the Emergency Force, all important decisions were taken by 
the Secretary-General with the approval of the Advisory Committee*
In direct response to resolution 100l(3ilS-l), Palcistan was one of those 
24 States which offered to participate in the Force* But the Secretary- 
General finally asked for unite from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, 
Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia.
Palcistan also voted for a 6-power draft resolution (A/5586) sponsored by 
Canada and others by which the Assembly approved the aide mémoire for the 
presence and functioning of the UNEP and clearing the Suez Canal.
Another draft resolution submitted by 16-powers asking the General Assembly 
to authorise the Secretary-General to establish a UNEP special account and 
other financial matters concerning the force was adopted by the Assembly by
1652 votes to 9, xfith I5 abstentions* The Soviet bloc opposed it. Pakistan 
supported it.
On January 15, 1957, the Secretary-General reported Israel's failure to 
withdraw. Twenty-five powers, including Pakistan, submitted a draft reso­
lution, 'noting with regret and concern'the failure of Israel to comply with 
the Assembly's resolutions 997, 998, 999, 1002 and 1120 (ES-l). The reso­
lution further requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts for
securing withdrawal and to report on such completion to the Assembly within
17five days. This was adopted by 74 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions.
Pakistan also voted in support of another resolution, sponsored by the 
United States and six other States, which deplored the non-compliance of 
Israel, asked to complete its xfithdrawal behind the Armistice Lines. This 
v/as/
16. G.A.O.R.* 11th Session, 596th Plenary Meeting, 25 November 1956, 
as Resolution 1122(Xl).
17# G.A.O.R.. 11th Session, 642nd Plenary Meeting, I9 January, 1957,
as Resolution 1125(Xl).
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v/as adopted, by the General Assembly by 72 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions, 
as Resolution 1124(Xl).
Another 7~Power resolution by which the Assembly sought the scrupulous 
maintenance of the Armistice Agreement by Egypt and Israel and the placing 
of MEF on the Israeli-Bgyptian Armistice demarcation Line, was adopted by 
56 votes to 0, with 22 abstentions, on 2 February, 1957» as Resolution 
1125(XI).
The United Nations Emergency Force entered the Gaza Strip on midnight 6th- 
7th March, 1957» and into the Sham el Sheikh area on 8 March after the 
xfithdrawal of Israeli troops.
The clearance operation of the Canal xms completed by mid-April 1957* The 
United Nations was finally successful in bringing the situation back to 
the status quo as it was before 29 October 1956.
The cease-fire in the Suez Crisis, was one of the most important achieve­
ments of the United Nations in its entire history. The most astonishing 
feature of the episode xms that the United States had come out against its 
principal allies Britain and France and its protege Israel, as an impartial 
champion of peace.
Of course, the fear of Soviet intervention xfas an Important factor in the 
cessation of hostilities and for the later developments, as the Economist 
had pointed out, "The decisive new development to halt the Anglo-French 
adventure in the Middle East in reality, was Mr# Bulganin's threat to 
intervene with force, a threat which it was possible neither to accept with 
a good grace nor to ignore with safety,"
18, The Economist, (London), 10 November, 1956, p*484<
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Btxt the compelling force of public opinion, which was asserted tlirough 
the United Nations and which brought about the cessation of hostilities 
and the xvithdrawal of the invading forces from Egyptian territory, could 
not be ignored. The close co-operation of the two world giants, the 
United States and the Soviet Union which is very rare in United Nations 
history, was also a major factor in the implementation of the United 
Nations decisions.
Palcistan had actively participated in United Nations activity in its 
handling of the Suez Crisis, by supporting and co-sponsoring resolutions 
and through the Advisory Committee, to the Secretary-General, of which 
Pakistan x^ as elected a Member.
Palcistan* s policy on this question, had been affected by the Afro-Asian 
influence as Palcistan, with other Afro-Asian States co-sponsored reso­
lutions for the cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of invading 
forces. It is important to mention that Pakistan's condemnation of the 
aggressors had not simply been Influenced by its Afro-Asian solidarity. 
This, in fact, had been motivated by objective consideration of its policy 
on Kashmir. Since, Pakistan had declared India an aggressor in Kashmir, 
it had alx-rays condemned aggression. This had been the underlying 
principle when in 1950, Pakistan condemned North Korean aggression. 
Commenting on the Korean situation, Daxm - which generally represents 
Government's viex-r « in an editorial, remarked;
" If, hoxfever, this xmr goes on, peace-loving 
nations such as Palcistan will have no alternative 
but to tread the painful path of duty x-rhich their 
conscience dictates and their abhorrence of 
aggression in any shape or form, in any part of 
the world, naturally prompts them to follow,
Palcistan has been the victim of aggression herself 
and is still seeking a peaceful solution of the 
Kashmir dispute through the intervention of the /
r/2
the United Nations. ”
The Paper added that Paidstan:
" can do no less than give at the United
Nations call, her moral and material support,
within her means, to any other country which may
19be the victim of similar aggression. "
This view has also been confirmed in the case of Suez, for Pakistan offered 
armed units for the United Nations lihiergency Force.
Pakistan's support for Egypt on the Suez issue had also been Influenced by 
its Muslim feelings, as expressed by Palciotan's Prime Minister, 'that his 
Governraent 'unreservedly condemn* the violation by the United Kingdom and 
France of the sovereignty and territory of Egypt, *a Muslim country towards 
which Pakistan has always entertained fraternal feeling.'
Pakistan offered its total support to Egypt, including armed aid, although
the offer, however, "was rejected by Cairo on the grounds that Pakistan's
20treaty relations with the Western powers made it an unwelcome friend."
'Alliance Politics* had not affected Palcistan's position on the issue of 
Suez, as Pakistan openly condemned the Anglo-French aggression in .Egypt*
The United States, the most important alliance partner from Pakistan's point 
of view, was itself leading the United Nations peace crusade against Britain 
and France* Pakistan, on the other hand, put pressure jointly with other 
Muslim/
19# Pawn (Karachi), 22 July, 1950*
20* Donald .N* Wilber, Pakistan, (New Yorks Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
Inc., 1964), p.252.
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Muslim Members of the Baghdad Pact, on Britaih to accept the cease-fire, 
which was aclcnowledged by the British Government in the following statement:
" Her Majesty's Govermnent are also most appreciative 
of the initiative of the Governments of Irati, Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey. The views offered both individ­
ually and collectively by these Governments have
weighed heavily in the decision to bring an end to
21military action in Egypt. "
The fear of India had not affected Pakistan's policy on the question of 
Suez. Suez being a colonial issue for the Afro-Asians, India and Pakistan 
mostly followed a similar policy. But comparing in general, whereas India 
adopted an attitude more favourable to Egypt, Pakistan had maintained its 
position of impartiality - that is to support the just cause - on the issue 
of Suez and had sought a just solution of the problem under the United 
Nations.
21* This statement was made by the United Kingdom I'oreign Office 
on 8 November 1956* Commonwealth Survey. Vol.2., No.25*,
15 November 1956, p.9^*
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IltHigaryi
The Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Crisis were going on simultaneously in 
1956» It is Instructive to consider Hungary briefly and to see the simi­
larities and differences, if any, in Pakistan's policy, Suez being a colonial 
issue and Hungary being a Cold War issue.
On 24 October, 1956, fighting broke out in Budapest and during that and the
following days there were frequent clashes between what were at that stage
officially described as "counter-revolutionary gangs" and the Hungarian
22
Government and Soviet Forces," On the same day, at an emergency meeting 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Mr.
Imre Nagy, who had been dismissed in April 1955? after having been condemned 
for "rightist deviations", was asked to resume office as Prime Minister*
On 26 October, it had become clear that the rising was widespread throughout 
the country. There were reported to have been several hundred casualties 
in Parliament Square, Budapest, when Soviet tanks fired at an Unarmed Crowd.
The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France, requested
a meeting of the Security Council under Article 54 of the United Nations 
25Charter. The letter from three Governments to the President of the
Security Council cited the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947? of which they and 
the Soviet Government were signatories, and which contained provisions for 
the maintenance of human rights and fundamental freedom in Hungary,
The/
22. At that time, two Soviet Army divisions and two Soviet Air Force 
divisions were stationed in Hungary.
25. Article 54 of the United Nations Charter provides that the Security 
Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might 
lead to International friction or give rise to a dispute, in order 
to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of International peace and 
security.
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The Security Council met on 28 October 1956 to consider the situation 
by "the action of foreign military forces in Hungary in violently re­
pressing the rights of the Hungarian people". The agenda was adopted 
by 9 votes to 1 (U,S,S.R,) with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia), A Soviet 
proposal to defer the consideration of the question for a few days was 
defeated by the same majority.
On 4 November, the Security Council voted on a resolution calling on 
the Soviet Union to withdraw all its forces without delay from Hungarian 
territory. This was vetoed by the Soviet Union. A further resolution, 
calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, under 
the 'Uniting for Peace* resolution was passed by 10 votes to 1 (U.S.S.R,); 
since this resolution was procedural, the veto did not operate.
The Assembly took the matter up later the same day. The U.S.S.R. repre­
sentative opposed the inclusion of the item 'The situation in Hungary' in 
the Agenda, on the grounds of Article 2(7) of the Charter, considering it 
a matter of domestic jurisdiction. He declared î
" By trying, in contravention of the Charter, to 
involve the General Assembly in a discussion of 
the situation in Hungary, the United Kingdom 
and France, together with the United States, are 
attempting to gain time and to enable the British- 
French forces to settle account with the Egyptian 
people,
The United States submitted a draft resolution by which the Assembly would: 
Condemn 'the use of Soviet Military Forces to suppress the efforts of the 
Hungarian people to reassert their rights'; and (l) would call on the 
U.S.S.R. to desist forthwith from armed attack on the peoples of Hungary 
and/
24" G.A.O.R.. 2nd Emergency Special Session, 564th Plenary Meeting,
4 November, 1956, p.2.
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and from any form of intervention; (2) request the Secretary-General to 
investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary» to 
observe it, 'through representatives named by him* and to report to the 
Assembly; (5) call on the Hungarian and Soviet Governments to allow 
United Nations observers to enter Hungary and to travel freely. The draft 
resolution was adopted by 50 votes to 8, with 15 abstentions. Pakistan 
voted in favour of the resolution.
The Pakistan Prime Minister appealed to the Soviet Government, on 5 November, 
to desist from using force and to let the people of Hungary decide for them­
selves, without coercion, the form of government they wished to establish in
26their country.
On 9th November, 1956, three resolutions on Hungary were adopted by the 
emergency special session of the General Assembly. The first, submitted 
by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru, was adopted by 48 votes to 11 
(the Soviet bloc, India and Yugoslavia), with 16 abstentions (Afghanistan, 
Austria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, Haiti, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen). In this resolution 
the Assembly noted 'with deep concern* that the provisions of the resolution 
of 4th November had not yet been carried out, and that the violent repression 
by the Soviet Forces on Hungarian efforts to achieve freedom and independence 
continued; again called on the Soviet Government to withdraw its Forces 
from Hungary without delay; and expressed the view that free election should 
be held in Hungary under United Nations auspices. The representative of 
Pakistan, while spealting in support of the resolution, said that 'his 
country/
25. Resolution 1004(E8-ll), 4 November, 1956, CAssembly document A/5286). 
The votes against were those of the Soviet bloc States except Hungary 
which did not participate in voting* The abstaining States were 
Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia.
26. Commonwealth Survey. Vol.2., No.24., 27 November, 1956, p.1025.
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country had not joined in sponsoring the draft resolution to oblige its 
friends or to spite others, but out of respect for certain principles which 
were more sacred than any earthly friendship or animosities, the principles 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and affirmed in the Bandung declar­
ation. '
The second resolution adopted by the Assembly by a vote of 68 to 0, with 
7 abstentions, was submitted by Austria, called for relief measures,
Pakistan voted in favour.
The third resolution submitted by the United States irras adopted by 55 votes 
to 9 (the Soviet bloc), with 15 abstentions. By this, the Assembly called 
on the U.S.S.R. to cease interference in the relief work; and called on 
the United Nations High Commission for refugees to malce emergency assistance 
arrangements for the refugees who were leaving Hungary.
Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution. India, not only abstained, 
on the American draft resolution, but also, tlirough an amendment, co­
sponsored with Indonesia and Ceylon, sought to modify the American draft 
resolution in such a way as to remove from it all words attaching blame on 
the Soviet Union, with respect to the situation in Hungary. Mr. Krishna 
Menon of India told the Assembly that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from 
Budapest as soon as order was restored.
Commenting on this, the representative of Cuba said, 'he was surprised to
find that the representative of India should so enthusiastically defend the
28Soviet Union's part in Hungary.* lie took a grave view of the thesis 
expounded/
27* G.A.O.R.. 2nd I&nergency Special Session, 570th Plenary Meeting,
9th November, 1956, p.48»
28. Ibid.
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expounded by India that what the Soviet Union had done in Hungary was
legal and proper and "that the United Nations must not react when confronted
with an invasion launched by a Member State which by force, violence and the
use of its army, imposes a Government which does not reflect the wishes of 
29the population."
On 12 November 1956, the Secretary-General set up two groups, one for 
'investigation* and one for 'observation* as envisaged in the Assembly's 
resolution of 4 November, and on the following day he asked the Hungarian 
Government to reconsider its view about United Nations observers. This 
brought no result, despite further exchanges in which an offer by the Secretai 
General to go to Budapest was countered by a Hungarian suggestion for a 
meeting with him in Rome.
On 21 November, 1956, the General Assembly at its 11th regular Session, 
adopted three further resolutions on the situation in Hungary. The first 
resolution proposed by Cuba and amended by El Salvador, was adopted by 55 
votes to 10 (the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia), with 14 abstentions (Afghanis­
tan, Finland, India, Indonesia, and the Arab States). In this resolution, 
the Assembly, 'having received information that the Soviet army of occupa­
tion in Hungary is forcibly deporting Hungarian men, women and children from 
their homes to places outside Hungary*, recalled the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention and the Peace Treaty with 
Hungary, renewed its call for the prompt withdra,wal of Soviet forces and the 
dispatch of United Nations observers to Hungary, and urged the Soviet and 
Hungarian authorities to cease the deportations and retin?n those already 
deported.
In the second resolution, submitted by Ceylon, India and Indonesia, and 
adopted by 57 votes to 8 (Soviet bloc except Poland), with 14 abstentions, 
(the'^
29. IMd, pp.72, 75.
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the Assembly noted that some States had affirmed, and others had denied 
that deportation had taken place, and urged Hungary to admit United 
Nations observers as requested by the Secretary-General.
The Third resolution, sponsored by iirgentina, Belgium, Denmark and the 
United States was adopted by 69 votes to 2 (Hungary and Romania), with 
8 abstentions (the rest of the Soviet bloc and Sudan). This dealt with 
aid for the refugees, and requested the Secretary-General and the United 
Nations High Commission for Refugees to malce immediate appeals to Govern­
ments and non-governmental agencies. Pakistan supported the three 
resolutions.
On 50 November the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly that
he had *no information .••••• concerning steps taken in order to establish
compliance with the decisions of the General Assembly which refer to a with-
50drawal of troops or related political matters*.^ The Secretary-General 
also stated that no permission had been given by the Hungarian Government 
for observers to enter Hungary.
On 3 December, the General Assembly continued discussions of the question. 
It had before it a draft resolution submitted jointly by Argentina, 
Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Norv/ay, Pakistan, Sweden, Thailand and the United States. By 
this the Assembly woulds reiterate its call to the U.S.S.R. Government 
and the Hungarian authorities to comply with its resolutions and to permit 
United Nations observers to enter Hungary to report on the situation; 
request the U.S.S.R. Government ànd the Hungarian authorities to communi­
cate not later than 7 December their consent to receive those observers; 
recommend/
50. G.A.O.R., 11th Session, Annexes 1 Agenda item 67, p.13»
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recommend that in the meantime the Secretary-General arrange for the 
despatch of observers to Hungary; and request all Members to assist a.nd 
co-operate with the Secretary-General *s representatives.
Speaking in support of it, the representative of Pakistan said*
" In co-sponsoring this draft resolution, our
delegation had been motivated by one desire
alone, namely to establish the authority of the
United Nations, V/e feel that this Organisation,
by allowing its decisions to be flouted or ignored
with equanimity in the past, has reached a stage
when its own effective existence is in jeopardy.
Its efficacy in the future depends on the manner
in which it can handle the questions that are now
51engaging oux’ attention.
The draft resolution was adopted by 54 votes to 10 (the Soviet bloc and 
Yugoslavia), with 14 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt,
Finland, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
^imisia and Yemen),
The United Nations General Assembly adopted, on 12 December, another 
resolution on the situation in Hungary, 'Die joint amendments, submitted 
by Ceylon, India and Indonesia were rejected. The voting on the resolution 
which was sponsored by 20 countries including Pakistan, was 55 iii favour to 
8 against (the Soviet bloc), with 13 abstentions including India, as 
resolution 113l(Xl),
After a report by the Secretary-General on 5 January 1957» the General 
Assembly again discussed the Hungarian question on 9th and 10th January,
A draft resolution submitted by 24-powers including Pakistan, asked for the 
establishment of a Special Committee, composed of represedatives of 
Australia /
31. G.A.O.R,B 11th Session, 606th Plenary Meeting, 4 December, 1956, 
p.492,
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Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia, and Uruguay, to report to the Assembly 
after investigation and observation in Hungary, call upon the Governments 
of U.S.8,Ho and Hungary to co-operate with the Special Committee; request 
Member States to assist the Committee; and request the Secretary-General to 
continue to take initiatives which he deemed helpful in relation to the 
Hungarian problem. This was adopted by a vote of 59 to 8, with 10 absten­
tions, on 10 January 1957as resolution 1132 (Xl)* On 11th January, the 
Hungarian Government in a note verbale to the Secretary General, protested 
most strongly against the 24-power resolution declaring that it represented 
an unexpected gross interference into Hungarian domestic affairs* The 
note concluded that no Committee of any kind had the right to conduct 
investigation into the so-called Hungarian question* It demanded that the 
question be deleted from the agenda of the Assembly.
A comparison of the Hues and the Hungarian question presents an interesting 
contrast of policies followed by some of the United Nations members. It 
shows how the States follow opposite policies which suit their national 
interests even on identical questions* The best examples which can be 
quoted in the case of Suez and Hxuigary are those of the Soviet Union and 
India* The Soviet Union, which had been so vociferous in condemning im­
perialist aggression against Egypt, was now caught in a similar position* 
The United States, which had offended its principal sdlies (Britain and 
France) and its protege Israel for the aggressive action in Suez, led them 
and others in Soviet condemnation on Hungary* The United States delegate 
Henxy Cabot Lodge, speaking on including the Hungarian question in the 
agenda said*
" After several days of ominous reports, the 
situation in Hungaiy has become all too clear.
What is revealed is the sickening picture of 
duplicity and double-dealing. Idaile this 
wholesale/
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wholesale brutality by the Soviet Government 
was being perpetrated, the Soviet representative 
here in this hall was praising peace and non- 
aggpression and raising his hands in horror against 
bloodshed in the Middle East.
The position of India had been somewhat similar; it had been a champion 
for the cause of Egypt and in condemning the aggressor but in the case of 
Hungary it either voted against or abstained on the resolutions which 
branded the Soviet Union as an aggressor. Pandit Nehru, the preacher of 
peace and non-alignment never uttered a word which could have displeased 
the Soviet Union. In a statement in Delhi on I4 November, 1956» the only 
thing he mentioned was that "Soviet forces should be withdrawn from Hungary 
speedily, and the Hungarian people (be) left free to decide their otm 
future
Ross N. Derkes has explained this paradox in Nehru* s attitude when he 
stated 8
" India's reaction to the Anglo-French Intervention 
in the Suez, which so unfortunately occurred at 
the same time, emptied the well of its moral indig­
nation. "
At the same time, he observes, "certainly Nehru's
public concern over Hungary was as noticeably tardy
'64as his cry of alarm over E^ypt was prompt. "
India's failure to condemn the Soviet Union as aggressor and its lack of 
support for the United Nations resolution on Hungary could not be attributed 
to/
52. G.A.O.R., 2nd Eraergency Special Session, 564th Plenary Meeting,
4 November, 1956, p.5*
55» Commonwealth Survey. Toi,2., No.24», 2? November 1956, p.1025*
54* Ross N. Derkes, and M.S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of India. (California- 
Stanford University Press/London; Oxford University Press, 1958), 
p.48.
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to her non-aligned policy# The real reason for its abstention on the 
United Nations resolution on Hungary had been to secure her own position, 
because the resolution asked for free election under the United Nations to 
which India did not like to consent, since it had opposed similar election 
in Kashmir. Further, India's unwillingness to oondeim the Soviet Union 
as an aggressor had been motivated by her national interest, because it did 
not like to displease the Soviet Union, whose support it needed on Kashmir#
As Russel Brines has mentioned;
"During the serious controversy over the Hungarian 
revolution, India had at first supported the 
Soviet bloc in opposing United Nations interference, 
but after November 15» 1956, Nehru had consistently 
called for the removal of Soviet troops. Other 
differences developed between Nehru and the Kremlin 
during the next year. The Soviet leaders sharply 
reminded Nehru of Kashmir, among other problems on 
which he sought Soviet support* "
Brines further states that Soviet Union's decision to avoid the veto on
the Security Council's resolution on Kashmir in 1957? "e.t a decisive moment
36for India, seemed to be disciplinary"^ action against India's Hungarian 
policy.
This belief - that India avoided to talce a clear cut position on the 
Hungarian question - had also been confirmed by Michael Brecher, who in 
his sympathetic interpretation of India's foreign policy, admits; "it is 
inevitable that Indian foreign policy should be influenced by the struggle 
for Kashmir". India's objection at the United Nations to the proposal to 
send/
35» Russel Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict. (London; Pall Mall Press, 
1968), pp.152-155.
360 Ibid.
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send United Nations Observers to Hungary and for a United Nations controlled 
election in Hungary was "because of the precedent it would have created for 
Kashmir
On the other hand, Pakistan's position on the questions of Suez and liungar;;^  
had been similar* It had condemned the aggressors in both the cases without 
any consideration for fear or favour. Pakistan's policy had been indepen­
dent and impartial and in conformity with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. This was declared by the representative of Pakistan in 
the course of supporting a United Nations resolution on Hungary. He said 
that Î
" ilia country had not joined in sponsoring the draft 
resolution to oblige its friends or to spite others, 
but out of respect for certain principles which were 
more sacred than any earthly friendship or animosi­
ties, the principles enshrined in the United Nations
■-^8
Charter and affirmed in the Bandung declaration. ""
Some observers of Pakistan's foreign policy might attribute Pal-cistan's 
outright support on the Hungarian issue to the United States influence; 
because Pakistan's position seems to be more close to the United States 
on this question, as compared with other Afro-Asians. This, of course, 
cannot be negated that in 1956 the relations between Pakistan and the United 
States were the closest, yet the real reason in supporting the United 
Nations measures on Hungary was a different one. As already mentioned 
in discussion, on the question of Suez, Pakistan's decision to support the 
United Nations resolution had been motivated because of its policy objective 
on Kashmir; therefore, Palciotan's support to Hungary was in complete accord 
though incidentally - with Pakistan's foreign policy. Thus, it was 
more/
37. Michael Brecher, India's Foreign Policy s An Interpretation, (New 
York: Institute of PhcificTrelations, 1957,) P.19.--------
38# G.A.O.H.. 2nd Emergency Special Session, 570th Plenary Meeting, 9th
November, 1956, p.48#
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more in Irakis tan's national interest to support the United Nations measures 
in Hungary than to the influence of United States aid, as it was in India's 
national interest not to support the United Nations resolution. It is an 
admitted fact that national interest is always foremost to any other interest 
lest the interest of a friend*
In comparing Pakistan's policy with India, on this issue, it can he con­
cluded that the moral fibre of Pakistan's polioy-malcers had been more strong 
and more consistent with International Law and morality than Pandit Nehru's 
so-called non-aligned policy of peace*
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
Pcilcistan has taken an active part in the United Nations activities, 
especially when one considers that the name " Paicistan " meant 
nothing to most of the world twenty years ago.
Of the Asian nations , many have had either national or ethnic, or
at the very least, geographic identity for much longer periods than
Pakistan, This new nation was lacking all these essentials, as
ex-president Ayuh Khan has pointed out ;
"Our nationalism was based more on an idea 
than any territorial definition. Ideo­
logically, we were Muslims; territorially, 
we happened to be Indians; and parochially 
we were a conglomeration of at least eleven 
smaller provincial loyalties.
Because of its strategic location in South East Asia, and the
Middle East, Palcistan has been constantly affected, by the Great
Power rivalries. In the words of Ayub Khan, to deal with them
2
" would be like walking on a triangular tightrope."
On the admission of new Members, Pakistan's policy can be seen as 
independent. This has been mainly due to the non-aligned policy 
which she followed from 1947 to 1952. In this period the 
question of admission of Members had been a subject of much acrimoni­
ous debate due to the intensity of the Gold War. In this Cold War 
confrontation, Pakistan had neither sided with the United States 
nor/
1. Mohammed Ayub Khan, " Palcistan Perspective ", in Foreign Affairs, 
July I960, p.549.
2. Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters, (London; Oxford University 
Press, 1968), p.119*
nor with the Soviet Union. She adopted an independent position 
which was in complete confirmity with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter. She opposed the move by Australia and some other 
Western Powers in the I00th meeting of the First Committe on 8th Nov­
ember 1947 for a liberal interpretation of Articles 3-— 6 and 27 of the 
Charter, pertaining to Membership, as an easy way out of the impasse.
At the same time, Pakistan expressed its opposition to the Soviet policy 
of " Horse trading " on the admission of new Members.
Time and again Palcistan has advocated the ‘Universality’ of the 
Organisation and has consistantly voted for the admission of new Members. 
The only exception was the admission of Israel. Israel’s failure 
to implement the United Nations Resolution of partition of Palestine 
e.g., no 181(11) of 29th November,1947? was the ostensible reason for 
Pakistan's opposition. This was supplemented by Pakistan's ideological 
desire to support the cause of the Muslims, e.g.,in her opposition to 
the creation of the State of Israel.
Pakistan, being conscious of ' East-West tension, emphasized the 
importance of the role which the small States can play as a stabilisi­
ng force for the achievement of peace and the welfare of mankind.
On the question of the representation of China, Pakistan's position 
has 'been based upon its policy of enlightened self-interest. In the 
begining - from 1950 to 1952 - Pakistan supported the resolutions 
seating the Government of the People's Republic of China in the United 
Nations in place of the Nationalist Government of China. Pakistan's 
attitude in this period was influenced by her non-aligned policy and 
its/
its feeling as an Asian State. But after 1953 Pakistan's policy on
this question has been entirely influenced by her power relations
with India.
From 1953 to 1956 and 1958 to I960 Palcistan adopted a different attitu­
de on the question of the representation of China in the United Nations 
and voted for the United States sponsored resolutions for postponing
discussion on the question.
There is a common belief that Palcistan adopted the United States line 
as a result of U.S. aid and because of Pakistan's membership of Western 
Military Pacts.At. first.sight,this interpretation seems to be correct, 
but a close examination of the events reveals that Pakistan had not 
followed the United States so far as any resolution for admitting the 
People's Republic of China had been presented in the United Nations,
In fact , Pakistan adopted a policy of " realpolitik " with regard to 
the United States and pursued a policy influenced by long term conside­
rations towards the People's Republic of China.
The circumstances under which the United States—Pakistan alliance took 
place clearly show that this was an"alliance of convenience" based 
upon divergent political objectives. For the United States, the alliance 
was an anti-Communist measure. For Pakistan, it was an American / 
guarantee of an entirely different nature. To Pakistan, the enemy was 
neither Russia nor China; it was India. Moreover, Pakistan's voting for 
the United States sponsored resolutions from 1953 to 1956 and I95& to 
i960 signified support for postponing discussion of the question. This 
âid  ^not represent Pakistan's opposition to the admission of Communist 
China/
icy
China to the United Nations, In addition, Pakistan did not make speeches 
supporting the United States position on the question of Chinese represen­
tation when she voted for the U.S. resolution in the General Assembly,
There is some evidence that Pakistan's policy was based on an understa­
nding with the People's Republic of China to vote for the United States 
resolutions and procure more and more aid. This is confirmed by the 
fact that good relations between Palcistan and China continue^to develop 
and China never showed any resentment of Pakistan's attitude. In 
contrast to India and Russia's bitter denunciation of Pakistan's 
Western alignment in I954-1955, the Chinese accepted it mildly, China, 
moreover, gave an assurance of friendship to Pakistan after the Bandung 
Conference in 1955» As Professor Rushbrook Williams has revealed;
" Following the Bandrnxg Conference,.....
Karachi received - as I have been assured 
on unimpeachable authority - a private 
message from Peking. The Chinese people's 
Government assured the Government of Pakistan ' 
that there was no conceivable clash of interest 
between the two countries which could imperil 
their friendly relations; but this did not apply 
to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite 
conflict of interests could be expected in the
3near future.
In 1956, Chou En-lai announced on his visit to Palcistan " that the 
difference between the political systems of Pakistan and China and 
the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the 
strengthening of friendship between their two countries."
In 1959, Peking accepted, without any protest, Ayub Khan's proposed 
joint defence agreement with India, Moreover, the official reason 
given/
3, L.F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, (London; Faber 3c 
Faber, 1962), p,I20.
4* Dawn (Karachi), 25 December, 1956.
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given by Pakistan for not voting against the United States resolutions 
on the representation of China also support the belief of Pak- Chinese, 
understanding. In the words of Werner Levi;
"...the (Pakistan) Government wanted to defer 
a decision on the representation of Commu­
nist China until this change was more nearly
5unanimously favoured."
The U.S. aid has not influenced Pakistan's attitude on the question 
of the representation of China. Although the security consideration 
might be taken as a factor of Pakistan's U.S. support in the early 
fifties , it is clear that Palcistan did not openly support the 
U.S. position, it has rather supported the Communist claim publicly 
in the later years. For example, during his visit to the United States 
in 1961, President Ayub Khan publicly stated that "it was only fair to 
allow the People's Republic of China to occupy her legitimate position 
in the United Nations,This stateforward declaration received a sharp 
criticism in the American press which felt that being a guest in their 
country the Pakistani President should not have openly gone against 
the American position.
1
In 1961, when Pakistan found that U.S. policy was going against her
national interest, she moved the steering of her policy to the north
by turning "to Nehru's disastrous tactic of wooing Peking for use
7against the nearest adversary."
At the same time, Pakistan reciprocated to the United States by the 
same/
5. Werner Levi, "Pakistan, The Soviet Union and China", in Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 35, 1962, p.219*
6. Mohammed Ayub Khan, Op.cit.,p.l62.
7. Russel Brines, Indo-Pakistani Conflict, (London: Pall Mall press,
1968),p.441.
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samG CliurchiIlian formula which she applied to India in Iyo2, 
namely that " the enemy of ny enemy is my friendkl
Palcistan's instant support of China following American supporl of 
India during the Sino-Indian hostilities of ip62, also provide 
evidence of Sino-Pak understanding. This proved Mchelling'c 
dictuiBy with respect to United State s-Pa.lc 1st an. relations that ;
" In bargains of mutual convenience, especially 
where there is not a pretence at the sharing
of fundamental values between the parties, it
is the letter rather than the spirit of the
bargain that counts, and loyalty to partne.rs 
is involved only slightly, if at all.
196I, Palcistan has actively supported Communist China's admiss­
ion to the United Nations by sponsoring or co-sponsoring draft 
resolutions. Finally, it seems that Pakistan's China policy has 
been dictated by the state of Sino-Indian and Indo- Americaxn relations..
It is now clear that Palcistan's commitment to the United States has
only been partial and lasted only so long as it was expected to 
benefit her national interest. What has appeared to the Western 
observer as Pakistan's solid commitment to the West, has been nothing 
more to Pakistanis than the application of a i’undamentally independent 
policy, reflecting the changing needs of the nation and the changing 
conditions of International relations.
On the question of Algerian self-determination, Pakistan's policy in 
the United Nations was mainly guided by her feeling for the Afro-Asian 
nations/
8. Thomas C, Schelling, 'American Aid and Economic Development; Somo
Critical Issues', International Stability and ^'’Ogresfs 2_JJ]pit_ed. State: 
Interests and Instruments, fNew York; The American Assembly, lûéb;.
p.140.
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nations, based upon her own colonial experience and the fact that 
the people of Algeria are Muslims, Pakistan's support of the 
right of self-determination for all the people under colonial rule 
has been in accordance with Pakistan's stated policy on colonialism, 
namely that all people struggling to be free from the yoke of colonial 
rule should be helped.
On the issue of peace-keeping in Suez and Hungary Palcistan adopted a 
policy in confirraity with the provision of the United Nations Charter, 
She condemned the aggressor in Korea and at Suez, as well as in Hungary 
and Congo, without being influenced by cold war rivalries. Sponsoring 
the resolution which condemned the Soviet intervention in Hungary the 
the representative of Pakistan made it clear that:
" his country had not joined in sponsoring 
the draft resolution to oblige its friends 
or to spite others, but out of respect for 
certain principles which were more sacred 
than any earthly friendship or animosities, 
the principles enshrined in the United Nations
9
Charter and affirmed in the Bandung declaration."
This approach of Pakistan has also been guided by her o\m objectives 
of foreign policy; it had condemned the Government of India for a 
similar aggi‘ession in Kashmir.
As it had been in India's interest not to support the United Nations 
resolution on Hungary - which asked for free elections under United 
Nations supervision and the withdrawal of the aggressor's armed forces, 
which/
9» G.A.O.R.,2nd Emergency Special Session, 570th Plenary Meeting,
9 November 1956, p.48.
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which was similar to the United Nations resolution on Kashmir* - 
conversely, it had been in Pakistan's interest to support the 
United Nations resolution on Hungary.
In this respect Pakistan's record had been more consistent than that 
of India, especially with regard to Pakistan's willingness to condemn 
clear cases of military aggression. Palcistan condemned the aggressions 
in Korea, Suez, Hungary and Congo. India condemned the aggressor 
in Suez and Congo but did not do so in the cases of Korea and 
Hungary.
Finally, to sum it up, the position taken by Pakistan's represent­
atives in the United Nations had been almost consistent with her 
stated principles of policy, that is to uphold the United Nations 
Charter and safeguard her national interest.
On Cold Har issues, Pakistan often differed with the other Afro-Asians 
on matters of interpretation and policy. On Colonial questions 
Palcistan* s position was substantially the same as that of other 
Afro-Asian States, except for minor points of timing and emphasis.
On Peace-Keeping Pakistan's position was more forthright than that 
of many of the Afro-Asian States.
During this span of twenty years Pakistan learned a great deal because 
of her alignment with the United States. An examination of her position 
in the world led to disappointing conclusions. Pakistan's membership 
of SEATO and CENTO brought criticism from the Asian and Arab world 
and hostility from the Communist bloc minus China, without providing 
compensating security. On Kashmir Pakistan's allies remained neutral 
whereas the Soviet Union openly sided with India.
Pakistanis/
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Pakistanis feel that the price paid for alliances with the Rest 
have been too high for the benefits received.
In view of this, a trend for reorientation of Palcistan*s foreign 
policy started in the beginning of the sixties, in the shape of 
" selective commitments to the West with better relations with the 
Communist bloc," But the real change towards neutralism took place 
after the war with India in 1965. This provided another oppertunity 
to measure the degree.of support from Pakistan's allies and friends.
The United States, although bound by treaty commitments, showed an 
unsympathetic neutral attitude and imposed an economic embargo on 
Pakistan's SEilTO and CENTO partners. The Soviet Union's attitude was also 
neutral and because of her global interests , she sought to end the 
conflict as-early as possible. In such a situation China's support 
was natural. The position taken by the three Great Powers was 
determined neither by their treaty relations nor by the extent of 
Pakistan's or India's identification with them but by their global 
policy objectives.
After these experiences, Pakistan came to the conclusion that in a 
situation of real trouble, no other state would come to her rescue 
and it is the Pakistanis who would have to defend the country alone.
Thus, a foreign policy based upon a rational and pragmatic approach 
was adopted. The objective was to establish normal relations with the 
Great and Global Powers, without antagonising any one of them, on a 
bilateral basis, with the clear understanding that the nature and 
complexion of the bilateral relations should be such as to promote 
their mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate 
interests/
I95
interests of third parties.
Thus a neutral policy based upon Pakistan's enlightened self-interest 
has been adopted to develops good relations with the Soviet Union, 
the United States and China, but without pre-conditions and on the 
basis .of non-interference. The realization of these objectives would 
secure Palcistan's position vis-a-vis India and would provide the 
oppertunity for Pakistan to play a positive role in the world.
lyb
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